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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the research 
Over recent decades, inter-firm transactions have been considered to be 
indefinably complex and dynamic due to fiercely transformed ways of conducting 
business, governance, therefore, is becoming increasingly uncertain. The pressure 
to develop and sustain a competitive edge, as well as face turbulence in relation to 
highly segmented demands, intensive global competition and uncertainty, 
emphasizes how firms need to reconsider their strategic choices throughout the 
value chain and implement effective ways of organizing buyer-supplier operations 
(Hanvanich, Miller, Richards & Cavusgil, 2003; Silva, Bradley & Sousa, 2012). 
Similarly, the scarcity of absolute resources is driving firms towards production 
and distribution hazards effecting their business performance, such that the use of 
all available resources effectively becomes the most significant tasks for firms 
(Modi & Mabert, 2007). These conditions pose a variety of challenges to a firm’s 
supply chain operations. However, these challenges can also be perceived as 
opportunities in developing buyer-supplier relationships by employing different 
governance approaches. Therefore, firms have realized the importance of these 
relationships, not only to identify the optimized ways to best utilize their resources 
in managing successful transactions, but also to foster joint performance and long-
term exchange (Kremic et al., 2006). Thus, research on inter-firm relationship 
governance has received significant attention in the operations, inter-firm 
governance and supply management literature, reflecting the value of these 
relationships influencing business performance (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Terpend, Tyler, Krause & Handfield, 2008; Dyer & Chu, 
2011; Liu, Luo & Liu, 2009; Luo, Liu, Yang, Maksimov & Hou, 2015; Liu, Luo, et 
al., 2017).  
However, transaction costs and inter-firm conflicts are commonly seen as 
potential obstacles to cooperation development, relationship performance and 
commitment. The uncertainty experienced by relationship partners concerning 
the expectations of their counterpart’s cooperative behaviour in conflicts and 
negotiations is an inevitable dilemma (Liu et al., 2009). The potential negative 
impact of these relationship disputes and failures overshadow the aggregate effects 
of relationship behaviours (Palmatier, Dant, Grewal & Evans, 2006). Hence, 
several studies have demonstrated high rates of relationship disputes and failures 
(e.g., Bamford, Ernst & Gubini, 2004; Dant & Schul, 1992; Jap & Anderson, 2003). 
Key reasons for these high failures are fragmentary contracts, distrust, asymmetric 
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information-sharing and interdependence, different goals and interests, and 
unforeseen market changes, which may act as negative forces in the collaboration, 
resulting in higher transaction costs, lower relationship commitment and a 
deterioration in the relationship (Pajunen & Fang, 2013). Governing such buyer-
supplier relationships effectively constitutes a panacea for these failures, as well as 
helping to achieve superior outcomes and stability (Luo et al., 2015; Liu et al., 
2009; Corsten, Gruen & Peyinghaus, 2011). Systematic relationship governance 
elucidates the efficient design of any repeated economic exchange structure where 
both relationship partners strive to collaborate and are fully devoted to fulfilling 
common business objectives (Luo et al., 2015; Liu, Luo et al., 2017). Therefore, 
firms are eager to improve relationship performance by employing such an 
effective collaborative governance structure (Li, Humphreys, Yeung & Cheng, 
2012; Yeung, Zhou, Yeung & Cheng, 2012; He, Ghobadian & Gallear, 2013; Yeung, 
Lee, Yeung & Cheng, 2013), instead of exposing relationship vulnerabilities (Suh 
& Houston, 2010). Building on TCE and SET, governance structures consist of 
interrelated supplier development (SD) strategies (Krause, Scannell & Calantone, 
2000), relationship governance mechanisms (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Liu et al., 
2009; Liu, Li, Shi & Liu, 2017) and conflict resolution strategies (CRS) (Yang, Gao, 
Li, Shen & Zheng, 2017; Lee, Shin, Haney, Kang, Li & Ko, 2017; Bai, Sheng & Li, 
2016).  
Recent seminal studies on buyer-supplier relationship performance have also 
called for systematic research regarding the varying roles of relationship 
governance and development mechanisms in the context of performance (e.g., Liu 
et al., 2009; Li, Xie, Teo & Peng, 2010). For example, meta-analysis studies 
conducted on supply chain management and integration link these mechanisms 
positively with a firm’s performance (e.g., Leuschner, Rogers & Charvet, 2013; 
Zimmermann & Foerstl, 2014). Similarly, several scholars suggest relationship 
control factors, i.e., asset-specific investments, contracts, relational norms and 
effective communication in information-sharing, as key elements of relationship 
performance (e.g., Liu et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Corsten et al., 2011). In addition, 
several studies (e.g., White, Joplin & Salama, 2007; Lin & Wang, 2002) suggest 
that future research should investigate the role of governance mechanisms and 
CRS in order to provide a comprehensive picture of conflict resolution processes. 
Similarly, Le Nguyen, Larimo, and Ali (2016) maintain that further study must 
analyse the link between CRS and relationship performance. Considering these 
calls for systematic research, this dissertation focuses on aligning and combining 
all the missing blocks and nodes that represent a complete picture of managing 
successful buyer-supplier relationships. 
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1.2 Research gaps 
To date, literature has probed inter-firm performance in numerous ways, but this 
diversity of approaches reflects an apparent lack of consensus about what 
effectively explains the management of these relationships. Particularly, this 
dissertation identifies the following research gaps in the literature. First, although 
there is much explanation in the literature regarding the significance of SD as an 
integrated means of sustaining competitive advantage and enhancing suppliers’ 
capabilities (Modi & Mabert, 2007; Burt, Dobler & Starling, 2003), and their 
strategic role in the value chain (Kwon, Joo & Hong, 2010), prior studies have fail 
to recognize the link between SD strategies and buyer-supplier relationship 
development. Furthermore, theoretical and empirical evidence concerning the 
process of SD approaches to inter-firm relationship development is extremely 
fragmented, as it is individually focused and offers limited understanding 
(Sillanpää et al., 2015; Shahzad et al., 2016). Therefore, an empirically validated 
comprehensive framework, which can provide rich explanations for systematic SD 
strategies and their impact on inter-firm performance outcomes, is needed (Li et 
al., 2012).   
Second, because buyer-supplier relationships are loosely coupled structures, 
where two relationship partners, having separate objectives, cooperate on supply 
chain activities (Liu, Huang, Luo & Zhao, 2012), an understanding of transactional 
and relational governance mechanisms in these inter-firm boundary-spanning 
decisions and their influence on relationship performance is important in 
managing successful relationships. Although research on relationship governance 
has highlighted the effectiveness of both transactional and relational governance 
mechanisms, it remains limited in the context of opportunism mitigation (e.g., Liu 
et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2015) and relationship quality (e.g., Liu, Li & Zhang, 2010). 
Further, several studies have presented two competing views of the nature of the 
relationship (complementarity and/or substitution) between transactional and 
relational governance mechanisms, and found conflicting results on whether these 
mechanisms act in a complementary (Van der Valk, Sumo, Dul & Schroeder, 2016; 
Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Liu et al., 2009) or as substitutes (Wuyts & Geyskens, 
2005; Li et al., 2010). On the other hand, the relative effectiveness of these 
mechanisms is characterized by a nuanced understanding of different transaction 
objectives driving governance factors, which is missing in the literature. Different 
governance mechanisms are required for different transaction objectives in 
governing relationship exchange. A better understanding of relationship outcomes 
and collaboration goals should drive managers to analyse which governance 
mechanism is more crucial for a particular task (Yang, Zhao, Yeung & Liu, 2016). 
Thus, the varying roles of transactional and relational governance mechanisms 
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(Yang et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2009) in achieving cost advantage and commitment 
have yet to be addressed. Such mixed evidence, as well as conflicting views about 
the complementary-substitutive perspective and the relative effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms, therefore necessitates further investigation into the 
phenomenon. This prompts the question about whether these governance 
mechanisms function as complementary and/or substitutes, and whether they are 
relatively more effective in minimizing ex-post transaction costs and fostering 
relationship commitment.      
Third, several studies have demonstrated that firms differ in their choices of 
conflict resolution approaches (e.g., Wade-Benzoni, Hoffman, Thompson, Moore, 
Gillespie & Bazerman, 2002); managers, therefore, need to identify the relative 
governance factors when dealing with emerging inter-firm disagreements (Lin & 
Germain, 1998). Although relatively few recent studies have recognized the 
significance of inter-firm conflict, the focus has remained mainly on the role of 
contractual or negotiated incentives in the process of managing conflicts, whether 
functional or dysfunctional (Chang & Gotcher, 2010; Cheng & Sheu, 2012; Ndubisi, 
2011), or constructive or destructive (Li, Liu & Liu, 2011). Further, prior research 
on conflict resolution process has centred on the context of international joint 
ventures (Le Nguyen et al., 2016; Lu, 2006; Lin & Wang, 2002; Lin & Germain, 
1998), while the applicability of the choice of CRS from a buyer-supplier 
perspective is unidentified. Although the potential impact of trust (Yang et al., 
2017; Ndubisi, 2011) and contracts (Yang et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2016; Bai et al., 
2016; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012) on conflict management appears in the 
literature, the choice of CRS, as influenced by relationship governance 
mechanisms (i.e., transactional and relational), is under-examined (Yang et al., 
2017). In addition, relationship performance is based on established inter-firm 
governance structures and internal conflict resolution through effective strategies. 
Prior research has presented no significant evidence of such variant forms of 
relationship performance involving effective strategies used in emerging conflicts 
(Le Nguyen et al., 2016), meaning that additional empirical investigations 
regarding the relationship between governance mechanisms, CRS and relationship 
performance are needed. Therefore, these aspects of governance mechanisms and 
CRS need to be further analysed, while this dissertation argues that firms should 
rely on governance mechanisms to diminish conflicts in order to encourage better 
relationship performance (Lumineau & Quelin, 2012). 
Although prior literature has presented potential benefits, risks and strategic 
issues of these relationships, it lacks in offering the effective governance tools and 
guidelines that support firms in making decisions (Kremic et al., 2006). This 
discussion recommends that the limited research available on inter-firm 
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relationship governance has produced mixed evidence and conflicting views, and 
has failed to align and explicitly explain the integrated role of SD strategies, 
relationship governance mechanisms and CRS in fostering relationship 
performance. Against the backdrop of this confined discussion by academia, the 
importance of this research area demands further investigations.   
1.3 Research problems, objectives and questions 
Problem statement 
Buyer-supplier relationships have been documented as fundamental strategic 
boundary decisions effecting business performance (Gulbrandsen, Lambe & 
Sandvik, 2017). However, in spite of the diversity of approaches concerning 
relationship performance, the determinants of governance structure, such as SD 
strategies, governance mechanisms, CRS and ex-post transaction costs, as 
important antecedents to relationship performance can only be found in 
isolation, while limited research has discerned how these factors are more salient 
in explaining the effective process of managing relationships. In other words, 
there is no comprehensive theoretically and empirically integrated framework in 
the literature focusing on the potential impact of aligned relationship governance 
structures on managing successful buyer-supplier transactions. 
Research objectives and questions 
The prior discussion on the identified research gaps and the research problem in 
terms of understanding how to manage successful buyer-supplier relationships 
drives the course of this dissertation. Thus, to fill these research gaps and provide 
further insights, this dissertation seeks to investigate and explore the 
determinants of governance structure and align their enabling roles in buyer-
supplier relationship performance. Therefore, the following research question 
(RQ) is presented based on the research problem and objectives:  
RQ: What factors explain an effective relationship governance structure, and 
how does this governance structure ensure relationship outcomes in managing 
buyer-supplier relationships?   
The following three sub-questions (SQs) are formulated in order to address the 
central research question of this dissertation: 
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SQ1: What approaches support the development of suppliers’ performance and 
how does SD strategies significantly lead to buyer-supplier relationship 
development? (Articles 1 and 2)   
SQ2: How do the underlying relationship governance factors effect buyer-supplier 
relationship outcomes? (Article 3) 
SQ3: What are the major relationship governance mechanisms and what are the 
underlying varying roles of these mechanisms in minimizing transaction costs and 
inter-firm conflicts, and in maximizing relationship commitment and relationship 
performance? (Articles 4 and 5) 
1.4 Research design and contribution 
This dissertation aims to deepen the knowledge about managing inter-firm 
relationships by developing a comprehensive framework that provides a rich 
explanation for governance practices in buyer-supplier relationships based on 
integrative the theoretical perspectives of TCE and SET. This framework depicts a 
unique combination of both qualitative and quantitative studies, characterized by 
aligning governance structures of SD approaches, relationship governance 
mechanisms and CRS, with the premise that these governance structure factors 
are equally important in achieving manifold relational benefits. This dissertation 
advances the understanding of SD efforts through identifying and constructing the 
most comprehensive set of strategies that supports the development of suppliers’ 
performance and capabilities, and provides a pathway to improved buyer-supplier 
relationships. Furthermore, it contributes to the discussion on the varying nature 
of relationship governance mechanisms by presenting a holistic picture of relative 
effectiveness, as well as the joint use of both transactional and relational 
governance mechanisms.  
This dissertation consists of five articles, which address the main research question 
and sub-questions mentioned above. The first sub-question refers to a pathway 
within significant SD strategies towards developing suppliers’ performance and 
buyer-supplier relationships. Therefore, Articles 1 and 2 address this question by 
comprehensively covering and combining the framework of emerging SD 
approaches, based on the SD literature and empirical evidence. Furthermore, the 
second sub-question in this dissertation seeks to explore the underlying effect of 
governance mechanisms on buyer-supplier relationship outcomes. To this extent, 
Article 3 addresses this question through multiple case studies. On the other hand, 
the third research question identifies the varying roles of relationship governance 
mechanisms influencing ex-post transaction costs, CR strategies, relationship 
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commitment and relationship performance. Based on quantitative analysis, 
Articles 4 and 5 counter these operational hazards and provide an institutional 
framework in addressing these issues. As a result, the main research question in 
this dissertation is addressed by combining the results and findings of all five 
articles. Figure 1 elucidates the pathway relating to the research design and process 
adopted in order to achieve the research objectives. 
 
Figure 1. Research design 
Methodologically, this study employs a mixed methods research approach 
involving an integrated summary of all the articles, following both qualitative and 
quantitative strands in order to present a complete understanding of the 
phenomenon by covering important elements of the research problem. This 
approach helps in achieving the research objectives practically and in 
understanding the holistic nature of a well-researched approach to studying this 
area. The qualitative and quantitative strands/studies, taken in parallel, prioritize 
the methods equally, and mix the results from all articles in the course of the 
overall interpretation. The intent behind the qualitative and quantitative studies 
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in this dissertation differs: qualitative research was conducted in an MNE 
environment to gain an in-depth perspective, while quantitative research was 
conducted in an SME environment to generalize the results. Table 1 below depicts 
components of each article, along with the research question, theoretical roots and 
methodology used.   
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1.5 Structure of the study 
This dissertation consists of two major parts: the first part summarizes the whole 
dissertation into six chapters, and the second contains a compilation of the articles. 
In the first part, Chapter 1 introduces a discussion on the background to the 
research and the research gaps. This is followed by a presentation of the research 
objectives and research questions (including the sub-questions). Finally, the 
chapter addresses the research design contributions and explains the whole 
procedure involved in completing the dissertation. The second chapter intends to 
offer a theoretical background to the research, including the major theories, 
literature and constructs that are highlighted in the dissertation. The third chapter 
introduces the research methodology whose approach elucidates the procedures 
and decisions aligned with the research philosophy, as well as the research design 
and methods employed in this study. Furthermore, the value and rationale 
concerning the choice of methods and research quality are significant parts of this 
chapter. Next, Chapter 4 summarizes all the articles included in this dissertation 
with their key findings. Chapter five intends to discuss and present the 
implications of this dissertation. It includes the theoretical contributions of the 
dissertation by answering each sub-question, followed by responding to the main 
research question. The main research question is answered by presenting 
synthesized results and overall contributions. Significant managerial implications, 
limitations and avenues for further research are presented towards the end of this 
chapter. The last chapter includes a brief conclusion about the findings in this 
dissertation. The second part contains all the articles.     
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2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION  
2.1 Transaction cost economics and social exchange 
theory hybrid 
TCE is a highly influential interdisciplinary theoretical setting within 
organizational sciences, which identifies and controls economic transaction 
characteristics (Williamson, 1981, 1985; Hawkins et al., 2008) and principally 
emphasizes the costs associated with designing the effective governance of inter-
firm transactions (Heide & John, 1992). Coase (1937) originally established this 
theory in explaining the nature of firm, and contributed to economics by 
explaining the existence of firms and how do they distinguished from market. His 
comparison between transaction costs and management costs defined the firms’ 
boundaries based on the choice of firm over market. Williamson (1975, 1985) 
further developed TCE and identified the underlying factors responsible for choice 
of firms over market (Williamson, 1985, 1993a). TCE syndicates the transactional 
features of relationship governance and provides compelling logic for assessing the 
effectiveness of exchange in order to manage opportunism and transaction costs 
determined by particular characteristics of relationship exchange (Heide & John, 
1992; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999). Inter-firm 
governance is realized through alternative optimal approaches of organizing 
economic transactions under a certain set of situational contingencies concerning 
the implications of a market, hybrid (i.e., relational governance) or hierarchical 
setting (Williamson, 1991; Reuer & Arino, 2007). Relationship partners are 
characterized as having bounded rationality and can exhibit opportunistic 
behaviour, with the major characteristics of transactions being frequency, 
uncertainty and transaction-specific assets (Williamson, 1985, 2005). TCE 
contends that relationship exchange should be designed in structural ways, relying 
on economic forces that organize and restrict a firm’s behaviour and enhance 
collaboration, thereby minimizing partners’ incentives for opportunism, conflicts 
and transaction costs (Hennart & Zeng, 2005; Luo et al., 2015).  
On the other hand, SET plays a pivotal role in elucidating relationship exchange 
and is considered as the foundation for buyer-supplier relationships, which offer 
social ways to manage and control a relationship in order to strengthen 
cooperation (Kaufmann & Carter, 2006; Hawkins et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2009; Li 
et al., 2010). It is defined as “voluntary actions of individuals that are motivated by 
the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact bring from others” 
(Blau, 1964, p. 91). SET emphasizes the development of norms of reciprocating 
benefits between relationship partners and suggests that relational elements of 
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trust and commitment are the significant drivers of relationship exchange (Blau, 
1964; Palmatier, 2008). Established to evaluate social behaviours that perform a 
prominent role among exchange partners, SET has widely influenced the research 
on buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Granovetter, 2005; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; 
Luo, 2002; Kingshott, 2006). As it produces economic rents out of social 
governance and plays an embedded role in economic transactions, it has evolved 
as a potential alternative with which to enhance the level of trust, commitment and 
collaboration in governing effective relationship exchanges (Hawkins et al., 2008; 
Liu et al., 2009; Hald et al., 2009). However, the increased level of understanding 
in socially embedded exchange results in an improved level of relationship 
commitment and cooperation by facilitating joint planning and problem-solving 
(Claro, Hagelaar & Omta, 2003). Therefore, SET researchers suggest that 
economic exchange in the longer run turns into strong relational ties, whose 
behaviours are guided through social factors countering operational hazards (e.g., 
Luo et al., 2015; Khalid & Ali, 2017).   
Several prior studies have highlighted the combined significance of TCE and SET, 
thus underlying the impact of governance factors on investigating their 
effectiveness in inter-firm performance (e.g., Ferguson, Paulin & Bergeron, 2005; 
Heide & John, 1992; Liu et al., 2009; Burkert et al., 2012). Both techniques tend 
to explain the pathway along which decision makers seek to develop and foster 
long-term inter-firm relationships, in contrast to approaches demonstrated to 
strengthen the relationship, as defined in Table 2 (Kingshott, 2006). That said, 
Hawkins et al. (2008) argued that it is naive to conclude that an inter-firm 
relationship is guided by the assumptions of TCE and SET. When relationships 
grow and continue, firms’ view of the extracted values and constant changes in 
strategies may transform the relationships from being transactional to relational, 
and vice versa. Building on TCE and SET, this dissertation therefore constructs a 
hybrid model of governance structure in buyer-supplier relationships and argues 
that firms need to employ a relationship governance structure within which SD 
strategies, relationship governance mechanisms (transactional and relational 
governance mechanisms) and CRS play varying pivotal roles in managing 
successful buyer-supplier relationships. This governance structure not only copes 
with implementing successful SD programmes and safeguarding relationship-
specific assets and adaptation, but also develops an environment of successful 
cooperation, which ultimately minimizes transaction costs and conflicts, and 
enhances the performance of relationship exchange. 
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Table 2. Key elements of transaction cost economics and social exchange 
theory in relationship management Adapted from Kingshott 
(2006) 
Relational dimensions Transaction cost 
economics 
Social exchange 
theory 
Managerial philosophy 
and focus 
Minimizing 
transaction costs 
Safeguard assets  
Building relationships  
Focus on inputs  
Conceptual 
origins/grounding  
Economics  Sociology 
Underlying assumptions  Bounded rationality  
Individuals act 
opportunistically 
Need for uncertainty 
reduction 
Risk neutrality 
Moral obligations 
between actors 
Inherent reciprocity  
Interdependence 
through socialization 
Governance  Contractual/legal Trust 
Mechanisms  Hierarchical  Relational norms 
Bilateral inputs 
required  
Managerial 
benefits/burdens 
More partner control  
Greater internalized 
certainty  
Relational 
specifications in 
advance  
Greater flexibility  
Interactive and 
adaptive  
Higher efficiency  
2.2 Supplier development 
Recent trends show that organizations focus on core capabilities, outsourcing and 
downsizing, which consequently enhances their dependence on suppliers in terms 
of competitive quality and timely delivery, as well as amplifies the need to develop 
suppliers .UDXVH+DQGILHOG	7\OHU0RGH	0DEHUW$÷DQ.X]H\
$FDU	$oÕNJ|]6'UHIHUVWRWKHFRRSHUDWLYHHIIRUWVWKDWILUPVPDNHQRW
only to continue long-term transactions through sustained competitive advantage, 
but also to enhance suppliers’ competences and efficiency in resolving supply chain 
SUREOHPV/LHWDO/RSSDFKHU&DJOLDQR	6SLQD$÷DQHWDO
The effectiveness of SD is determined by the clarity of long-term organizational 
goals; therefore, firms strive to implement SD programmes in order to improve 
operational performance and long-term relational development. Thus, firms 
carefully evaluate the competences of suppliers and are eager to implement SD 
programmes to gain competitive and relational advantage (Modi & Mabert, 2007), 
as well as a high-performance supply base. Further, firms may also decide to 
implement SD efforts when suppliers’ performance is not satisfactory, due to the 
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concerns about quality, service levels, capacity sufficiency and innovative strength 
(Wagner, 2006; Glock, Grosse & Ries, 2017). These efforts help suppliers to foster 
ongoing improvements where a diversity of skills and knowledge provides effective 
competitiveness and upgrades their operational and technical capabilities 
associated with supply-based costs, innovation, quality, delivery and productivity 
(Modi & Mabert, 2007; Lintukangas, 2011; Blonska, Storey, Rozemeijer, Wetzels 
& de Ruyter, 2013).      
Several seminal studies have emphasized the importance of suppliers’ capabilities 
in firms’ competitive advantage. Similarly, researchers have highlighted those 
critical SD activities (i.e., performance measurement, supplier evaluation, setting 
goals for suppliers, training, personnel exchange, monitoring etc.) in the inter-firm 
governance literature that play a pivotal role in firms’ performance and relational 
benefits (Govindan et al., 2010; Blonska et al., 2013; Krause et al., 2007). In 
addition, SD efforts contain several mechanisms, such as relational norm 
development, transferring knowledge, bilateral communication, top management 
involvement and support, shared promises, a positive attitude towards long-term 
partnership (Bai & Sarkis, 2010; Lintukangas, 2011), and driving relationship 
development (Sucky & Durst, 2013). 
2.2.1 Supplier development strategies 
The prior literature on SD has presented several success factors that are critical to 
SD implementation in different contexts. For example, Krause (1999) developed 
and validated an important set of antecedents for a SD programme, which need to 
be assured before being implemented. These antecedents are considered as 
important inputs for SD, including strategic supplier management, taking into 
account purchasing functions as a source of competitive advantage, investments 
in suppliers’ capabilities, the consideration of supplier partners, effective 
communication, and information-sharing. Hartley and Choi (1996) argued that 
committed top management and capable team development are important in 
developing suppliers. Moreover, SD factors, such as supplier evaluation and 
recognition, training and awards, and top management involvement, support 
firms in effective communication (Krause, 1999; Krause & Ellram, 1997). Krause, 
Handfield and Scannell (1998) presented a generic process model of SD in a 
process-oriented way, which contains several important systematic factors from 
identifying critical commodities for development to ongoing continuous 
improvements. Humphreys, Li and Chan (2004) examined the role of SD in the 
context of buyer-supplier relationships and identified transaction-specific and 
infrastructural factors influencing performance improvement. Furthermore, 
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knowledge transfer (Arroyo-López, Holmen & De Boer, 2012), communication 
(Modi & Mabert, 2007; Jane Zhao & Anand, 2009), information-sharing (Krause 
et al., 2007) and relational factors (Ghijsen, Semeijn & Ernstson, 2010; Govindan 
et al., 2010) have been recognized as the most important mechanisms for SD 
programmes in order to gain competitive advantage (Khan & Nicholson, 2014). 
Ghijsen et al. (2010) conducted an exploratory study and found that the use of 
promises and both human- and capital-specific SD critically affect supplier 
commitment, while indirect and direct influence strategies and capital-specific SD 
play significant roles in supplier satisfaction. Recently, Glock et al. (2017), based 
on a systematic literature review, presented a supplier relationship management 
process, comprising several building blocks, such as the identification and 
selection of appropriate suppliers, their evaluation and development, and the 
monitoring of their performance.  
On the other hand, top management support and long-term commitment, trust, 
joint actions, supplier evaluation, strategic goals, effective communication and 
asset-specific investments have been found to be critical factors in SD in order to 
improve supplier performance and buyers’ competitive advantage (Handfield, 
Krause, Scannell & Monczka, 2000; Li et al., 2007, 2012). Several researchers have 
highlighted suppliers’ importance to buying firms’ operational performance, while 
considering them as a virtual extension of buyers and observing that combined 
inter-organizational communication is the most important prerequisite for 
converting a firm’s efforts in SD (e.g., Wagner & Krause, 2009; Modi & Mabert, 
2007). Therefore, SD strategies concerning competitive pressure, supplier 
evaluation and incentives, and the direct involvement of buying firms in training 
suppliers are considered as the most comprehensive internal and external 
activities supporting inter-firm relationship development (Krause et al., 2000; 
Modi & Mabert, 2007). Table 3 elaborates the most comprehensive set of SD 
strategies obtained from prior research. 
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Table 3. Supplier development strategies 
Supplier 
development 
strategies 
Studies Explanation 
Supplier 
assessment 
Krause et al., 2000; Modi & 
Mabert, 2007; Song & Di 
Benedetto, 2008; Hammami 
et al., 2014; Ho et al., 2010; 
Agan et al., 2016; Blonska et 
al., 2013; Glock et al., 2017 
A supplier assessment and 
certification scheme 
warrants and encourages 
high performance by supplier 
and raises the organization’s 
expectation about 
performance.  
Competitive 
pressure  
Krause et al., 2000; Modi & 
Mabert, 2007; Glock et al., 
2017 
Multiple supply bases enable 
firms to put competitive 
pressure on suppliers by 
encouraging others to 
improve quality and supply 
performance.   
Supplier 
incentives  
Krause et al., 2000; Modi & 
Mabert, 2007; Agan et al., 
2016; Wagner & Krause, 
2009; Sucky & Durst, 2013; 
Glock et al., 2017 
Supplier incentives help to 
motivate suppliers in order 
to enhance their capabilities, 
resulting in cost advantage, 
continuity of business and 
increased volume. These 
include forms of supplier 
recognition through awards.    
Direct 
involvement 
Krause et al., 2000; Modi & 
Mabert, 2007; Ghijsen et al., 
2010; Li et al., 2012; Agan et 
al., 2016; Blonska et al., 2013; 
Glock et al., 2017 
Organizations follow a pre-
emptive method in order to 
enhance suppliers’ 
performance by direct 
involvement. This 
involvement may contain 
asset-specific investments 
etc.  
Although prior research has focused on the significance of SD as an integrated 
means of enhancing suppliers’ performance and capabilities (Modi & Mabert, 
2007; Burt et al., 2003), and their strategic role in the value chain (Kwon et al., 
2010), it has failed to identify the link between a comprehensive set of SD 
strategies and buyer-supplier relationship development. Moreover, theoretical 
and empirical evidence of the effectiveness of SD strategies in inter-firm 
relationship development is extremely fragmented, as well as individually focused 
with limited understanding (Sillanpää et al., 2015; Shahzad et al., 2016). Based on 
these previous seminal studies, this study identifies a comprehensive set of SD 
strategies concerning supplier assessment, competitive pressure, supplier 
incentives, and forms of direct involvement that improve the performance of both 
buyer and supplier and support relationship development. 
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2.3 Relationship governance mechanisms  
The importance of managing buyer-supplier relationships to achieving superior 
relationship performance has increased and become a predominant research issue 
throughout the supply chain (Liu et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2015). Therefore, effective 
governance in accordance with TCE and SET is the key instrument that supports 
firms seeking to enhance relationship performance and stability, while academia 
has been more attentive towards different aspects of relationship governance 
structures (Liu et al., 2009; Liu, Li et al., 2017; Liu, Luo et al., 2017). In such 
relationship exchanges, the main question concerns how to design such a 
governance structure effectively where both parties are fully committed to fulfilling 
common business objectives (Yu, Liao & Lin, 2006; Liu et al., 2009; Luo et al., 
2015). Therefore, relationship partners need to design and employ several 
governance mechanisms to deal with operational hazards and achieve relationship 
objectives (Yu et al., 2006). Several researchers have highlighted the significant 
multiple governance mechanisms within relationship structures for successfully 
governing transactions between buyer and supplier (e.g., Bai et al., 2016; Liu et al., 
2009; Yang et al., 2017; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). Hence, derived from the 
economic and social rationality of TCE and SET, transactional and relational 
governance mechanisms have emerged as systematic frameworks of inter-firm 
governance structures centred on enhancing relationship performance (Liu et al., 
2009; Liu, Li et al., 2017). The purpose of these mechanisms is not only to cope 
with issues regarding safeguards against opportunism, conflicts and higher 
transaction costs, but also to develop an environment of successful coordination 
and trust, which ultimately minimizes inter-firm uncertainty and enhances 
performance outcomes.    
2.3.1 Transactional governance mechanisms 
Transactional governance mechanisms, according to TCE, are manifested as 
economically embedded organizational measures, which are derived from 
economic rationality and rely on a binding legal and economic framework (Liu, Li 
et al., 2017; Luo et al., 2015) that supports the process of managing, monitoring 
and harmonizing relationship partners’ behaviours (Liu et al., 2009). Conflicts, 
opportunism and higher transaction costs in buyer-supplier relationships have 
always been dilemmas because each party in a relationship strives to accomplish 
its own business objectives (Samaha, Palmatier & Dant, 2011). Transactional 
mechanisms, therefore, offer structural ways to avoid these operational hazards in 
governing successful relationship exchanges (Williamson, 1985; Hawkins et al., 
2008; Liu et al., 2009; Liu, Li et al., 2017). Transactional determinants (i.e., 
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contract completeness and interdependence) are demonstrated as being mutually 
specified contractual clauses and idiosyncratic relationship-specific investments 
(Brown, Dev & Lee, 2000; Yeung et al., 2013).   
Contractual completeness comprises term specificity, contingency adaptability 
and contractual obligatoriness (Luo, 2005). Term specificity delineates the 
specificity and details of contractual terms, whereas contingency adaptability 
concerns the contractual handling of future problems. Contractual obligatoriness 
includes the legal clauses to which partners are bound and allows for the possibility 
to penalize the counterpart (Cannon, Achrol & Gundlach, 2000; Luo, 2002, 2005; 
Reuer & Arino, 2007), as well as protects against exploitation (Lumineau & 
Malhotra, 2011). As private goal-seeking may create potential risks and 
misunderstandings between partners (Luo & Park, 2004), a contract functions as 
a comprehensive tool (i.e., explicitly explaining roles and responsibilities for both 
partners) controlling for future contingencies and behavioural uncertainty (Liu et 
al., 2010). While interdependence is a significant transactional incentive factor in 
monitoring relationship exchange, which necessitates both partners to invest 
idiosyncratically in physical and human assets that have a lower alternative value 
(Kumar, Scheer & Steenkamp, 1995; Ali & Larimo, 2016; Khalid & Ali, 2017), 
explicating that from relationship partners requires a joint motivation of 
forbearance (Heide, 1994; Liu, Li et al., 2017). Such idiosyncratic investments can 
be tangible (i.e., technical equipment, facilities and financing) or intangible (i.e., 
administrative and technical personnel, tacit knowledge, particular technologies 
or skills) (Jap & Anderson, 2003).  
2.3.2 Relational governance mechanisms 
Relational governance mechanisms, according to SET, are manifested as socially 
embedded organizational instruments, which are derived from social rationality 
and rely on informal arrangements and practices in the context of economic 
activities that support the process of managing, monitoring and organizing 
relationships (Liu et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2015; Liu, Li et al., 2017). SET suggests 
that relationship exchanges rooted in strong relational bonds drive relationship 
partners to control operational hazards, i.e., conflicts and transaction costs 
(Granovetter, 2005; Heide & John, 1992; Li et al., 2010). Relational governance 
mechanisms, therefore, offer relational ways and provide standards of anticipated 
behaviours, which prevent the need for coercive relations to avoid these 
operational hazards while strengthening relationship exchanges (Hawkins et al., 
2008; Liu et al., 2009; Liu, Li et al., 2017). Based on SET, this study categorizes 
two relational determinants (i.e., trust and communication) as useful approaches, 
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as well as underlying the impact of these relational ties on managing successful 
inter-firm relationships.    
As a relational governance mechanism, trust is depicted as a significant non-
contractual force that results in inter-firm relationship performance 
improvement; this is explained as the willingness to trust or have confidence in a 
counterpart concerning their reliability, benevolence and integrity (Dyer & Chu, 
2011; Khalid & Ali, 2017; Liu, Li et al., 2017). Trust, as a source of flexibility and 
tacit knowledge among relationship partners, minimizes uncertainty by predicting 
the counterpart’s behaviour and aligning their actions accordingly (Liu et al., 
2009; Yang et al., 2017). Furthermore, trust enhances firms’ confidence and 
behavioural consistency by critically calculating the perceived risk and exhibiting 
a cooperative atmosphere between relationship partners, which influences their 
choice of more collaborative strategies in a disagreement in order to develop and 
sustain long-term relationships (Lui & Ngo, 2004; Liu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 
2017). Meanwhile, communication is depicted as an effective relational instrument 
in developing collaboration, integration and cooperation (Kim & Chai, 2017), 
which refers to the mutual expectation of formal and informal information 
exchanges that are meaningful, frequent and timely (Hung & Lin, 2013; Wang, 
Wang, Jiang, Yang & Cui, 2016). Mutual effective communication and the frequent 
availability of particular information act as effective safeguards in deterring 
perceived risks, conflicts and uncertainty, and help in fostering relationship 
partners’ confidence by aligning perceptions and expectations (Yang et al., 2017; 
Yen, Shih-Tse Wang & Horng, 2011; Liu, Li et al., 2017). Table 4 explains both 
relationship governance mechanisms (i.e., transactional and relational) within 
successful governance, based on the most seminal literature.       
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2.4 Ex-post transaction costs 
Several researchers have highlighted the importance of transaction costs and 
argued that they have a major influence on economic effectiveness (e.g., Coase, 
1937; North, 1991; Williamson, 1991; Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Gulbrandsen 
et al., 2017). Transaction costs contain all of the expenses occurred in achieving a 
jointly acceptable agreement (Zaheer et al., 1998; Luo et al., 2015) for carrying out 
an economic exchange that fluctuates independently of competitive prices and 
products exchanged (Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999), and are divided into ex-ante 
and ex-post costs (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1993; North, 1991). Ex-ante 
transaction costs can be divided into search and contracting costs, which contain 
expenses for identifying and evaluating an appropriate relationship partner, as 
well as writing equally acceptable contracts. On the other hand, ex-post 
transaction costs can be divided into monitoring and enforcement costs, which 
contain expenses for monitoring an exchange agreement to ensure that both 
partners perform their obligatory functions and ex-post negotiating and 
sanctioning them in the case of their inabilities (Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2003; 
Gulbrandsen et al., 2017). Operational contingencies and constant market 
turbulence emerge as threats to a static relationship; partners, therefore, carry out 
renegotiations to handle exchange hazards in order to enhance their operational 
effectiveness. In this vein, Williamson (1985) argued that relationship firms also 
have to deal with ex-post transaction costs, even after a jointly acceptable 
agreement is established. 
2.5 Conflict resolution strategies  
The operations management literature provides evidence of the paramount 
importance of inter-firm relationships, wherein relationship partners often have 
different interests and objectives, meaning that conflicts may arise. These inter-
firm conflicts refer to a disagreement between both parties because each party 
strives to accomplish its own business objectives (Samaha et al., 2011; Yang et al., 
2017). As such, conflict is an inevitable feature between relationship partners; 
firms, however, are lacking any systematic solution to deal with it (Lumineau & 
Henderson, 2012). Inter-organizational conflict has become a negative force that 
may lead to confusion and interruptions in business operations (Robbins, 2005). 
Relationship partners, therefore, need to realize the criticality of these conflicts 
and employ different CRS when managing successful relationships. Previous 
studies have highlighted different approaches in conflict resolution, such as 
integrating, accommodating, negotiating and compromising in buyer-supplier 
relationships (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012; Ndubisi, 2011), as well as problem-
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solving, compromising, enforcing and legalistic strategies in international joint 
venture contexts (Lin & Germain, 1998; Le Nguyen et al., 2016), which depict 
firms’ behaviour in the case of disagreement. This study adapts problem-solving, 
compromising and legalistic approaches as CRS because they are more explicit and 
comprehensive in their nature in terms of resolving buyer-supplier conflicts. 
2.6 Synthesis of governance structure: the potential 
interaction of its determinants   
Previous research has provided significant conceptual and empirical evidence 
regarding the significance of managing these relationships by following the 
concepts relating to TCE, the resource-based view, SET and institutional theory. 
However, TCE and SET have emerged as the major theoretical paradigms within 
research on buyer-supplier relationships. Several studies have suggested that SD 
approaches contain firms’ efforts involved in maintaining competences and a high-
performance supply base; firms thus employ SD programs in order to enhance 
collaboration between buyer and supplier, as well as relationship development 
(Modi and Mabert, 2007; Sillanpää et al., 2015; Shahzad et al., 2016). This notion 
urges researchers to examine absolute factors that warrant the success of SD 
implementation and buyer-supplier relationships. On the other hand, the 
significantly varying roles of relationship governance mechanisms have dominated 
discussions on how to manage successful buyer-supplier relationships. Although 
research on relationship governance has highlighted the effectiveness of both 
transactional and relational governance mechanisms in governing these 
relationships, it remains limited to the context of opportunism mitigation (e.g., Liu 
et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2015) and relationship quality (e.g., Liu et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, prior research has produced conflicting results of a complementary 
or substitution nature concerning these governance mechanisms in explaining 
relationship performance. This situation necessitates further investigation into the 
relative effectiveness of relationship governance mechanisms in achieving joint 
objectives. These mechanisms can help to foster inter-organizational relationship 
performance by supporting firms not only in the choice of the most appropriate 
CRS when conflict arises, but also in minimizing transaction costs and maximizing 
relationship commitment. This set of strategies and mechanisms creates a 
governance structure between relationship partners. The reasons for choosing this 
governance structure are to cope with the issues regarding transaction costs and 
inter-firm conflicts, and to develop an environment of successful SD and 
relationship commitment. Therefore, building on TCE and SET, the theoretical 
discussion in earlier sections of this chapter makes it explicit that managing 
successful buyer-supplier relationships can be highly influenced by employing an 
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effective and interrelated governance structure of SD strategies, transactional and 
relational governance mechanisms, and CRS. 
In sum, prior studies have investigated inter-firm performance in numerous ways, 
but this diversity of approaches reflects an apparent lack of consensus on what 
effectively explains the management of buyer-supplier relationships. In other 
words, in spite of providing several perspectives on relationship performance, SD 
strategies, governance mechanisms, CRS and ex-post transaction costs, as 
antecedents to relationship performance, are only found in isolation. The extant 
literature has overlooked how these strategies and mechanisms are linked to each 
other and, more importantly, failed to explain the managing process in buyer-
supplier relationships. Therefore, a combined framework, based on TCE and SET, 
which explores and investigates the determinants of a relationship governance 
structure and their impact on buyer-supplier outcomes should represent an 
important contribution to the research on inter-firm relationship governance. 
Figure 2 depicts a conceptual framework of the main determinants of governance 
structure in managing successful buyer-supplier relationships, as combined in this 
study.    
 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
This chapter discusses the methodological choices and empirical research design 
of the study, based on the research objectives. Particularly, it provides detailed 
justifications of the chosen philosophical assumptions, techniques, and research 
methods and approaches.   
3.1 Research approach 
In this subchapter, the research approach, in terms of the procedures and 
decisions, aligned with the research philosophy, design and methods, employed to 
address the research problem in the best possible manner, is clarified. Prior 
relationship governance research has examined the roles of governance factors, 
either quantitatively (e.g., Bai et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2009; Luo 
et al., 2015) or qualitatively (e.g., Makkonen, Vuori & Puranen, 2016; Schmitz, 
Schweiger & Daft, 2016), while mixed methods approaches appear to have been 
rarely used (Golicic & Davis, 2012). Mixed methods (i.e., a combination of both 
qualitative and quantitative) have emerged as important research approaches by 
providing a complete understanding of a research problem (Creswell, 2014; Hall, 
2013). Therefore, this dissertation employs mixed methods as its research 
approach because it integrates both qualitative and quantitative studies in order 
to present a holistic picture of buyer-supplier relationship development. In the 
following, the most important intersection of components involved in the research 
approach is presented. 
3.1.1 Philosophical worldview/paradigm  
The research philosophy adopted by a researcher encompasses fundamental 
assumptions of viewing the world, which reinforce research strategy and research 
methods (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). Philosophical worldviews can be 
seen as common sets of beliefs influencing the process of research (Morgan, 2007; 
Creswell, 2014). It guides researchers in the choice of methodology employed to 
understand the research problem, based on the alignment of philosophical 
assumptions about ontology, human nature and epistemology, and the research 
objectives (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela, 2004; Collis & Hussey, 2009; 
Guba & Lincoln, 2004; Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011). These efforts elucidate 
the configuration of research and represent a general philosophical positioning 
about the world in a study, enabling researchers to build an argument regarding 
their choices of particular methodological approaches for a research project 
(Creswell, 2014). Prior research has highlighted differences in philosophical 
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paradigms and ongoing arguments about “paradigm wars” regarding “what world 
view or beliefs researchers bring to inquiry”. Several worldviews of a post-
positivist, constructivist, transformative, post-modernist and pragmatist nature 
have emerged in the seminal literature (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Creswell, 
2014; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003; Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill & Bristow, 2016). 
Post-positivist assumptions are linked to the quantitative research approach, 
wherein researchers claim that their understanding is based on the purpose, 
reductionism and verification of theory. Constructivist assumptions (usually 
linked with interpretivism) are associated with the qualitative research approach, 
wherein research is developed from the bottom up, based on the understanding 
and subjective views of participants’ experiences, social and historical 
construction, and theory generation. The transformative (also known as 
participatory) worldview holds that assumptions are influenced by political and 
societal concerns and often related to qualitative research approach. Post-
modernism highlights language and alternative suppressed views, and establishes 
ways of understanding in the world (Saunders et al., 2016). Lastly, the pragmatist 
world view is linked with the mixed methods approach, wherein researchers claim 
that their understanding is based on consequences of actions, as well as problem-
centred, pluralistic and real-world practice-oriented assumptions (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011; Creswell, 2014; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003).  
Philosophical worldviews contain common components, while adopting different 
positions on these features. These world views vary and always build upon the 
researcher’s understanding of the world and the nature of reality (ontology), what 
establishes acceptable knowledge and how we advance our knowledge of what we 
know (epistemology), the understanding of the role that values play in research 
(axiology), the research process (methodology) and the research language 
(rhetoric) (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). These elements frame a debate about the 
choice of the most relevant research philosophy and guide researchers to conduct 
and articulate their research, given that these elements describe different ways of 
viewing the world’s reality and carrying out research. However, efforts to 
understand philosophical assumptions assist researchers in elucidating the overall 
configuration of research, and identifying the most suitable research methodology 
in relation to their research objectives (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, Jackson & Lowe, 
2012). Consequently, this study follows the pragmatist worldview because it 
integrates both qualitative and quantitative methods and strives to bring together 
objectivism and subjectivism, facts and values, accurate and valuable knowledge, 
and real-world practice-oriented assumptions. Table 5 describes the paradigm 
components of the chosen world view (i.e., pragmatism) for this dissertation. 
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Table 5. The study’s philosophical worldview and paradigm components 
Paradigm 
components 
Pragmatism 
Ontology 
(i.e., nature of 
reality) 
External, multiple and practical realities, 
fluctuation of process and practices to best enable 
answering of questions (e.g., researchers test 
hypotheses and provide several viewpoints). 
Epistemology 
(i.e., how we 
advance our 
knowledge of 
what we know) 
Practicality of knowledge and theories enabling 
effective action, problem-focused, incorporating 
different viewpoints to provide acceptable 
knowledge 
(e.g., researchers collect information in terms of 
“what works” to address questions). 
Axiology 
(i.e., role of 
values in 
research) 
Multiple positions, value-driven research (e.g., 
researchers encompass both biased and unbiased 
viewpoints). 
Methodology  
(i.e., research 
process) 
Integration of methods (e.g., mixed, multiple, 
qualitative, quantitative, action research), focused 
on practical results. 
Rhetoric 
(i.e., research 
language) 
Formal or informal (e.g., researchers may 
integrate both formal and informal styles of 
writing). 
Pragmatism, as the chosen research philosophy in this study, asserts that the 
research problem and research questions are the most important factors 
concerning the philosophical assumptions about ontology, epistemology and 
axiology. A pragmatist research philosophy evolves out of actions, situations and 
consequences (Creswell, 2014), and if the research problem does not clearly 
suggest a certain knowledge or method. This view holds that there are multiple 
realities and supports different techniques of interpreting the world and carrying 
out research to create a complete picture (Saunders et al., 2016; Saunders et al., 
2009). Schoonenboom (2017) argued that the research purpose in pragmatism is 
to solve temporary problems and include a sequence of experiences where prior 
beliefs are revised, based on particular research actions. Pragmatist researchers 
freely choose different methods, techniques and procedures for collecting, 
analysing and interpreting data in order to arrive at a better understanding of the 
research problem (Morgan, 2007; Creswell, 2014).   
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3.1.2 Research design and methods 
According to Saunders et al. (2009), methodological choices (i.e., quantitative 
and/or qualitative) are not made in isolation, but are based on a monomethod (i.e., 
particular data collection approach and corresponding analysis techniques) or 
multiple methods (i.e., several data collection and analysis approaches to answer 
the research question). The research design and methods include the overall plans 
and strategies for the study, associated with three research designs of quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed methods, which provide a particular direction for processes 
on a research project (Creswell, 2014). Several factors inform the research design, 
such as research objectives, existing knowledge, available resources, techniques 
and procedures for data collection, analysis and interpretation, and philosophical 
underpinnings that drive researchers to choose the most relevant research design 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Quantitative research design is related to a post-positivist 
world view and includes experimental (true experiments and quasi-experiments) 
and non-experimental designs, such as surveys. On the other hand, qualitative 
research design is associated with constructivism and includes narrative and 
phenomenological research. Mixed methods research design is mainly associated 
with a pragmatist world view and combines qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques, procedures and strands, either at the same time (parallel) or one after 
the other (sequential), thereby neutralizing the weakness of each data set 
(Saunders et al., 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Creswell, 2014). 
3.2 Research approach, design and methods of this 
study 
Managing successful buyer-supplier relationships is a complex and dynamic 
phenomenon, where the capability of applied research methods is important in 
order to explain it comprehensively. A comprehensive understanding of this 
central research phenomenon requires more than one type of approach because 
single-method research techniques are insufficient (Golicic & Davis, 2012). Several 
researchers (e.g., Spens & Kovacs, 2006; Golicic & Davis, 2012) agree that any 
particular research method comprises certain inherent biases, which jeopardize 
the theoretical development as well as the evolution of any discipline. Therefore, 
this dissertation follows the pragmatist worldview because it integrates both 
qualitative and quantitative studies and strives to bring together objectivism and 
subjectivism, facts and values, accurate and valuable knowledge, and real-world 
practice-oriented assumptions in order to provide a rich understanding of the 
complexity and dynamism of buyer-supplier relationship management by 
addressing the research problem pragmatically. Furthermore, this dissertation 
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employs a mixed methods research approach because the limitations of either 
method (i.e., qualitative or quantitative) counterbalance those of the other, while 
the research questions capture a complete picture of the phenomenon, which 
covers the important elements of the research problem by finding innovative 
solutions (Bryman, 2006). The mixed methods approach in this dissertation 
consists of both participants’ views on buyer-supplier relationship management 
and an investigation into the interrelationship between and among variables, 
which are appropriate for theory building and theory testing, respectively 
(Saunders et al., 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & 
Turner, 2007). Both study designs in this dissertation (i.e., qualitative and 
quantitative) complement and help in verifying the validity of each other 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010), while diminishing the likelihood of unanticipated 
outcomes (Saunders et al., 2009).  
This dissertation consists of five articles (focusing on the areas of buyer-supplier 
relationship governance, conflict management, SD and performance), which 
include a systematic literature review, and a qualitative and quantitative approach 
in order to supporting the notion of pragmatism and mixed methods research. The 
research approach in this dissertation depicts an integrated summary of all the 
articles, following both qualitative and quantitative methods. This study 
implements qualitative and quantitative strands/studies in parallel, prioritizes the 
methods equally, and combines the results from all the articles during the overall 
interpretation provided in the summary. The final synthesis consists of a 
pragmatic world view, with an emphasis on mixed methods, and highlights a 
complete picture of the phenomenon. Table 6 below depicts the research approach, 
design and methods adopted in each article.     
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Table 6. Research approach adopted in the articles 
Articles Research designs Research methods 
Article 1 Systematic literature 
review 
Intensive review of supplier 
management, SD process factors, 
their impact on buyer-supplier 
relationship performance, and a 
comprehensive set of SD 
strategies. Several of the most 
relevant and seminal studies are 
reviewed.  
Article 2 Qualitative (single case 
studies), based on 
validating the research 
framework empirically 
proposed in Article 1 
Semi-structured interviews with 
20 key executives (11 from buyers, 
nine from suppliers). Within-case 
analysis. 
Article 3 Qualitative (multiple case 
study), exploratory case 
study 
Semi-structured interviews, three 
case studies, qualitative data 
analysis techniques: data-driven 
thematic analysis and putting all 
the information in classified 
chronological order. 
Within- and cross-case analysis. 
Article 4 Quantitative (survey)  Web-based questionnaire, data 
collection involving 170 SMEs in 
Finland. Data analysis: partial 
least squares (PLS) structural 
equation modelling (SEM).  
Article 5 Quantitative (survey) Web-based questionnaire, data 
collection from 170 SMEs in 
Finland. Data analysis: PLS SEM. 
Figure 3 demonstrates how the mixed methods design was implemented in this 
dissertation, while explaining the philosophical worldview, reasons for mixing 
methods, priority and timing of the strands, point of interface, type of mixed 
methods and notation. It also contains both qualitative and quantitative strands, 
which explain the philosophical view, theoretical foundations, reasoning, research 
strategy, and data collection and analysis approaches adopted for each design. As 
mentioned earlier, this dissertation included both qualitative and quantitative 
methods, the main sources of the data consisted of systematic literature review, 
semi-structured interviews and web-based survey depending on the scope and 
nature of the each publication. A comprehensive explanation of data collection and 
analysis techniques is provided adequately in each publication in addition to Table 
6. 
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Figure 3. Mixed methods used in the dissertation 
3.3 Value and rationale used in the dissertation 
This section provides a rationale for the choice of mixed methods and argues that 
this choice is the most appropriate approach in order to comprehensively 
understand this dynamic field of buyer-supplier relationship governance, as a 
single-method approach would be insufficient (Golicic & Davis, 2012). Several 
researchers have emphasized the importance of mixed methods research and 
argued that a mixing strategy provides a better understanding of research 
phenomena than either qualitative or quantitative methods (e.g., Giddings, 2006; 
Palmer, 2008; Creswell, 2014). With single-method approach (i.e., qualitative or 
quantitative) has limitations and presents different viewpoints: for example, the 
generalizability of results can be absent in qualitative results, while the 
understanding of any individual is limited in quantitative research (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011). Therefore, the mixed methods approach used in this 
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dissertation allowed for the limitations and weaknesses of both approaches (i.e., 
qualitative and quantitative) to be offset at a general level, while offering a 
sophisticated method to access both qualitative and quantitative data at a practical 
level. At a procedural level, the mixed methods approach helped us to obtain a 
holistic understanding of the research problem by comparing or relating different 
viewpoints drawn from both qualitative and quantitative results (Creswell, 2014). 
Factors related to procedural intention and practical aspects drive researchers to 
select a particular mixed methods design, i.e., a convergent parallel, explanatory 
sequential or exploratory sequential design (Creswell, 2014). This dissertation 
follows a convergent parallel design because both quantitative and qualitative 
strands are converged and prioritized simultaneously in order to present a broad 
analysis of the research problem. Both qualitative and quantitative strands are 
kept independent in the data collection phase, while analyses are merged in order 
to display a side-by-side comparison or highlight a relationship between two 
different stories in order to interpret the overall results (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011). In this vein, Bryman (2006) argued that a mixed methods approach offers 
a greater research validity by employing both strands and can be integrated to 
triangulate results in such a way that these may be mutually corroborated. 
Accordingly, the mixed methods approach in this dissertation offers utility, draws 
meta-inferences developed through the complete, balanced and useful findings for 
both academics and practitioners, and represents the diversity of views drawn 
from qualitative and quantitative perspectives (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). Therefore, 
this dissertation enhances the integrity of the findings by synthesizing the results 
from both types of study (i.e., qualitative and quantitative) and better achieves the 
research objectives by answering “what” and “how” questions in significant ways. 
3.4 Quality of the research 
Research quality consists of the reliability and validity of the research. Reliability 
and validity are important indicators of valid research and refer to the extent of the 
repeatability, quality, consistency and accuracy of research findings (Johnson et 
al., 2007; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). This dissertation confirms the reliability 
and validity of the research whereby all necessary steps were taken for each 
individual article. Quantitative reliability elucidates the consistency of 
measurements and can be tested by employing certain procedures (Jordan & 
Hoefer, 2001; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), while validity is of three types: 
external, internal and construct validity. However, qualitative reliability refers to 
the consistency of the researcher’s approach across different research projects 
(Gibbs, 2007), while qualitative validity refers to the credibility of case studies and 
the accuracy of research findings from the perspective of the researcher by 
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employing certain techniques (Creswell, 2014; Ryan et al., 2002). Therefore, each 
article in this dissertation validates the quality of the research by explaining the 
respective reliability and validity, and logically develops the consistency and 
accuracy between meta-inferences and research objectives. External validity is 
achieved by ensuring the generalization of research findings in quantitative 
articles across populations, contexts and time (Dellinger & Leech, 2007; Modell, 
2005), while internal validity confirms the extent to which the inferences of a 
causal relationship between variables are effective. Construct validity is achieved 
by ensuring the measurability of the constructs used in the study (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998).  
On the other hand, the research quality of the mixed methods approach consists 
of the components of both qualitative and quantitative approaches, in parallel, in 
order to draw a meta-inference in the process of achieving the research objectives 
(Ihantola & Kihn, 2011). Researchers (e.g., Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008) have previously referred to internal validity and 
credibility as “inference quality”, dividing it into design quality and interpretive 
rigor. Design quality helps in evaluating the methodological rigor of mixed 
methods, whereas interpretive rigor relates to the criterion of assessing the validity 
of conclusions. Furthermore, inference transferability reflects external validity in 
mixed methods research and generalizes the research findings across populations, 
contexts and time (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). On the 
other hand, Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (2006) referred to mixed methods validity 
as “legitimation” and argued that it takes place at every stage of the mixed methods 
process. Thus, the meta-inference of this dissertation is based on the inference 
quality (i.e., accuracy of inductively and deductively derived conclusions) and data 
quality (i.e., quality of collected data considered to be valid and reliable), as well as 
combines the findings of individual articles by clarifying the notion of mixing 
methods (Venkatesh, Brown & Bala, 2013). 
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4 SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLES  
This chapter seeks to summarize the articles relevant to this dissertation. The 
dissertation comprises five articles, which focus on governance structure in the 
context of managing successful buyer-supplier relationships. Four of the articles 
are published in refereed international journals whereas one article is included in 
peer-reviewed conference proceedings. This chapter briefly presents the 
objectives, research findings and contributions in order to provide an overview of 
each article. The published articles are attached to the dissertation towards the 
end.    
The present author is both the lead author of each appended article (except for 
Article 1) and the corresponding author (except for Article 2), and has made 
important contributions to all articles. For example, as Article 1 was a literature 
review manuscript, the author was in charge of correspondence with the respective 
journal and contributed equally in research planning, research design, reviewing 
the literature, and writing the manuscript along with the co-authors. As Article 2 
was a qualitative single case study, the author along, with the second author, 
significantly contributed to research planning and design, presenting the extended 
research framework from SD to buyer-supplier relationship, based on the 
literature, and shaping the research, methods, results and conclusions. The 
collected research data were analysed by the second author, and the other co-
authors contributed by providing their input and valuable feedback. Article 3 
comprises qualitative multiple case studies, where the author contributed 
considerably throughout the drafting of the manuscript. The author was 
responsible for correspondence with the journal as well as the research design, 
data collection, analysis and writing the manuscript. The other co-authors 
provided valuable feedback on the research and helped with data collection and 
analysis. Articles 4 and 5 were quantitative manuscripts: the author contributed 
solely to Article 5, while Article 4 was a co-authored manuscript. In Article 4, the 
author was in charge of research design, data collection and drafting the whole 
manuscript, while the second author helped with data analysis. The other co-
authors put forward comments, concerns and valuable feedback in the course of 
drafting and revising the manuscript. Table 7 below presents an overview of the 
key findings in each article. 
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4.1 Supplier development strategies 
Article 1 is entitled “Supplier development and buyer-supplier relationship 
strategies – a literature review”. The purpose of this article is to identify and 
construct a step-by-step process framework for more comprehensive internal and 
external SD approaches, in order to provide a pathway towards improved buyer-
supplier relationships. Further, this study aims to explore the most relevant and 
seminal literature on SD efforts that influence buyer-supplier relationships in 
order to identify future research avenues. 
SD and buyer-supplier relationships are important building blocks in inter-firm 
relationship governance. Firms that support suppliers’ capability development 
improve relationship commitment, while efforts geared towards influencing the 
behaviour of suppliers drive relationship satisfaction. Suppliers’ capability 
development aims to improve operational competence and includes the buying 
firm’s human and capital investments, training, site visits, personnel exchange and 
information-sharing in order to achieve short-term as well as long-term needs. 
Therefore, suppliers’ capability development has emerged as a critical relational 
investment because such an idiosyncratic investment is difficult to redeploy and 
makes the relationship important to both firms, which in turn adds unique value 
to the relationship. Similarly, increased interest in SD activities highlight the 
importance of strategic collaboration between buyers and suppliers to enhance 
operational performance and build stronger and longer-term relationship 
commitment. Transaction-specific efforts, infrastructural matters, education and 
training, direct involvement, supplier evaluation, incentives, and effective 
communication are found to be critical SD factors enhancing trustworthiness in 
the relationship. The competitive advantage and financial performance of both 
buyer and supplier are crucial sources that determine the strength of ties, 
survivability and ranking on the market. Thus, SD strategies have been found to 
reflect the significant efforts that firms undertake for enhancing product 
development integration, joint planning and integrating information systems. 
4.2 Supplier development to buyer-supplier 
relationship development 
Article 2 is entitled “Benchmarking supplier development: an empirical case study 
of validating a framework to improve buyer-supplier relationship”. This article 
explores the role played by different SD efforts and highlights the outcomes of 
implementing and validating an integrated research framework, as developed in 
Article 1, through a case study. Further, the propositions presented in this study 
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identify the most critical SD strategies that help in developing buyer-supplier 
relationships (see Figure 4).   
  
Figure 4. Supplier development to buyer-supplier relationship development 
The findings reveal that SD strategies are significant strategic tools to develop 
buyer-supplier relationships and increase a supplier’s performance and 
capabilities. SD efforts in improving supplier capabilities also benefit buyers with 
improved products and competitive advantage, thereby enhancing confidence in 
each other. Furthermore, firms make direct investments in suppliers in terms of 
on-site meetings, providing training and equipment, and indirect investments in 
terms of setting up performance targets and incentives for suppliers, and measures 
for SD activities. Both internal and external factors (e.g., length of buyer-supplier 
relationship, sharing of power, organizational strategies and technological 
uncertainties) are involved in implementing successful SD programmes that 
support long-term relationship development. Meanwhile, the top management 
role of both buyer and supplier acts as a facilitator in trust-building by permitting 
both partners to share important information. Supplier evaluation allows firms to 
keep a supplier’s operations consistent according to their required operational 
competency. Consequently, by implanting all the determinants of SD intact, both 
parties’ willingness towards and interest in SD are important facilitators, which 
create opportunities for improving operational and relationship performance. 
Therefore, this study contributes by proposing a combined research framework 
containing several benefits of cost efficiency, continuous quality progress, better 
customer services, improved delivery performance and reduced product cycle 
time. 
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4.3 Buyer-supplier relationship success 
Article 3 is entitled “Managing for success: the role of transactional and relational 
mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships”. Strategically managing buyer-
supplier relationships has become the most important driver of sustainable 
competitive advantage, such that firms in a supply chain network identify the 
significance of business relationships in terms of achieving organizational 
objectives and success. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to investigate the 
underlying effect of relationship governance factors in buyer-supplier 
relationships through multiple case studies. This article develops an integrated 
framework of transactional and relational factors that influence buyer-supplier 
relationship outcomes. The findings of this article demonstrate the impact of 
transactional and relational factors on transaction cost and relationship 
performance. This study reveals that trustworthiness facilitates relationship 
partners in safeguarding contingencies and resolving conflicts, which in turn 
results in achieving transaction value and cost advantage. Trust and effective 
communication are therefore found to be pivotal mechanisms in developing long-
term relationships. Further, symmetric interdependence reflects a higher 
transaction value through minimizing the potential of uncertainty and replicating 
a level of competitiveness and cooperation in the relationship. Figure 5 illustrates 
the combined framework of governance factors influencing transaction costs and 
relationship performance.  
This study provides a new dimension to managers in order to integrate and 
reconsider the most suitable transactional and relational factors while making 
decisions that support the minimization of transaction costs and the maximization 
of buyer-supplier relationship outcomes. Further, it provides insights that help in 
understanding the importance of these factors in inter-firm operations. 
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Figure 5. Integrated framework of relationship factors based on two 
theoretical perspectives 
4.4 The varying roles of relationship governance 
mechanisms  
Article 4 is entitled “The varying roles of governance mechanisms on ex-post 
transaction costs and relationship commitment in buyer-supplier relationships”. 
Building on TCE and SET, this article investigates the varying roles of economic 
(i.e., contract completeness and symmetric dependence) and sociological (i.e., 
trust and communication) governance mechanisms. A theoretical integrated 
framework is tested by employing a non-parametric technique (i.e., PLS) to SEM 
and semi-partial correlation. The proportion of the variance in the dependent 
variable (R2) that is predictable from the independent variable provides a 
satisfactory measure of how well observed outcomes are replicated by the model 
based on the proportion of total variation of outcomes explained by the model that 
is between 21% - 43%. However, as PLS-SEM does not offer fit indices, a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was computed in addition, wherein the results 
specified a good model fit. 
An analysis of data from 170 buyer-supplier relationships established by Finnish 
SMEs indicates that economic and sociological mechanisms are equally important 
in terms of transaction cost containment and relationship commitment 
development. Further, sociological mechanisms function as substitutes with 
contractual governance and complement symmetric dependence in relation to ex-
post transaction costs and relationship commitment. However, economic 
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governance mechanisms have a more effective role in minimizing ex-post 
transaction costs, whereas sociological governance mechanisms are more powerful 
in enhancing relationship commitment. This study contributes to the industrial 
marketing and management literature by portraying a comprehensive picture of 
relative effectiveness, as well as the joint use of both economic and sociological 
governance mechanisms influencing ex-post transaction costs and relationship 
commitment. The empirically comparative investigation into the concurrent 
examination of these two effects supports managers in understanding the relative 
influence of varying governance mechanisms in order to manage successful buyer-
supplier relationships. Such techniques provide firms with the opportunity to 
evaluate the relative effectiveness of various governance mechanisms. Governing 
successful inter-organizational relationships requires relationship managers to 
show their willingness and commitment towards planning and operationalizing an 
optimal governance structure. Firms should consider different governance 
mechanism choices for different transaction objectives such that managers are 
encouraged to examine which mechanism is more crucial for a particular task. 
4.5 Conflict resolution strategies and buyer-supplier 
relationship performance  
Article 5 is entitled “Conflict resolution strategies and buyer-supplier relationship 
performance: the role of governance mechanisms”. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate the relationship between relationship governance mechanisms (i.e., 
contract, interdependence, trust and communication), the choice of CRS and the 
effects on relationship performance. This approach is different from earlier 
conflict management studies and provides a more integrative perspective of the 
buyer-supplier conflict resolution process. The theoretical integrated framework 
is tested by employing variance-based PLS-SEM. The proportion of the variance in 
the dependent variable (R2) that is predictable from the independent variable 
provides a satisfactory measure of how well observed outcomes are replicated by 
the model based on the proportion of total variation of outcomes explained by the 
model that is between 28% - 42%. However, as PLS-SEM does not offer fit indices, 
a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was computed in addition, wherein the 
results specified a good model fit except GFI and NFI values that need further 
analysis.  
The results based on empirical evidence show that firms’ choice of CRS depends 
on the governance mechanisms employed between relationship partners. The 
problem-solving approach is the most preferable choice, while the legalistic 
approach remains the path of last resort, influenced by different governance 
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mechanisms. Interdependence and trust drive firms to compromise in order to 
resolve inter-organizational conflicts. Further, the strategies selected by firms may 
also bolster or deteriorate relationship performance. This study contributes to the 
industrial marketing literature by extending earlier conceptualizations, while 
linking both transactional and relational governance mechanisms with conflict 
resolution processes. It also demonstrates the effect of soft and hard CRS on buyer-
supplier relationship performance (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Conflict resolution in buyer-supplier relationships 
An awareness of possible actions and behaviours of partners thus prevails in the 
relationship during conflict, which help managers to achieve resolution effectively. 
Thus, mangers should understand that a cooperative and integrative problem-
solving approach is the most crucial of all CRS, as it facilitates open discussion and 
mutual agreement in order to obtain a “win-win” solution. Further, trustworthy 
relationships provide both partners with a level of confidence with which to 
compromise in the interests of the long-term relationship. Similarly, 
interdependency between firms drives them to compromise because of 
relationship-specific investments employed in the relationship. A legalistic 
strategy may be the last resort for managers in cases where partners cannot 
mutually break out of a deadlock situation. As this is a lengthy and expensive 
approach and can hurt partners’ feeling, managers should ensure that conflicts are 
resolved through alternative approaches in order to minimize the impact on 
relationship performance. 
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5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS   
The main purpose of this dissertation was to explore and highlight the 
effectiveness of governance structure in managing successful buyer-supplier 
relationships. Therefore, this chapter intends to present a discussion and 
conclusions concerning the dissertation, based on the findings of each article 
included in the study. It starts with the theoretical contributions of the dissertation 
by answering each sub-question, followed by a response to the main research 
question. The main research question is answered by providing a summary of the 
main findings of this dissertation in order to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the research topic. Furthermore, this chapter intends to offer 
significant managerial implications to firms that are involved in inter-firm 
relationships. This dissertation, therefore, advances TCE and SET by providing a 
holistic view of an effective governance structure in the context of buyer-supplier 
relationship development. Finally, this chapter outlines the main limitations and 
suggests potential future research avenues. 
5.1 Theoretical contributions  
In spite of the significance of buyer-supplier relationships and the effective roles 
of governance mechanisms, prior research has provided limited understanding 
and conflicting views of these fundamental strategic boundary decisions affecting 
business performance. Therefore, this dissertation aims to address the research 
gaps and investigates the antecedents of governance structure and its impact on 
inter-firm relationship performance in order to develop a better understanding of 
how firms can receive manifold benefits from managing successful inter-firm 
relationships, with a specific focus on the following: relationship development and 
performance improvement, relationship commitment, reduced ex-post 
transaction costs and conflict resolution. For this purpose, the dissertation 
attempts to address the concerns mentioned above in relation to the different 
relationship governance structure perspectives presented in the five articles. Each 
article addresses the research problem and contributes to the related research 
question by offering empirical testimony of the phenomenon. 
5.1.1 Answering research sub-question 1 
The first sub-question, “What approaches support the development of suppliers’ 
performance and how do SD strategies significantly improve buyer-supplier 
relationship development?”, is answered by the first two articles. This research 
question was so framed because the extant seminal research fails to recognize the 
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clarity of the process of SD within buyer-supplier relationship development. 
Particularly, the literature has overlooked the comprehensive framework of 
systematic SD strategies and approaches, which are employed to steer firms 
towards supporting buyer-supplier relationship development (Sillanpää et al., 
2015; Shahzad et al., 2016; Li et al., 2012). Therefore, Article 1 contributed to the 
literature by approaching this sub-question through identifying and constructing 
the most comprehensive set of SD strategies that can enhance suppliers’ 
performance and capabilities and provide a pathway towards improved buyer-
supplier relationships. The second article, which is a continuation of Article 1, 
approaches this sub-question by signifying different roles of SD strategies and 
investigating how these strategies encourage firms towards developing buyer-
supplier relationships by implementing and empirically validating the conceptual 
framework developed in the previous article.  
These approaches include supplier assessment (i.e., evaluation, certification and 
feedback), competitive pressure (i.e., multiple suppliers and threats of switching), 
supplier incentives (i.e., increased volumes, favourable status for future business, 
and recognition and rewards) and direct involvement (i.e., site visits, supplier 
training and investments). These efforts enhance the level of understanding 
between firms and encourage information-sharing, suppliers’ response to buyers’ 
needs, top management’s interest, and cross-functional teams, thereby improving 
relationship performance (Krause et al., 2007; Blonska et al., 2013). SD strategies 
can also be employed to enhance suppliers’ capabilities, from low involvement 
activities (i.e., evaluation) to more resource-demanding activities (i.e., investment 
and training) (Wagner & Krause, 2009; Arroyo-López et al., 2012). Firms that 
support suppliers’ capability development improve relationship commitment 
(Blonska et al., 2013); as such, it has emerged as a critical relational investment 
because such an idiosyncratic investments is difficult to redeploy and makes the 
relationship important to both firms, which in turn adds unique value to the 
relationship. Thus, theoretical and empirical evidence for a process framework 
involving a comprehensive set of SD strategies, as well as an explicit set of 
propositions, demonstrates that firms not only receive competitive advantage by 
implementing successful SD programmes but also improve operational and 
relationship performance (Li et al., 2012). Both Articles 1 and 2 clearly position 
their strands and contribute to the extant literature by linking SD and buyer-
supplier relationships, which was missing from or separately discussed in previous 
articles. 
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5.1.2 Answering research sub-question 2 
The second sub-question, “How do the underlying relationship governance factors 
affect buyer-supplier relationship outcomes?”, is answered by Article 3. This 
research sub-question was formulated because existing inter-firm relationship 
studies fail to provide a complete understanding of how firms in such a 
relationship are able to minimize their transaction costs and enhance relationship 
performance with reference to effective transactional and relational governance 
factors. This article mainly contributes to the existing research by exploring the 
degree to which effective relationship governance factors influence transaction 
costs and relationship outcomes. In particular, this article builds on the 
foundations of TCE and SET and advances the theoretical perspective by 
integrating their mechanisms of interdependence, contracts, communication and 
trust in a framework. It also contributes to an evaluation of these factors in 
combination, in relation to a specific relationship found in multiple case studies, 
where knowledge can be acquired in detail, and recommends how relationship 
partners can receive relationship benefits, even if the relationship is not 
sufficiently matured. In turn, the article reveals that relational governance 
mechanisms of trust and communication are more effective in enhancing 
relationship performance, which is a finding that is consistent with those of prior 
studies (e.g., Liu et al., 2009). Relationship partners intend to create a trustful 
environment in order to facilitate information sharing, conflict resolution and 
safeguarding contingencies (Dyer & Chu, 2011; Liu, Luo et al., 2017). Similarly, 
transactional factors are also important, as symmetric interdependence reflects a 
higher transaction value through minimizing the potential of uncertainty and 
replicating a level of competitiveness and cooperation in the relationship (Liu, Li 
et al., 2017; Shen, Wang & Teng, 2017). 
5.1.3 Answering research sub-question 3 
The third sub-question, “What are the major relationship governance mechanisms 
and what are the underlying varying roles of these mechanisms in minimizing 
transaction costs and inter-firm conflicts, and maximizing relationship 
commitment and relationship performance?”, is answered by Articles 4 and 5. This 
research sub-question was framed because, although prior inter-firm relationship 
governance literature identified ineffective governance as the key reason why 
relationships fail, it produced mixed evidence and conflicting views, and failed to 
explain explicitly the varying effective roles of relationship governance 
mechanisms in minimizing ex-post transaction costs and conflicts, and 
maximizing relationship commitment and performance. Conflicting empirical 
results on the nature of governance mechanisms (i.e., complementarity and/or 
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substitutes) and their isolated existence overlook the significant question about 
varying roles these mechanisms play. Employing effective relationship governance 
mechanisms has therefore emerged as a panacea for firms’ competitive woes, such 
as resource scarcity, higher transaction costs, conflicts and relational risks 
(Corsten et al., 2011). To this extent, these articles advance the theoretical streams 
by synthesizing two relevant theories (i.e., TCE and SET) and by offering a 
comprehensive picture of relationship governance mechanisms.    
Article 4 approaches this research sub-question by defining the relative 
effectiveness as well as the joint use of both transactional (i.e., contract 
completeness and symmetric dependence) and relational (i.e., trust and 
communication) governance mechanisms influencing ex-post transaction costs 
and relationship commitment. In particular, this article supports and add to the 
reasoning of TCE and SET by offering additional insights, while incorporating a 
complementarity view of sociological mechanisms and symmetric dependence, 
and a substitution view of sociological mechanisms and contract completeness. 
Thus, it suggests that forms of contractual governance function as substitutes with 
sociological governance and can be alternatively adopted, depending upon the 
objectives of the collaboration (Li et al., 2010; Wang, Yeung & Zhang, 2011). 
Instead, symmetric dependence more easily complements sociological governance 
because of its nature of relational embeddedness (Lee et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
the empirically comparative investigation into the concurrent examination of these 
two effects support us in understanding the relative influence of varying 
governance mechanisms in order to manage successful buyer-supplier 
relationships. Although both governance mechanisms drive cost advantage and 
commitment, their effects are different (Liu, Luo et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2016). 
Thus, different governance structures are required for different transaction 
objectives. A better understanding of relationship outcomes and collaboration 
goals drives managers to analyse which governance mechanism is more crucial for 
a particular task (Yang et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2009).  
Article 5 sets out to answer this research sub-question by providing new insights 
into conflict resolutions between buyer and supplier and models, relationship 
governance mechanisms (i.e., contract completeness, interdependence, trust and 
communication) as antecedents in the choice of CRS, and their impact on 
relationship performance. As this article argues that transactional and relational 
governance mechanisms may be connected to the choice of effective CRS when 
conflicts arise, firms should rely on these mechanisms in order to diminish 
conflicts and encourage cooperation. Article 5 significantly contributes to the TCE 
and SET literature and extends earlier conceptualizations by empirically testing a 
combined governance mechanism model for influencing conflict resolution 
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processes and identifying the most preferable strategy, as well as demonstrating 
the effect of soft and hard conflict strategies, which can suppress or bolster 
relationship performance. The findings validate and add to the theoretical 
reasoning by demonstrating that a problem-solving strategy is the most crucial 
conflict resolution approach (influenced by both transactional and relational 
mechanisms), and the most popular among firms during a conflict situation as it 
enables a cooperative environment (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). A legalistic 
strategy may be used as the last resort (i.e., when relationship partners cannot 
mutually break out of a deadlock situation), but preferable when specified contract 
terms are violated (Cannon et al., 2000; Lusch & Brown, 1996). Influenced by 
interdependence and trust between relationship partners, firms will seek to 
compromise in order to resolve conflicts (Han & Harms, 2010; Dyer, 1997; 
Ndubisi, 2011). Similarly, when trust is in place, relationship partners may 
compromise in order to pursue a longer-term relationship. Problem-solving and 
compromising are the most significant CRS that enhance relationship 
performance (e.g., Lin & Germain, 1998; Le Nguyen et al., 2015; Mohr & Spekman, 
1994), whereas a legalistic strategy can hurt partners’ feelings and diminish 
relationship performance (e.g., Le Nguyen et al., 2015; Lin & Germain, 1998; Lu, 
2006). Thus, it is important that relationship partners recognize the contextual 
situation in which choices are made concerning effective strategies (Lin & 
Germain, 1998) that help to anticipate conflict resolution behaviours (Lin & Wang, 
2002). 
5.2 Synthesized results and overall contributions 
This sub-section provides an answer to the main question of this dissertation: 
“What factors explain an effective relationship governance structure, and how does 
this governance structure ensure relationship outcomes when managing buyer-
supplier relationships?” In turn, it puts forward an explicit idea about the most 
relevant pathway for managing successful buyer-supplier relationships through 
employing and aligning a significant governance structure, which is missing from 
the literature. Effective inter-firm relationship governance signifies an efficient 
design of the economic exchange structure within which both relationship partners 
strive to collaborate and are fully devoted to fulfilling common business objectives, 
resulting in beneficial outcomes and relational stability (Liu et al., 2009; Luo et al., 
2015; Liu, Li et al., 2017; Liu, Luo et al., 2017). As discussed earlier, the significance 
of buyer-supplier relationships has been documented in relation to fundamental 
strategic boundary decisions affecting business performance; however, prior 
research has highlighted the salient governance structure with limited 
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understanding and conflicting views, thereby reflecting an apparent lack of 
consensus about the nature of efficiently managed buyer-supplier relationships.  
Therefore, this dissertation contributes to the inter-firm relationship governance 
literature by offering a comprehensively integrated theoretical and empirical 
framework, which explains the varying roles of relationship governance structure 
in successful buyer-supplier outcomes, based on the synthesized findings from all 
five articles. In particular, this dissertation significantly advances the relevant 
research by incorporating TCE and SET, as well as two relevant concepts of SD and 
relationship governance, on the premise that SD, and transactional and relational 
mechanisms are equally important factors in achieving manifold relational 
benefits. Figure 7 presents an overall picture of the important building blocks in 
systematic buyer-supplier governance. This framework addresses the research 
gaps and responds to the calls for systematic research (explained in Chapter 1 in 
detail) by answering the main research question and linking the missing dots in 
the literature. Furthermore, an important implication of this dissertation pertains 
to the empirical setting because it integrates both MNEs and SMEs from Finland 
into the empirical analysis and provides additional evidence regarding the varying 
roles of governance structure in buyer-supplier relationships. Finally, this 
dissertation also makes significant methodological contributions. As prior inter-
firm relationship governance research lacked the use of mixed methods (Golicic & 
Davis, 2012), this dissertation has employed such an approach in order to 
practically achieve the research objectives and arrive at a holistic understanding of 
a well-researched field of study by covering important elements of the research 
problem.   
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Figure 7. Synthesized research model 
5.3 Managerial implications  
Firms establish buyer-supplier relationships in order to achieve common 
objectives and relational benefits. They are also eager to develop these 
relationships, even in turbulent environments, and effectively cooperate to avoid 
uncertainties and operational hazards. An effective governance structure between 
relationship partners is central in terms of attaining transaction value. Therefore, 
this dissertation has intended to address the significant varying roles of 
governance structure in developing buyer-supplier relationships, in a way that is 
of practical value to business practitioners involved directly in inter-firm 
relationships, as well as innovative start-ups where technology and knowledge 
dependency is crucial. 
The multidimensional framework of this dissertation suggest that managers can 
receive manifold benefits from managing buyer-supplier relationships (i.e., 
transaction costs advantage, conflict resolutions, relationship development, long-
term commitment and relationship performance) by employing an effective 
governance structure. In particular, managers should consider implementing SD 
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programmes and involve suppliers proactively in developing capabilities in order 
to align their processes. These efforts towards capability development are critical 
relational investments, which influence suppliers’ behaviours that, in turn, help 
managers to achieve market responsiveness and attain the benefits of improved 
products/services through more capable and better performing suppliers, 
resulting in relational commitment and satisfaction. Top management 
involvement in SD is critical; it can control operational hazards by effective 
communication and information-sharing, and facilitate collaborative planning, 
education and training, and trust between them. Therefore, firms’ willingness 
towards and interest in implanting all the SD determinants intact should 
encourage them to align organizational objectives and construct an effective and 
competitive supply base. Thus, employing SD strategies, from supplier assessment 
to direct involvement, not only supports managers in enhancing suppliers’ 
performance, but also drives them towards long-term relationship development.              
Furthermore, this dissertation’s findings imply that managers should also 
understand the importance of relationship governance structure and ensure that 
optimal mechanism decisions are made under different transaction objectives. 
Cooperation goals will drive managers to make an assessment of the significance 
of potential factors for particular tasks. Although the level of contract 
completeness functions as the foundation of a relationship and prevents ex-post 
negotiations, once trust is developed between relationship partners, it enhances 
relational governance, resulting in long-term relationships through cost advantage 
and fostered commitment. Managers should therefore ensure a trustworthy 
relationship, which provides both partners with a certain level of confidence to 
compromise on a “middle-ground” when disagreement arises in order to continue 
pursuing a long-term relationship and align their business objectives accordingly. 
In addition, this dissertation proposes that managers should ensure the quality of 
the existing communication system, as this minimizes the possible information 
asymmetries and allows relationship partners to learn about each other by sharing 
substantial knowledge about internal operations and external market conditions. 
These efforts in support of open and timely information exchanges by managers 
will protect the relationship from conflicts, opportunism and behavioural 
uncertainty, as well as mitigate ex-post transaction costs, thereby keeping the 
firms committed to each other. This dissertation also suggests that 
interdependence between relationship partners hinders any exploitation and 
opportunistic behaviour because of idiosyncratic investments that are difficult to 
redeploy, thereby ensuring that the relationship is important to both firms. 
Similarly, in the case of inter-firm conflicts, interdependency in terms of the 
investments made in the relationship produces a socially embedded template and 
drives managers to follow relational norms by inducing a compromising approach 
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in resolving the issues that helps them to prevent opportunistic behaviour and 
facilitate integration and coordination.   
Notably, the findings also imply that managers should consider the 
interdependence between partners as a form of relational governance because of 
its nature of relational embeddedness, as well as adopting relational mechanisms 
and interdependence simultaneously, so that a perception of confidence, social 
goodwill and commitment is created between them. As contractual governance 
functions are substitutes within sociological governance, managers can adopt 
them alternatively, depending upon the objectives of the collaboration, because the 
presence of one obviates the use of another. This notion suggests to managers that 
the simultaneous use of these functions may complicate the understanding of the 
relationship, which in turn restricts the enhancement of relationship commitment. 
Another managerial implication of this dissertation is the relative importance of 
transactional and relational governance mechanisms, which suggests that 
managers seeking ex-post transaction cost advantages should pay more attention 
to transactional factors, whereas managers seeking to resolve a large number of 
conflicts in an informal manner and develop personal ties should refer more to 
relational factors.           
Inter-firm conflicts can never be avoided; however, the way in which managers 
respond to these situations plays a significant role in conflict resolution. As such, 
the dissertation’s findings also imply that, in the case of any conflict, managers 
should be aware of the possible actions and behaviours of their partners, as this 
will help them to understand the situation well and act accordingly. Managers 
must consider cooperative problem-solving and/or compromise approaches at 
first, as these are the most crucial CRS as they facilitate open discussion and 
mutual agreement in pursuit of a “win-win” solution and improved relationship 
performance. Unlike problem-solving and compromise strategies, a legalistic 
strategy may be the last resort for managers in cases where partners cannot 
mutually break out of a deadlock situation. As this is a lengthy and expensive 
approach, which can hurt partners’ feeling, managers should ensure that conflicts 
are resolved through alternative approaches in order to minimize the impact on 
relationship performance. 
5.4 Limitations and future research  
As with any piece of research, this study has some research limitations, which need 
to be acknowledged. While every single article contains its own discussion on 
limitations in detail, this subsection sheds light on the overall limitations of the 
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dissertation in more general terms and offers potential future research 
suggestions. First, the overall outcomes of this dissertation are based on diverse 
industries, where the sample in the study consisted of firms in multiple industries, 
as opposed to focusing on a specific industry. This approach limits the dissertation 
and opens up avenues for further research in terms of replicating and extending 
its findings in a specific empirical context in order to investigate the framework 
and narrow the research scope. Doing so could reveal interesting findings, which 
would facilitate a comparison between industries (e.g., manufacturing and/or 
service industry, technology and knowledge depending start-ups, global markets) 
under different conditions of power, competitive intensity and uncertainty, and an 
understanding of the extent to which firms are willing to manage these 
relationships. Second, the meta-inference of this dissertation is based on the 
integrated findings of two different empirical settings (i.e., MNEs and SMEs), 
because the empirical data were collected separately. This dissertation suggests 
that future researchers should conduct a comparative analysis of these two 
different empirical settings in order to link comparative behaviours of firms with 
the importance of governance structure in their operations. Given that MNEs and 
SMEs are highly different in size and have different amounts of resources, the level 
of dependence varies according to investments made in a relationship. Further, 
regardless of the chosen data collection methods, some additional techniques, such 
as holding focus groups and carrying out a review of records and other documents, 
could have increased the scope and depth of analysis in order to gather additional 
information about the level of efficacy in a governance structure as an important 
platform in developing relationships. Third, this dissertation has only focused on 
upstream business relationships in the supply chain, in which the focal firms were 
asked to respond in relation to their key supplier during data collection. In this 
vein, further research is suggested in order to first compare the roles played by 
governance structure among other suppliers in the upstream, and then perform 
the same exercise for downstream operations. By doing so, we would assume 
remarkably different findings because of the different boundary decisions with 
respect to the acquisition of requisite capabilities.  
Fourth, this dissertation has constructed a comprehensive framework and 
presented conclusions, based on the integration of five articles representing 
different concepts, which is a theoretically justified approach. However, an 
attempt to empirically investigate and verify the interaction among these concepts 
of SD strategies, CRS and relationship governance mechanisms, in order to explain 
buyer-supplier relationship outcomes, is lacking. To this extent, further studies 
could endeavour to empirically investigate these important concepts, in parallel, 
in order to produce more holistic conclusions. Fifth, although this dissertation 
acknowledges opportunism as one of the major strands of TCE and portrays it as 
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a potential obstacle to nurturing cooperation, it does not adopt opportunism as its 
unit of analysis in order to determine what type of relationship governance 
structure can mitigate opportunism, and in what way. Further studies should 
attempt to explore and identify the most relevant governance structure for 
curtailing opportunism in inter-firm relationships, thereby offering important 
insights into the dynamics of repeated exchange. Sixth, this dissertation is based 
on a cross-sectional approach, where only Finnish buyers’ perspective of 
employing a governance structure was probed, which limits its capacity to reflect 
the constant and dynamic process of relationship development. Thus, a dyadic 
perspective of the Nordic region and/or emerging markets within a longitudinal 
setting should help researchers to offer a holistic viewpoint of the challenges in 
managing inter-firm relationships. Lastly, drawing on TCE and SET, this 
dissertation adds some new factors to relationship governance structures, which 
impact buyer-supplier relationship outcomes, while leaving out other factors, such 
as relational norms, uncertainty, complexity, influence strategies and unexplored 
goal congruence. Further research could provide both theoretical and empirical 
understandings of the varying roles of these factors, individually as well as jointly, 
in the process of minimizing operational hazards, conflicts, opportunism and 
transaction costs, and maximizing dynamic capabilities and knowledge transfer. 
While there are both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs, this dissertation only 
focuses on the latter. As such, future researchers are encouraged to investigate the 
impact of several governance structure factors on a broad range of transaction 
costs (i.e., ex-ante and ex-post). 
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6 CONCLUSIONS   
In today’s business environment, firms have realized the importance of their ‘make 
or buy’ boundary decisions and their preferences for market transactions or 
hierarchies in the case of high or low opportunism and transaction cost 
possibilities. When firms decide to procure items/services from the market, their 
network relationships become a significant source of gaining access to the required 
resources, as well as fostering joint performance and long-term exchange 
relationships. Therefore, firms are eager to improve relationship performance by 
employing an effective relationship governance structure. In prior research, the 
significance of these network relationships has been documented in terms of 
strategic boundary decisions affecting business performance, although with 
limited understanding and conflicting views. Thus, the essential purpose of this 
study was to investigate the significant varying roles concerning relationship 
governance structure in order to provide an explicit idea of the most relevant 
pathway for managing successful buyer-supplier relationships. The mixed method 
approach adopted by this dissertation enabled us to combine both qualitative and 
quantitative studies in order to provide a more holistic picture in response to the 
main research question. The research indicated the importance of the 
appropriateness of the design of relationship governance mechanisms, within 
which both relationship partners strive to collaborate and are fully devoted to 
fulfilling common business objectives, resulting in beneficial outcomes and 
relational stability. In particular, by combining the building blocks of different 
concepts, the research findings demonstrate that SD strategies, relationship 
governance mechanisms and CRS are equally important factors in achieving lower 
ex-post transaction costs, and improving relationship commitment, relationship 
development and relationship performance.  
This dissertation extends the understanding of inter-firm management and 
organizations, while positioning itself between the pertinent theoretical concepts 
of SD, relationship governance mechanisms and conflict resolution processes in 
buyer-supplier relationships by linking them and offering a critical redirection of 
existing views. Building on TCE and SET, this study also argues that single-source 
dependence can be risky in dynamic and turbulent business environments; firms, 
therefore, should become directly involved by investing in transaction-specific 
resources, which have a lower alternative value, in order to create a more 
specialized resource. Supplier governance processes enhance the level of 
understanding between firms and include SD efforts that encourage suppliers to 
respond to buyers’ needs in terms of cost, quality, delivery and flexibility. Given 
that operational hazards are incurred in the course of maintaining any 
relationship, SD efforts can help to deter suppliers from pursuing opportunistic 
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behaviour and offset buyers’ operational uncertainty, thereby resulting in a 
cooperative buyer-supplier relationship that alleviates operational costs. Similarly, 
transactional and relational governance mechanisms are of equal importance and 
provide institutional frameworks for managing inter-firm transactions, although 
their effects are different. Relationship partners need to understand their 
relationship objectives and outcomes clearly in order to analyse and employ the 
most appropriate governance mechanisms for specific tasks. Such approaches also 
provide opportunities to both partners in terms of determining the relative 
importance as well as the interaction (complementarity and/or substitutions) of 
these factors, within which firms can adopt them simultaneously and/or 
alternatively in order to achieve long-term cost benefits and improved relationship 
performance by countering conflicts between partners. Furthermore, the varying 
nature of these governance mechanisms enables firms to adapt effective CRS, 
which facilitate cooperative behaviour, address their interests and feelings, and 
satisfy their needs and relationship objectives. Therefore, this dissertation 
concludes that a critical understanding of how to achieve relational benefits resides 
in establishing an aligned governance structure between relationship partners. 
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1 Introduction 
Supplier development was used by Leenders (1996) first to explain the determination by 
manufacturers to enhance the supplier’s numbers and to improve their performance.  
After that, researchers in supply chain management started a discussion of supplier 
development. In the same time, organisational theorists began discussion of  
complex-product businesses that incline to be considered as high degree of mutual 
interdependence of transitional module makers and ultimate assemblers (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). 
One of the supplier development literature part states and explains the actions before 
supplier development concept takes place called ‘the antecedents’ (Krause, 1999). He 
identifies that 
1 organisations need to manage their suppliers strategically for the competitive market 
2 buying firms need to take a strategic viewpoint for suppliers, consider the purchasing 
function as a significant source for competitive advantage, and make investments in 
development of suppliers’ performance and capabilities 
3 to increase the supplier commitments, buying firms need to consider their suppliers 
as virtual extensions that helps to motivate them to improve their performance 
4 a relationship between buyer and suppliers identifies the opportunity to invest into 
the supplier development programmes 
5 communication and information sharing between buyer and suppliers is an important 
prerequisite to supplier development activities (Krause, 1999). 
 
 Acta Wasaensia 69 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Supplier development and buyer-supplier relationship strategies 229    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Moreover, supplier performances and capabilities have significant existence and play a 
pivotal role maintaining the manufacturing firms’ competitive advantage (Humphreys  
et al., 2001; Krause, 1997; Watts and Hahn, 1993). Supplier development may include 
goal setting, supplier evaluation, performance measurement, supplier training, and  
other related activities (Krause et al., 2007). Supplier development approaches could be 
summarised into Table 1. 
Table 1 Supplier development approaches 
Factor Author Explanation 
Communication Krause (1997), Galt and Dale 
(1991), Wen-Li et al. (2003) and 
Wagner and Krause (2009) 
Interaction between supplier 
and buyer 
Competitive pressure 
among suppliers 
Krause (1997), Galt and Dale 
(1991) and Wen-Li et al. (2003) 
Use of two suppliers to create 
competition 
Contract Galt and Dale (1991) Contract between the buyer and 
supplier 
Customer base Chakraborty and Philip (1996) Suppliers number of customers 
Demographic 
information 
Watts and Hahn (1993) and  
Krause and Scannell (2002) 
Information like gross annual 
contract sales, number of 
employees, etc. 
Direct involvement Krause (1997) and  
Krause and Scannell (2002) 
Buyer firm site visits, product 
knowledge, training of 
suppliers personnel, investment 
to suppliers operation 
Green supplier 
development 
Blome et al. (2014), Dou et al. 
(2013), Igarashi et al. (2013),  
Fu et al. (2012), Lee and Kim 
(2011) and Bai and Sarkis (2010) 
Green and sustainable supplier 
development 
Interdependence Chakraborty and Philip (1996) The relationship with buyer and 
supplier 
Level of involvement in 
supplier development 
programmes 
Watts and Hahn (1993) and  
Krause and Ellram (1997a) 
Management support for 
supplier development projects 
Local versus 
international sourcing 
Galt and Dale (1991) Product is produced locally or 
sourced from abroad 
Product development 
involvement 
Chakraborty and Philip (1996), 
Arumugam et al. (2011) and  
Talluri et al. (2010) 
The role that the supplier plays 
in product development 
Supplier base Krause (1997) and  
Galt and Dale (1991) 
Number of suppliers in buyer 
firm supplier base 
Supplier certification Galt and Dale (1991) and  
Krause and Scannell (2002) 
Buyer nominate best 
performing suppliers 
Supplier development 
incentives 
Krause (1997) and 
Krause and Scannell (2002) 
Promising current benefits, 
promising future business, 
recognition achievement 
Supplier development 
outcomes 
Hartley et al. (1997) Result-oriented,  
process-oriented 
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Table 1 Supplier development approaches (continued) 
Factor Author Explanation 
Supplier development 
programme objectives 
Watts and Hahn (1993) and 
Arráiz et al. (2013) 
To improve quality, on time 
deliveries, technical capability, 
etc. 
Supplier development 
programme perspective 
Watts and Hahn (1993), Krause 
and Ellram (1997a) and  
Arroyo-López et al. (2012) 
New sources or long term 
cooperation. 
Supplier development 
programme team 
Watts and Hahn (1993) Nominated teams for supplier 
development. 
Supplier evaluation Krause (1997), Watts and Hahn 
(1993), Wen-Li et al. (2003), 
Krause and Ellram (1997a),  
Hahn et al. (1990) and 
Humphreys et al. (2004) 
Buyer personal is assigned to 
study the present system 
followed by supplier or 
supplier itself providing the 
required data about their 
present system to the buyer 
Supplier involvement in 
product development 
and innovation 
Johnsen (2009) Supplier involved in product 
development and innovation 
which shorter time to market 
and improved quality. 
Supplier satisfaction Ghijsen et al. (2010) Indirect influence strategies and 
promises encourage supplier 
satisfaction. 
Supplier selection Galt and Dale (1991), Igarashi  
et al. (2013), Ordoobadi (2009), 
Ho et al. (2010), Lee (2009),  
Önüt et al. (2009) and  
Chen and Li (2008) 
Selection of suppliers 
according piece, quality,  
on time deliveries, etc. 
Supplier training Krause (1997) and  
Galt and Dale (1991) 
Training programme  
with supplier organised  
by buyer firm 
Task structure Chakraborty and Philip (1996) Unstructured, semi-structured, 
structured 
Vendor selection 
methods 
Chakraborty and Philip (1996) Open tender, closed tender, 
direct selection 
The term ‘suppliers’ has become a substantial party who are not only suppliers of goods 
these days but they have become strategic partners for the firm which represents the 
importance of their role in the value chain (Kwon et al., 2010). Supplier relationship 
management or buyer-supplier relationship in a global supply environment is the 
concepts of management network that involves different skills and knowledge into the 
field and enhance the possibility of performance (Lintukangas, 2011). Therefore, the 
relationship between buyer and supplier provide a pivotal prospect for firms to develop 
strategically global competitive advantage. These relationships have developed to the 
level of strategic partnership relationship rather competitive (Loppacher et al., 2011). 
There are some success factors which influence supplier development including: 
1 effective communication 
2 an attitude of partnership 
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3 mutual commitment 
4 top management support. 
These factors really define the aspect of supplier development and its success which 
ultimately is a resource to develop buyer-supplier relationship and continuous 
performance improvement through competitive advantage (Sucky and Durst, 2013). 
The process of supplier development is a dimension of supplier development 
research. For the purpose, Hartley and Choi (1996) suggest a process model which 
consists of five factors. These five factors are: 
1 supplier’s team leadership 
2 supplier’s top management commitment 
3 capable joint-development team 
4 data driven changes 
5 success of a model line. 
Previous studies state that buying firms can communicate more efficiently with suppliers 
if they put efforts in supplier development including supplier evaluation, supplier 
training, and supplier award programmes (Krause and Ellram, 1997b). Furthermore, they 
perceive their suppliers as partners and place a better emphasis on some serious issues 
(Krause and Ellram, 1997a). Buying firm’s tendency to engage in supplier development 
was affected by its perception of supplier obligation, its anticipation of relationship 
endurance and operative buyer-supplier communication (Krause, 1999). In the following, 
there are factors to increase supplier’s performance and competences and infrastructure 
factors of supplier development (Humphreys et al., 2004). 
Table 2 Factors to improve performance and supplier development 
Infrastructure factors of  
supplier development Factors to improve supplier performance 
Strategic goals Increasing supplier performance goals 
Effective communication Providing the supplier with training 
Long term commitment Equipment, technological support and investment 
Top management support Personnel exchanging 
Supplier evaluation Evaluation of supplier performance 
Supplier strategic objectives Recognising supplier progress in the form of awards 
Trust  
Source: Humphreys et al. (2004) 
More specifically, the determinations of the systematic review are to highlight the 
supplier development strategies, and buyer-supplier relationships to meet the short and 
long term supply needs with the help of detailed and updated literature. This will lead to 
examine the impact of supplier development on buyer-supplier performance and will 
provide a research framework to identify the step by step process of supplier 
development and improved buyer-supplier relationships. Moreover, this study explores 
the examples and literature on supplier development strategies and relationships to 
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identify areas for future research to provide a platform based on the detailed literature 
review (Krause et al., 1998; Krause, 1997, 1999; Giunipero, 1990). 
The idea of this study is significantly objective which clarifies the supplier 
development strategies and approaches, their impacts, and developing buyer-supplier 
relationships. Thus, this important study collaborates and combines the framework of 
supplier development approaches which lead to develop a strong relationship and provide 
the answers to the following research question of the study: 
x What approaches support to develop suppliers’ performance to improve buyer-
supplier relationships? 
The main question of the study can be divided into the following sub-questions: 
1 What are the significant supplier development approaches in the literature which 
help buyers to improve the performance of suppliers? 
2 How buyer-supplier relationships can be developed to highlight and to provide the 
important factors in the relationships for empirical examination? 
3 Finally, how to combine supplier development strategies with buyer-supplier 
relationship framework to answer empirical questions? 
This research identifies and addresses above mentioned questions by investigating a link 
between different strategies of supplier development and buyer-supplier relationships 
performance outcomes. 
The following section reviews the research methodology used in this research  
paper. Based on this review and methodology, a detail literature review is presented  
in Section 3. Section 4 presents research framework based on the literature. 
Discussion/conclusions, future research perspectives/implications are discussed in 
Section 5 and Section 6 respectively. 
2 Research methodology 
A literature review is a critical summary and assessment of the range of existing materials 
dealing with knowledge and understanding. The purpose is to discover the research 
project, to customise its context or background, and to provide insights into previous 
work (Blaxter et al., 2010). One of the critical primary responsibilities of a researcher is 
to find out and analyse the existing literature concerns to a research topic (Kumar, 2011). 
It consists of a comprehensive research through a variety of resources such as books, 
journals, electronic journals, and abstracts. According to Kumar (2011), a literature 
review has three functions. First, it explains and emphasis the research question helping 
researcher to understand the subject area completely and different theoretical approaches 
applied previously. Secondly, it may develop the methodology. Literature review helps 
researcher to observe the other investigators’ approach to study the chosen phenomena 
and validity of methodologies. Third, a literature review helps to expand the researcher’s 
knowledge of the area and provide a better command of the chosen area and relevant 
issues. The greater understanding on existing research area reinforces the validity and 
findings (Rudestam et al., 2007). 
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This research paper follows the ideologies for systematic literature review proposed 
by Tranfield et al. (2003) to ensure the consistency and significance to the practice. In 
this study, a literature review was employed as the research methodologies to develop a 
supply chain strategy framework. The literature on supply chain strategies was composed 
primary from journals in the areas of strategic management, supply chain management, 
operations research and operations management. The target was to focus on latest 
journals from last decade and that is why dissertations, textbooks, unpublished working 
papers, and conference papers were excluded. The literature search incorporated journals 
published by numerous publishers and research was done using Scopus which is one of 
the largest abstract and citation database of research literature. Several hundreds of 
journal articles were found and that is why the research has to focus the most relevant, 
cited and newest journals. 
3 Supplier development 
3.1 Supplier development strategies 
Hahn et al. (1990) proposed a theoretical model for supplier development and document 
industry practice. Krause et al. (2000) characterise following useful supplier development 
strategies: 
x Competitive pressure: Multiple suppliers are more important to develop competitive 
pressure which help and motivate other suppliers to enhance quality and maintain 
improved performance (Tezuka, 1997). 
x Evaluation and certification systems: Supplier evaluation and certification system 
ensures the suppliers’ performance and organisation’s expectation of performance. It 
motivates suppliers to improve performance consecutively (Krause et al., 2000;  
Carr and Pearson, 1999). 
x Incentives: Buying firm can offer incentives to motivate suppliers to develop their 
performance and capabilities which include achieved cost savings sharing, increased 
volumes consideration, future aspects for business, and recognising them through 
awards (Monczka et al., 1993; Krause et al., 1998). 
x Direct involvement: Organisations follow a pre-emptive method to develop 
suppliers’ performance through direct involvement (Krause et al., 2000;  
Monczka et al., 1993). Direct involvement can be investments in operations or 
manufacturers can acquire supplier firm (Dyer, 1996). 
According to Krause et al. (1998), buying firms follow an evolutionary path to develop 
suppliers’ performance. In the adoption of TQM, respondents specified that they had 
implemented many or all of the TQM involvements, i.e., focus on customer requirements, 
supplier partnerships, cross-functional teams, use of scientific methods for performance 
measurement, and use of quality tools. Moreover, external suppliers focus helps 
companies to conduct a thorough supply base evaluation of acknowledgment to develop 
material quality, lower development costs, reduce purchase prices, and improve  
supplier responsiveness. After the supply base evaluation, organisations emphasis on 
amalgamation of purchased volumes with fewer suppliers to remove the suppliers’ 
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incapability of meeting expectations. To further improve the performance and capabilities 
of their supply bases, respondent firms engaged in supplier development (Krause et al., 
1998). 
Figure 1 Progression towards supplier’s development strategies and improved performances 
 
Higher 
Relative supply 
base performance/ 
capability level 
 
Progression towards supplier development strategies and improved supplier performance 
TOTAL QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Time 
Lower 
STRATEGIC SUPPLIE
DEVELOPMENT 
SUPPLY BASE 
ASSESSMENT 
REACTIVE SUPPLIER
DEVELOPMENT 
SUPPLY BASE 
REDUCTION  
 
Source: Krause et al. (1998) 
Table 3 Overview of differences between reactive and strategic supplier development 
Factors Reactive Strategic 
Primary question A supplier performance problem has 
occurred – what is needed to correct 
the specific problem? 
We have dedicated resources to 
develop the supply base – where 
should resources be allocated for 
the greatest benefit? 
Primary objective Correction of supplier deficiency Continuous improvement of supply 
base 
 Short-term improvements Long-term competitive advantages 
Unit of analysis Single supplier Supply base 
 Supplier development project Supplier development programme 
Selection/ 
prioritisation 
process 
Supplier self-selects through 
performance or capability deficiency 
Portfolio analysis 
Problem-driven Pareto analysis of 
commodity/suppliers 
 Market-driven 
Drivers 
(examples) 
Delivery dates missed Supplier integration into the buying 
firm’s operation 
Quality defects Supply chain optimisation 
Negative customer feedback Continuous improvement 
Competitive threat for buying firm Value-added collaboration 
Production disruptions Technology development 
Change in make/buy decision Seek competitive advantage 
Source: Krause et al. (1998) 
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Krause et al. (1998) presents reactive and strategic supplier development approaches.  
In the strategic supplier development, initiatives are typically carried out by an  
executive-level team, with an execution plan being articulated and carried out by a  
cross-functional commodity team. In this way, reactive firms were not efficient enough in 
supplier performance assessment and further they recognised as candidates for supplier 
development only after a problem actually occurred. Table 3 explains some of the major 
differences between strategic (systematic) and reactive (remedial) approaches to supplier 
development (Krause et al., 1998). 
Krause et al. (1998) present a generic process model for supplier development 
including ten steps to make systematic supplier development in process-oriented way. It 
includes critical commodities for development, identify critical suppliers for 
development, form cross-functional commodity team, initiate communication with 
suppliers management, identify critical performance areas for improvement to gain 
competitive advantage, identify opportunities and probability for improvement, develop 
agreements on improvements, provide joint resources as required and implement supplier 
development effort, rewards and recognition and finally systematically institute ongoing 
continuous improvement (Krause et al., 1998). 
Figure 2 Strategic supplier development process 
 Identify critical commodities 
for development 
Identify critical suppliers  
for development 
Form cross-functional 
commodity team 
Identify critical performance  
areas for improvement to gain 
competitive advantage 
Initiate communication with 
supplier’s management 
 
Rewards and recognition 
Identify opportunities and 
probability for improvement 
Provide joint resources as  
required and implement  
supplier development effort 
Develop agreements  
on improvements 
Systematically institute 
ongoing continuous 
improvements 
 
Source: Krause et al. (1998) 
3.2 The impact of supplier development on buyer-supplier performance and 
relationship 
Supplier development activities can be categorised into transaction-specific and 
organisational structure of supplier development. The factors of supplier development 
infrastructure affect the performance of buyers and suppliers (Humphreys et al., 2004). In 
this vein, transaction-specific supplier development is the basic practice for buying 
organisations to develop suppliers’ performance and capabilities (Krause, 1999). 
Moreover, supplier development includes direct investment in assets focused to buyer 
and supplier perspective and training with transaction-specific knowledge (Joshi and 
Stump, 1999). Krause (1999) explains that buyer’s direct involvement to develop 
suppliers’ performance is a key approach for the development and improved quality 
performance. 
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The clarity of long-term strategic goals determines the effectiveness of supplier 
development. Supplier development efforts should focus on future capabilities in 
technology and product development rather than on current quality and cost (Watts and 
Hahn, 1993). Effective communication plays a key role between buyers and suppliers to 
motivate them (Newman and Rhee, 1990; Giunipero, 1990); it enhances the mutual 
understanding of both parties and reassures the conflict resolution (Spekman, 1988).  
A long term commitment of buying firm assures a relationship with suppliers where 
suppliers willingly can make changes in their operations to fulfil the requirements of 
buyer (Lascelles and Dale, 1989). Supplier evaluation is another important strategy to 
improve buyer-supplier performance. For the purpose, buyers should select suppliers 
carefully and evaluate them regularly. Supplier evaluation results could provide valuable 
information about general areas of weakness where performance improvements were 
needed. When suppliers follow further developments of its performance and capability by 
itself to improve competence, a rational and tactical match come into exist between buyer 
and supplier management which increases possibilities of success in the cooperation 
(Stuart and McCutcheon, 1995). Trust between buyer and supplier is needed to improve 
the performance and capabilities of supplier and specially when they jointly investing 
into a business. Transaction-specific investments help to increase the buyer’s reliance on 
the particular trading association and expose them to larger risk and uncertainty (Krause, 
1999). Buyers must safeguard themselves against the hazards of opportunism of 
suppliers. Buyer trust in the supplier would enhance the effect of buyer assets specificity 
on joint action in buyer-supplier relations (Humphreys et al., 2004). 
According to Humphreys et al. (2004), performance consequences are defined in 
various extents in the purchasing literature. Giunipero (1990) suggested that capability to 
handle suppliers’ quality, delivery, and lead time, and also to control the acquisition cost 
has a significant dimension where purchasing function’s efficiency can be measured. 
Watts and Hahn (1993) explained that supplier performance improvement indicator is 
most important factor to measure the result of supplier development. Moreover, Monczka 
et al. (1993) stated the key objectives supplier development which a buying firm initiate 
to increase the competitive advantage of buyer and to improve the relationship between 
buyer and supplier. In this vein, Humphreys et al. (2004) presented three dimensions of 
supplier development outcomes, i.e., 
1 supplier performance 
2 buyer competitive advantage 
3 buyer-supplier relationship improvement (Humphreys et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, Hahn et al. (1990) state that upgrading existing suppliers’ performance and 
capabilities help in supplier development to fulfil the changing competitive requirements. 
Improvements in supplier performance focus on perception of buyers about the quality, 
delivery, cost, inventory, lead time, and the rate of new product introduction aspects. 
Further, linking a purchasing strategy with buying firm’s overall corporate competitive 
strategy objectively develops the long-term relations and suppliers’ performance and 
capabilities. Competitive advantage development of a buying firm should be one 
indicator of efficiency in supplier development (Hahn et al., 1990). Thus, Stuart and 
McCutcheon (1993) suggested that competitive advantage of buying firms includes 
market share gains, quality, cost reduction and quick product development. On the  
other hand, Heide and John (1990) noted that firms efficiently make alliances when  
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there is some scope and possibility of joint activities. For the purpose, the performance 
results of buyers are mainly reliant on the performance outcomes of their suppliers. In 
manufacturing industries, buying firms have four key competitive priorities in their  
end markets, i.e., cost, quality, delivery time and reliability, flexibility, and outcome of 
promise (Krause et al., 2007). 
Buying firms’ development in the product cost is reliant partially on subcomponent 
suppliers’ improvement that means it can be a reduction in rework, scrap, and downtimes. 
The benefits by reducing the supplier’s cost should be partially transferred to the 
industrial customers in low prices form (Clark, 1989; Human and Provan, 1997; Turnbull 
et al., 1992). In automotive and electronics industry, the manufacturer follow a low costs 
of their supplied inputs, lower in final assembly and to provide a competitive price  
to the consumers (MacDuffie, 1995). Organisations have a key concern about the 
manufacturing flexibility to meet the changing needs of their customers but flexibility of 
assembler can be perceived to be a function of suppliers’ quality, delivery time, 
reliability, and flexibility (Krause et al., 2007; Dyer, 1996; Liker and Wu, 2000; 
Meredith, 2000; Womack et al., 2007). 
Performance improvements are often only possible required by buying firms when 
they make a long-term relationship commitment with their key suppliers (Krause et al., 
2007). Previous research suggests that suppliers will be reluctant to promise or commit a 
relationship specific investment if buying firms are unwilling to sustain long term 
relationships and mutual investments to improve suppliers’ performance (Krause, 1999). 
Moreover, suppliers consider relationship specific investments as susceptible to 
resourcefulness when commitments are not tangible or approaching from buying firms 
(Krause et al., 2000). In this way, supplier development efforts from a buying firm for a 
purpose to develop the performance or capabilities are more significant to analyse the 
influence on the its performance and competitive strategy within the buyer-supplier 
relationship domain (Krause et al., 2000, 1998; Wagner, 2006). For the purpose, Wagner 
and Krause (2009) stated that to understand the performance improvements in cost, 
quality and delivery and advantage from increased supplier capabilities, the buyers and 
suppliers need to jointly involve in relationship focused investments. They may also 
contribute resources for the development, i.e., information sharing and investing in 
physical and human assets (Hunter et al., 1996; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). 
Wagner and Krause (2009) highlighted the research gap in supplier development and 
explained that research has been lacking because of missing distinction in between 
supplier development objectives and performance achievements. The relatively less 
research does not clarify the various goals for supplier development efforts that can be 
affected on the relationship between buyers and suppliers. For the purpose, Wagner and 
Krause (2009) presented the important study of supplier development goals. They 
presented a study where the difference between goals which are short-term in nature and 
immediate (delivery, order cycle times, and quality) and long-term goals in nature 
(strengthening a supplier’s managerial, product development, and processes 
competences) are highlighted (Wagner and Krause, 2009). Further, supplier development 
goals will emphasise and focus on the measurable results of suppliers. On the other hand, 
a combined value creation needs much more efforts from buyers and suppliers; 
harmonised and combined capabilities, and a long-term focus on suppliers’ performance 
and capabilities (Wagner and Krause, 2009). Supplier evaluation and feedback may be 
the significant activities to develop suppliers while training them, by sharing and 
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transferring employees from one to another, and some other related activities (Monczka 
et al., 1993; Wagner, 2006). 
Moreover, Terpend et al. (2008) explained that empirical outcomes of studies propose 
the performance of a purchasing organisation which is achieved through integration of 
buyer/supplier firms generally and specially by integration of product development, 
collaborative planning, and integration of information system (Ellram and Liu, 2002; 
Frohlich and Westbrook, 2002; Narasimhan and Kim, 2002; Rosenzweig et al., 2003; 
Droge et al., 2004; Petersen et al., 2005b). Further, supplier development factors effect an 
organisation financially, i.e., it has effect on sales of buying company, return on equity 
(ROE), total return to shareholders, and net present value (NPV). Many studies explain 
that supplier development also has a significant impact on operational performance 
improvement, i.e., cost, quality, and cycle time (Rosenzweig et al., 2003; Tracey, 2004; 
Petersen et al., 2005a). 
Park et al.’s (2001) propose that suppliers with maximum performance assessment 
have a strong impact on process development competences but those who emphasise 
conformance quality; they will not have strongest process development capability. In this 
vein, McGinnis and Vallopra (2001) established that a strong connection of purchasing 
function of buying firm assists supplier process development competencies and making 
sure supplier participation with high priority which is significant for the supplier 
development to improve performance and capabilities. Moreover, Krause and Scannell 
(2002) stated that product-oriented organisations are more expectedly depend upon  
the encouragements, drives, motivations, direct connection, and participation than  
service-based organisations. Further, operational factors like communication develops the 
performance of suppliers and play a key role in supplier development whereas 
collaborating and sharing information endorses reduction in cycle time and improve 
financial performance of buying firm and expand supplier’s commitment (Rosenzweig  
et al., 2003; Tracey, 2004; Petersen et al., 2005a). 
Figure 3 Buyer-supplier relationships 
 
BUYER MECHANISMS 
COMMONLY USED 
 
%X\HU3UDFWLFHV
Ͳ JIT implementation 
Ͳ Power/dependence 
Ͳ Contractual Clauses 
Ͳ Supplier evaluation 
Ͳ Supplier selection 
Ͳ Supply base reduction 
Ͳ Supplier incentives 
 
%X\HU6XSSOLHU0XWXDO(IIRUWV
Ͳ Communication 
Ͳ Information sharing 
Ͳ Specific investments 
Ͳ EDI adoption 
Ͳ Trust 
Ͳ Knowledge sharing 
Ͳ Integrated NPD 
DERIVED VALUE SOUGHT 
 
2SHUDWLRQDOSHUIRUPDQFHEDVHG
Ͳ Quality 
Ͳ Cost  
Ͳ Delivery 
Ͳ Inventory  
Ͳ Speed/lead time 
Ͳ Flexibility  
Ͳ Agility 
 
,QWHJUDWLRQEDVHG
Ͳ Improved cooperation 
Ͳ Reduction of risk/opportunism 
Ͳ Coordination of activities  
Ͳ Knowledge acquisition/transfer 
 
6XSSOLHU&DSDELOLW\EDVHG
Ͳ Global capability 
Ͳ Continuous improvement 
Ͳ Technology acquisition  
Ͳ Improved NPD 
0DUNHW&KDUDFWHULVWLFV
%X\LQJ)LUP¶V&KDUDFWHULVWLFV
3URGXFW&KDUDFWHULVWLFV 
Buyer-Supplier Relationships 2001–2005 
BUYER FINANCIAL 
OUTCOMES 
Ͳ Profit/profit margin 
Ͳ Return on sales 
Ͳ Return on assets 
Ͳ Return on investment 
Ͳ Market share 
Ͳ Net present value 
Ͳ NIBT 
Ͳ Sales/sales growth 
Ͳ Return on equity 
Ͳ Total return to shareholders 
 
Source: Terpend et al. (2008) 
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Liker and Choi (2004) presents a research on supplier relationships in automotive 
industries Toyota and Honda. He suggested that supplier relationships are followed by six 
distinct steps: First, they understand how their suppliers work (supplier’s business, works, 
capabilities and commitment). Secondly, they turn supplier rivalry into opportunity by 
(sourcing, compatible production and system, and setting up joint ventures). Third, they 
supervise their vendors by (monthly reports, constant feedback, and involving managers 
to solve problems). Fourth, they develop their suppliers’ technical capabilities by 
(building up skills, a common lexicon, and innovation capabilities). Fifth, they share 
information intensively but selectively considering (specific time and place, rigid formats 
for sharing information in a structured fashion, and accurate data collection). Lastly, they 
conduct joint improvement activities (i.e., exchange best practices, initiate kaizen 
projects, and supplier study groups). Toyota and Honda have succeeded not because they 
use one or two of these elements but because they use all six together as a system (Liker 
and Choi, 2004). 
Prahinski and Benton (2004) presents that buyer-supplier relationship is the supplier’s 
perception of the buying firm’s behavioural and operational relationship attributes: 
buying firm’s commitment, cooperation and operational linkages. Moreover, he presents 
two buyer-supplier relationship approaches. The first approach explains the relationship 
which is based on transformation process, i.e., from awareness, exploration, expansion, 
and commitment to dissolution whereas second approach is based on the mechanism of 
buyer-supplier relationship at one point in time, i.e., organisational governance ranging 
from a transactional-based relationship to a strategic association or vertical integration 
(Cooper and Gardner, 1993; Webster, 1992), or the continuum between competitive and 
cooperative positioning (Ellram, 1995). 
4 Research framework 
Reviewing literature there are researches which examine supplier development from 
supplier’s perspective through buyer-supplier relationship studies and highlights the 
important supplier perspective. Therefore, Krause (1999) highlights the importance of 
suppliers and emphasises that buying firms consider its suppliers as virtual extension of 
the firm which will in result increase the motivation of suppliers towards the buying 
organisation. Moreover, communication between buyer and supplier firms is significant 
prerequisite which creates an environment of supplier development (Wagner and Krause, 
2009; Krause et al., 1998; Krause and Handfield, 1999). Some authors suggest that 
supplier commitment and a level of inter-firm communication are seen as antecedents to 
supplier development. The successful supplier development factors are focused on 
perception of suppliers as partners and their virtual extensions. For the purpose, higher 
management collaboration and commitment along with supplier acknowledgment, direct 
investments into the operations of suppliers, effective communications in between the 
buyer and supplier firms, and a secure multiple contact point are the success factors for 
supplier development to improve their performance and capabilities (Krause, 1997; 
Krause and Ellram, 1997a, 1997b). Further, critical success factors included supplier 
commitment, trust, and alignment of organisational cultures which are more important in 
supplier development strategy (Handfield et al., 2000; Hartley and Choi, 1996). 
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Moreover, purchasing literature emphasis the significance of supplier development 
favouring an organisation’s operations strategy and makes sure the suppliers performance 
and competences. The focus remains on supplier development drivers and it helps to 
explore the impact of these initiatives on performance and competences (Hahn et al., 
1990; Monczka et al., 1993; Hartley and Choi, 1996). Figure 4 elaborates a detailed 
research framework and a structural analysis which concludes the literature review and 
explains different steps for the supplier development process and supplier-buyer 
relationship. 
Figure 4 Operational breakdown of the values of buying firms’ approaches to develop supplier 
performance (see online version for colours) 
 
Supplier development and buyer-supplier relationship need to be in a systematic way 
which helps firms to organise the process and collaborate with suppliers for the 
improvement of product manufacturing capabilities. Supplier development carries a 
process including: 
1 supplier assessment 
2 competitive pressure 
3 supplier incentives 
4 direct involvement that elaborates a detail version of steps to get a competitive 
advantage and to develop buyer-supplier relationship. 
In the same vein, research framework indicates that companies follow an evolutionary 
route to develop their supplier’s performances and relationships. They try to focus on 
adoption of total quality management (TQM) followed by evaluation and culmination in 
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supplier development strategies (Krause et al., 1998). Moreover, Modi and Mabert (2007) 
stated following supplier development strategies: 
4.1 Competitive pressure 
Companies use different supplier sources and market forces to develop competitive 
pressure. This strategy not only helps the organisations to analyse their suppliers’ 
competence and performance and to build the long-term relations but motivates others 
develops their performance quality. Purposefully, firms use multiple suppliers to keep a 
competitive pressure among different suppliers. This support buying firms to get 
improved quality process services and they can inspire suppliers to keep the quality, 
delivery, or whatever supplier performance characteristics high by rewarding them with 
huge volume of the business over time (Tezuka, 1997). Therefore, buying firms apply 
this method to its suppliers when they need competitive offers from different suppliers to 
attain a comparatively cheaper purchase price (Krause et al., 2000). The threat of 
switching suppliers or losing business to other supplier creates a possibility or condition 
to provide suppliers a motivation to keep the competitiveness up with high quality supply 
at a low cost. Buyers expected to have developed relations with more than one supplier 
while dealing with manifold or parallel sourcing but buyers try to develop a strong 
relation with only one supplier dealing with sole sourcing. However, if there are certain 
switching costs (firm specific investment costs) involved, the buyer will hesitate to 
threaten supplier for a specific deviation in quality (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995). 
4.2 Evaluation and certification 
Evaluation and certification system supports the organisational strategies regarding 
current and expected performance of suppliers and ensures the suppliers about their 
performance and business prospects of organisation. For the purpose, evaluation and 
certification system is an important tool of communication between buyer-supplier and a 
motivational process for the suppliers to improve their performances. This evaluation and 
certification system comes under supplier assessment which is a key enabler in between 
supplier development activities and buyer-supplier relationship development. Supplier 
assessment is not only an important tool for buying firms to calculate the performance of 
suppliers in comparison of several other suppliers but it also allows buying firms to  
set future direction standards of suppliers’ performance (Krause et al., 2000). Supplier 
assessment tool explains and elaborates the detailed evaluation of suppliers’ managerial 
competencies, quality, technical competencies, cost, and delivery capabilities (Giunipero, 
1990; Hahn et al., 1990). Therefore, it is very useful in providing feedback to its suppliers 
about their performance index and competencies. In fact, feedback is the evaluation and 
comparison of expectations and outcomes of suppliers’ activities which integrates the 
competitive strength of the market to address the current performance and encourage 
them in improving performance (Krause et al., 2000). 
4.3 Incentives 
Incentives play a vital role in developing the motivation and interest of suppliers towards 
their capabilities and competence including; awards, cost savings, consideration for 
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increased volumes, etc. Supplier incentives are the key motivators for suppliers to 
improve their performance and in building strong and long-term relationships. Moreover, 
if incentives are not offered and awarded, suppliers are unwilling or reluctant to keep up 
and build long-term relations with buying firms. Therefore, literature suggests that 
supplier incentives may enhance the possibility and suppliers’ will and satisfaction to 
follow the buyers’ required demand (Ghijsen et al., 2010). However, supplier assessment 
and supplier incentives have indirect influence on performance of suppliers (Krause et al., 
2000). Positive supplier’s incentives for improved performance can be in the form of 
increased business volume and vice versa. Keeping this in view, suppliers focus more on 
the delivered performance to the buyer and maintain the required standard for future 
business considerations which usually has a positive impact on operational knowledge 
transfer activities (Modi and Mabert, 2007). These activities involved in suppliers’ 
incentives allow buying firms to evaluate continuous improvements in suppliers’ 
performance by increasing the performance expectations and recognition for improved 
performances. Thus, supplier’s incentives activities foster the momentum of suppliers to 
provide continued performance to strengthen the buyer-supplier relationship (Krause  
et al., 1998). 
4.4 Direct involvement 
Companies use proactive method through direct involvement and make sure their 
existence by making capital and equipment investments, acquiring supplier firm 
operations partially, and by investing human and organisational resources to develop 
suppliers’ performance and competence. Buying firms are eager to get directly involved 
in the supplier development programmes which include different activities and actions 
regarding investments in supplier development resources. In this vein, Williamson (1985, 
1981) provides a holistic picture of transaction-specific investments in buyer-supplier 
relationship and supplier development activities and direct involvement can be a reason 
to reduce transaction cost and uncertainty of buying firms. On the other side,  
suppliers’ involvement into buyer-supplier relationship also enhance the strength of 
relationship (Ghijsen et al., 2010). Many variables in direct involvement label the 
supplier development activities and enhance the performance of both buyers and 
suppliers (Krause and Ellram, 1997a, 1997b; Humphreys et al., 2004; Sánchez-Rodríguez 
and Martínez-Lorente, 2004). These supplier development activities involve site visits, 
training and education programmes, technical assistance and investments with suppliers. 
Continuous site visits allow suppliers to focus on the required quality by the buyers and 
enhance the process capability. These efforts are really important in supplier development 
actions which lead to enhance the performance (Modi and Mabert, 2007). 
Firms are employing the supplier development programmes and strategies 
progressively to develop suppliers’ performance and to build strong relationships  
with them to continue competitiveness in the market. According to Modi and Mbert 
(2007), supplier’s development strategy has a strong link in developing suppliers’ 
performance and capabilities and involving top management into the process to build 
purposeful relationship with suppliers. This link creates operational knowledge transfer 
activities and assistance to select a set of suppliers which triggers supplier development 
activities. 
Therefore, this paper explores the possible supplier development strategies that are 
useful for buying firms for supplier development. Moreover, this study develops a 
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research framework where each building block explains different ideas to develop strong 
relationships with suppliers. Finally, overall research framework provides the 
opportunities where supplier development and buyer-supplier efforts ultimately improve 
the performance of firms. 
5 Discussion/conclusions 
In this paper, a detailed literature overview of supplier development strategies and  
buyer-supplier relationship is presented. Many of different activities can be used to 
improve the performance of suppliers including low involvement actions (supplier 
evaluation) to more elaborative and resource demanding action (investing in production 
equipment and supplier’s employees training) tasks (Wagner and Krause, 2009;  
Arroyo-López et al., 2012, Modi and Mabert, 2007). Supplier development activities can 
be summarised as: 
1 introduction of competition to the supply base 
2 supplier evaluation for further development 
3 supplier certification 
4 elevation of performance expectations/goals 
5 recognition and rewards 
6 promise of future benefits 
7 training and education of suppliers’ staff 
8 direct investment in the supplier by the buying firms 
9 exchange of personnel between buyer and supplier organisations 
10 supplier plant visits 
11 intensive information exchange with suppliers 
12 collaboration with suppliers to improve the material and development of new 
materials 
13 involvement of suppliers in new product development process  
(Krause, 1997; Krause and Ellram, 1997a, 1997b). 
One objective for supplier development is to transfer competences from the customer to 
the supplier. These capabilities gradually develop the basic skills to guarantee the 
performance index towards continuity of development and innovation. For the purpose, 
this transmission of competencies may be accomplished through different actions and the 
execution of organisational procedures facilitating an association and interactions, 
sharing the information, and integration of best practices to strengthen or enhance the 
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quality of knowledge to be transferred (Hartley et al., 1997; Krause et al., 2000; Sako, 
2004; Dyer and Hatch, 2004). Moreover, there are some critical elements in supplier 
development that play an important role to improve supplier performance. These 
elements include the involvement of buyer building a perception as partners. Moreover, 
two-way multifunctional communication, top management interest, and building cross 
functional teams are most significant factors making supplier development strategies 
(Krause and Ellram, 1997a). 
Furthermore, supplier development has an effect on financial performance indicators 
such as sales, ROE, total return to stakeholders, and NPV (Rosenzweig et al., 2003; 
Tracey, 2004; Petersen et al., 2005a). For the purpose, it is examined that supplier 
development has a vital impact on operational performance improvement, i.e., cost, 
quality, and cycle time. Supplier development is a key factor and positively effects on 
buyer’s performance specially in product development integration, collaborative planning 
and information system integration (Frohlich and Westbrook, 2002; Narasimhan and 
Kim, 2002; Rosenzweig et al., 2003; Droge et al., 2004; Petersen et al., 2005b; Ellram  
et al., 2002). Suppliers with high performance rating have strong process improvement 
capabilities with involvement of purchasing function and considering it with top priority 
(Frohlich and Westbrook, 2002; Narasimhan and Kim, 2002; Rosenzweig et al., 2003; 
Droge et al., 2004; Petersen et al., 2005b; Ellram et al., 2002). In the same vein, 
information sharing is a significant factor which foresees the competitive existence of a 
buyer and helps to measure the process of supplier assortment (Kannan and Tan, 2002). 
Most of the firms prioritise their supplier development goals according to the 
delivery, order, cycle times, quality, product development, and operational capabilities 
(Wagner and Krause, 2009). For the purpose, companies follow an evolutionary path to 
increase supply base performance. They consider TQM interventions, i.e., supplier 
collaboration, customer requirements, cross-functional teams, measuring performance 
through scientific methods, and quality tools usage. Therefore, external suppliers are also 
much more important to be focused to conduct a supply base evaluation on the 
acknowledgment to develop the material quality, lower development costs, reduction in 
purchasing prices, and to improve the responsiveness of suppliers. Once supply base 
performance is assessed, companies focus on the consolidation of purchased volumes 
with fewer suppliers in order to eliminate suppliers incapable of meeting expectations 
(Krause et al., 1998). 
6 Future implications 
Most of the organisations hold a relationship and develop a key strategy for constant 
competitive achievement. In the supplier development process, buyers and suppliers need 
to consider the amount of investment and aligning processes and cultures to improve the 
supplier performance and capabilities. After the formation of buyer-supplier relationship, 
buyers need to realise the structure to maintain a reasonable relation with better suppliers 
how to develop them for long-term relations. On the other hand, suppliers need to be 
proactive and focused with the mutual interest and development processes of buyers. 
This study elaborates the theoretical point of view for the supplier development and 
buyer-supplier relationship and gives only a theoretical proof. Future research should 
consider a comprehensive case study with the given theoretical research framework 
adding empirically analysis of transaction cost economics and social exchange concept. 
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Buyer-supplier relationship analysis with variables of transaction cost and social 
exchange theory will help organisations to get a detailed view of supplier development 
and sustainability of buyer-supplier relationship. Moreover, future empirical research will 
help organisation to form cross-functional teams, involving top management role, 
checking alternative rewards and recognitions, determining the criteria to identify better 
suppliers and efforts towards sustaining the long-term relationship with suppliers. For the 
purpose, the structural factors of transaction cost economics (i.e., bilateral investments in 
specific assets to reduce the transaction cost and enhance the transaction value) and social 
factors (i.e., trustworthiness, information sharing) will be beneficial for the academia to 
understand the concepts of supplier development process. In fact, knowing the social 
factors and structural arrangements of buyer-supplier relationships that lead to reduction 
of transaction costs and enhancement of transaction value will help the managers to 
effectively manage their buyer-supplier relationships and development. 
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evolved as an important strategic instrument to improve buyer supplier relationships. For
that reason, this study focuses on providing the strategic significance of supplier develop-
ment approaches to improve business relationships. By using qualitative research method,
an integrated framework of supplier development and buyer-supplier relationship develop-
ment has been tested and validated in a Finnish case company to provide empirical evidence.
It particularly investigates how supplier development approaches can develop buyer-supplier
relationships. The study present a set of propositions that identify significant supplier devel-
opment approaches critical for the development of buyer-supplier relationships and develop
a theoretical framework that specifies how these different supplier development approaches
support in order to strengthen the relationships. The results are produced from an in-depth
case study by implementing the proposed research framework. The findings reveal that sup-
plier development strategies i.e., supplier incentives and direct involvements strongly effect
in developing buyer-supplier relationships. Further research may focus on considering in-
depth investigation of trust and communication factors along with propositions developed
in the study to find out general applicability in dynamic business environment. Proposed
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tactical and strategic management’s decision making and also valid for academic researchers
to develop supplier development theories.
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Introduction
In recent years, supplier development activities
are defined as the most important effort that firms
undertake not only to gain competitive advantage
but to develop suppliers for long term partnership
and relationship enhancement. Several strategic sus-
tainable activities are involved in developing the core
capabilities of suppliers’ that are utilized across in-
dustries [1]. Reference [2] argues that different suppli-
er development efforts exist but they fluctuate based
on the firm’s commitment and dedication towards
supplier development. Similarly, the increased inter-
est in supplier development and buyer-supplier re-
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lationship result in highlighting the importance of
strategic collaboration of buyers and suppliers to en-
hance the operational performance and to build-up
stronger and long-term relationships [3]. Suppliers
are the most important capability and critical input
resource for firms to produce a significant product or
service and that is the reason now firms are imple-
menting supplier development programs. This does
not provide only competitive advantage to the firms
but also long-term relationships with their potential
suppliers [4].
Supplier development efforts increase the compe-
tencies of both buyers and suppliers that results in
successful operational performance. The success as-
pects include but not limited to: effective two-way
communication, an attitude of partnership, shared
promises and management support [5] and [6]. Those
factors lead toward successful supplier development,
continuous performance improvement and strate-
gically developing buyer-supplier relationships [7].
Similarly, the process model of reference [8] proposes
five successful factors (e.g. supplier’s team leader-
ship, top management commitment, capable joint-
development team, data driven changes, and suc-
cess of a model line) that influence in enhancing the
supplier development efforts. In the similar way, top
management commitment has become a critical suc-
cess factor in value-based supply chain innovation
which provides a wide range of opportunities to be-
come competitive. Reference [5] and [9] have come
up with the conclusion that supplier development
programs including supplier evaluation, training and
awards help to communicate with supplier effectively.
These efforts develop a narrative of successful part-
nership with suppliers and to remain competitive.
Suppliers signify critical resources which provide
essential materials and services to a firm for produc-
tion. The quality and cost of a product is always on
the stake and firms are more careful to evaluate the
capabilities and competencies of suppliers because
it also provides opportunity to suppliers to develop
their capabilities. Therefore, organizations are more
eager now than ever to implement supplier develop-
ment programs not only in maintaining competitive
advantage but also to develop strong buyer-supplier
relationships [4] and [10]. In the same vein, refer-
ence [4] provide some successful corporate examples
where supplier development has been implemented
successfully to achieve continuous improvement; re-
duced supply based cost, improved quality and de-
livery, lead time, and improved productivity.
Further, reference [11] state that developing sup-
pliers need efforts for long term cooperation which
leads towards the improvement in suppliers’ techni-
cal, quality, delivery, and cost capabilities. Firms are
eager to take supplier development initiatives and
transfer knowledge into their supply base to improve
supplier performance [12]. On the other hand, [4] dis-
cover a research gap by highlighting the ineffective-
ness of those efforts and initiatives in supplier per-
formance. They have highlighted the critical role of
communication in buyer-supplier relationship which
is untested in context of supplier development.
Despite the much appreciation of importance of
efficiently developing suppliers and buyer-supplier re-
lationship, gaps remain in understanding the signif-
icant supplier development factors that strategically
develop buyer-supplier relationship. Theoretical and
empirical evidence of supplier development strategies
and buyer-supplier relationship is highly fragment-
ed; focused separately with little understanding, and
hence limited cumulative learning. This research ad-
dresses this research gap by implementing and val-
idating a developed integrated research framework
through a case study. Reference [3] proposes an in-
tegrated research framework based on detailed theo-
retical literature review, and this study is a step for-
ward to implement and validate the research frame-
work in a case study. This study compliments their
research and provides the empirical evidence of step
by step supplier development strategies, approaches
and their strategic impact on business relationships.
This study is quite important in its nature be-
cause it fills the research gap by providing empiri-
cal evidence of integrated framework of supplier de-
velopment strategies that become important reasons
to develop long-term relationships. Such an inte-
grated research approach helps to uncover rich ex-
planations about the management of suppliers and
buyer-supplier relationships. As a consequence, this
study investigates the following research question:
How supplier development framework leads towards
strategic value-added buyer-supplier relationships?
This research identifies and addresses above men-
tioned question by empirically investigating a link
between step by step supplier development pro-
gram and buyer-supplier relationship performance
outcomes. The remainder of this study is organized
as follows. In the next section, literature review is
presented in order to develop an understanding of
the link between supplier development and buyer-
supplier relationship. This is followed by a descrip-
tion of empirical section which presents research
methodology used in this study. Next section pro-
vides results with discussion of supplier development
strategies and their impact on business relationships.
After presenting the discussion and implications of
the results, the paper concludes with some manage-
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rial implications, limitations and suggestions for fur-
ther research.
Literature review
Supplier development and buyer-supplier rela-
tionship are significant fields of research in global
supply chain management where diversity of skills
and knowledge provide effective competitiveness and
improved performance to both parties [6]. Firms are
more eager in supplier development programs not
only to continue long term relationship with their
suppliers but also to develop strategically global
competitive advantage [13]. Further, [8] proposed a
model consisting five supplier development factors.
Those factors include; supplier’s top executives com-
mitment, capable joint-development team, supplier’s
leadership, accomplishment of a model line, and data
driven changes. Reference [14] highlighted the buy-
er’s inclination to involve in supplier development
programs where communication, buyer-supplier rela-
tionship endurance, and obligations of suppliers are
taken under consideration.
The concept of supplier development was orig-
inated by [15] to describe the willpower of manu-
factures in enhancing the numbers of suppliers for
the purpose of improved performance. This idea was
then left with an open discussion platform for the
researchers in supply chain management where the
discussion started with the complex product busi-
nesses and their suppliers [16] and [17]. On the other
hand, [14] provided a different aspect of supplier de-
velopment called “the antecedents” which explains
the actions to be taken before supplier development
programs. He highlighted those antecedents as the
important inputs for supplier development including
strategic supplier management, purchasing functions
as a source of competitive advantage, investments
in supplier’s competencies, commitments, supplier as
partners, communication, and information sharing.
Several researchers have highlighted the impor-
tance of supplier’s competencies and capabilities in
manufacturing firm’s competitive advantage. Simi-
larly, researchers pointed the important aspects of
supplier development programs in supply chain man-
agement literature (i.e., performance measurement,
supplier evaluation, setting goals for suppliers, train-
ing etc.) that play a pivotal role in maintaining im-
proved performance of manufacturing firms [18, 5,
11] and [19].
Supplier development approaches
Recent trends in manufacturing firms show re-
focusing strategies on the core capabilities while in-
creased outsourced activities and effectively using all
resources to gain competitive advantage [20] and [4].
Supplier performance has become very important for
manufacturing firms’ long term relationships, quality
and cost of the products and services, efficient suppli-
er network and successful outcomes. For that reason,
buyers are eager to implement increasingly supplier
development strategies and approaches in their op-
erations to sustain proficient and high performance
supply base. Those approaches include assessment
of suppliers, performance incentives, initiating sup-
pliers’ competition, and buying firm’s own direct in-
terest in development of suppliers through training
of supplier’s personnel [20] and [4].
In a very rich literature of supply chain manage-
ment, researchers have examined supplier’s perspec-
tive in discussion of business relationships for suppli-
er development approaches. For the reason, many re-
searchers highlighted the importance of suppliers for
buying firms operational performance and suggest-
ed to consider suppliers their virtual extension. Fur-
ther, they have found combined inter-organizational
communication as the most important prerequisite
in converting an organization’s efforts in supplier de-
velopment [14, 21–23] and [4]. On the other hand,
supplier commitment, trust, and alignment of orga-
nizational culture have been noticed by many re-
searchers as antecedents to supplier development [24]
and [8]. While, others highlighted suppliers as part-
ners through motivations of their acknowledgement,
buying firms’ direct involvements, efficient communi-
cation between them, and multiple contracts to keep
the competition up between suppliers. These factors
transform buying firm’s efforts not only into supplier
development but to improve operational performance
and competencies [2, 5] and [9].
Reference [25] proposed a benchmarking model of
supplier development where they identified the most
significant critical success factors (CSFs) and classi-
fied into four groups; 1) supplier related factors, 2)
secondary factors related to supplier, 3) manufactur-
er related factors, and 4) manufacturer and supplier
related factors in order to adopt successful suppli-
er development. Moreover, researchers have focused
on the firm’s operations strategy inclined towards
supplier development and improved supplier perfor-
mance. They highlighted some supplier development
approaches and drivers that are most important sup-
porting factors in transforming buyers’ efforts into
supplier development and performance improvement
[26, 27] and [8].
Supplier development strategies include the most
significant supporting approaches that help buyers to
enhance the overall operational performance. These
58 Volume 7 • Number 1 • March 2016
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approaches include; supplier assessment, competitive
pressure, supplier incentives, and direct involvement.
This process of supplier development was discussed
and tested by [20] and [4] in their articles but later
on, [3] developed a conceptual framework for supplier
development and improved buyer supplier relation-
ships.
Reference [3] highlighted an evolutionary sup-
plier development route which leads towards im-
proved relationship performance. Supplier develop-
ment framework was developed based on a detailed
literature review on supplier development and buyer-
supplier relationship which provides the successful
strategies not only to develop suppliers but to im-
prove long term relationships with suppliers [3]. It
identified four main steps lead toward supplier devel-
opment; 1) supplier assessment, 2) competitive pres-
sure, 3) supplier incentives, and 4) direct involve-
ment. Each of the steps includes several activities
that ensure supplier development to enhance firm’s
competitive advantage.
Supplier assessment
In supplier development strategic framework,
supplier assessment is the first part to be started
with supplier development process. Reference [28]
stated that supplier selection, supplier assessment,
and their involvement are the most important ac-
tions a buying firm should concentrate on. Therefore,
many researchers provided a notion of supplier’s as-
sessment in strategic decision making process [29–
31] and [32] to attain operational supply chain [33].
Similarly, when firms are focused to utilize their re-
sources in a best possible way, they try to improve
inter-organizational performances. This way, suppli-
ers can be involved into the new product develop-
ment processes which lead towards supplier assess-
ment to improved business relationship performance
[34] and [35].
Further, [36] presented a detailed literature re-
view of performance criteria in supplier selection and
evaluation in order to sustain competitive advantage.
He identified the most significant supplier evaluation
and selection criteria models from an in-depth litera-
ture review. Three main supplier evaluation methods
(i.e. categorical method, weighted point, and cost ra-
tio) which are helpful for companies to implement
supplier evaluation. Based on intense literature re-
view, he argued that weighted point model is more
appropriate supplier evaluation model because of its
precise and clear outcomes to the decision makers.
Certification and evaluation guarantee firm’s per-
formance by motivating suppliers to produce at their
best and to enhance their capabilities [20, 37] and
[38]. Further, it supports to evaluate supplier’s cur-
rent and expected performance and helps in better
communication between the parties to improve their
business performance. Reference [20] highlighted the
importance of certification and evaluation in suppli-
er development process and stated that it provides
not only a competitive edge to buyers to assess their
suppliers’ performance but a strategic way to set a vi-
sion for suppliers. Similarly, supplier assessment is a
critical success source of evaluating the competency,
quality, technical know-how, cost, and delivery capa-
bility of suppliers [39] and [26]. Feedback in supplier
assessment is a useful tool which contains the impor-
tant information about the suppliers’ performance.
It helps suppliers to improve their operations intact
with buyer firm’s requirements [20].
Competitive pressure
Buyers implement another supplier development
approach competitive pressure which ensures the
quality and improved performance of suppliers [41].
In this vein, firms utilize different market forces to
build a competitive pressure for suppliers to deliver
their best. This supplier development strategy pro-
vides three folded advantages to the firms, 1) to an-
alyze supplier’s capability and performance, 2) pro-
vide motivation to other suppliers to improve quali-
ty in their operations, and 3) build long term busi-
ness relationships [20]. Further, competitive pressure
is a key source of getting improved suppliers’ per-
formance in terms of quality, cost, and delivery [40]
and [41].
Therefore, supplier development strategies in-
clude multiple suppliers’ assessment and threats of
switching to other suppliers which help buying firms
to get higher standard products and services from
their suppliers. This approach develops a healthy
and competitive environment for suppliers and mo-
tivates them by providing high quality supplies with
a low cost. Competitive bids from several suppliers,
short term contracts, and use of developed bidding
details help buying firms to attain a comparatively
low price [20, 42] and [26]. However, buyer will resist
threatening suppliers in case of some certain switch-
ing costs [43].
Supplier incentives
Supplier incentives are another useful supplier de-
velopment approach. Buyers motivate their suppli-
ers by offering supplier incentives in different forms.
This strategy keeps suppliers motivated and intact
with buyers’ requirements and help suppliers to im-
prove their supply base and operational capabilities
[27] and [22]. Similarly, this approach becomes key
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motivators and critical success factor to suppliers to
develop their production competency with improved
performance and also to build strong relationship be-
tween both parties [25]. On the other hand, suppliers
will resist or will be unwilling to keep high quality
products and services and long term relationships if
incentives are not offered to them. Therefore, this
strategy plays a pivotal role by transforming buyers’
incentives into suppliers’ high quality products and
services and improved operational performance [44].
Suppliers’ performance is influenced indirectly by
supplier assessment and supplier incentives efforts by
buying firms. This results in improved business per-
formance in form of increased business volume and
future business for suppliers. These efforts foster the
thrust of suppliers to perform well through provid-
ing best supply to buyers not only for their benefits
but also to build long term relationships. Literature
has focused more on operations and provides the re-
quired supplies to buyers which positively influence
knowledge transfer activities [22, 4] and [27].
Direct involvement
Direct involvement is a preemptive strategy
which helps buying firms in developing suppliers and
relationships [27] and [20]. Different direct involve-
ment methods are important success factors for com-
panies to implement successfully supplier develop-
ment programs [25]. These methods include by in-
vesting capital and equipment in supplier operations
[40] and [27], partially acquiring the suppliers as [45]
exemplified about the acquisition ratio of Toyota and
Nissan. Similarly, investments in human and organi-
zational resources motivate organizations to be in-
volved and develop supplier performance [4]. This
novel idea is not only used in supplier development
but it also offers a holistic depiction of long term
buyer-supplier relationships. Reference [46] and [47]
concluded with the importance of transaction specif-
ic investments as a useful factor in transaction cost
and uncertainty reduction between buyers and sup-
pliers.
Reference [19] also highlighted the importance
of suppliers’ involvement in business relationships
which result in empowering buyer-supplier relation-
ships. Several researchers in literature have under-
lined the most significant direct involvement’ factors
that help in enhancing the supplier development per-
formance. For example; site visits, training and ed-
ucation, technical support, and capital and human
resources investments are the most substantial ones
that transform suppliers in producing good quality
products along with enhanced process capability [5,
48] and [49].
Further, [4] also have discussed the importance
of these factors in supplier development process.
They also have highlighted the important role of top
management into supplier development programs to
provide a strategic view of supplier’s performance
and competency [4]. Reference [20] operationalized
the concept future business incentives to operational
knowledge transfer prior to establish direct involve-
ment which allows firms to continue longer term rela-
tionships with their suppliers to transfer tacit knowl-
edge and excel competitively.
Supplier development to buyer-supplier
relationship development
Firms are eager to implement supplier develop-
ment programs not only to benefit operational per-
formance through improved product manufacturing
competencies but also to develop buyer-supplier re-
lationships. Strategic supplier development activities
are utmost important drivers of developing long term
buyer-supplier relationships. A conceptual frame-
work of [3] is a useful example of supplier devel-
opment process towards buyer-supplier relationship
performance. The concept of supply chain network is
a support for organizations to employ the available
resources in such a successful manner where business-
es focus on inter-organizational cooperation [34].
Therefore, several researchers have explained the
logic behind the supplier development and buyer-
supplier relationship factors of supplier selection and
supplier involvement in strategic decision making
and efficient supply chain separately [29–32] and
[33]. Reference [29] developed a performance mea-
surement system (PMS) in order to enhance suppli-
er relationship management activities in a successful
way. They argued that PMS supports to evaluate
the performance gap better which ultimately pro-
vides a platform in strategic decision making to meet
the challenges successfully. The efforts of supplier
development including capital and human resource
investments positively impact the relationship per-
formance of buyers and suppliers [48]. Consequent-
ly, this study develops and implements an integrat-
ed framework of supplier development activities to
buyer-supplier relationship development.
Transaction specific investments in education and
training and direct involvement of buyers and sup-
pliers in supplier development programs are a foun-
dation of developing business relationships [14] and
[50]. Moreover, effective communication, long term
strategic goals and cooperation between buyers and
suppliers lead towards twofold benefits; 1) supplier
development, and 2) relationship development [11,
51] and [39]. In the same vein, supplier evaluation
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has a vital role in developing buyer-supplier relation-
ships which demands careful evaluation of suppliers
regularly. After careful and successful supplier’ evalu-
ation, buyers can propose improvement requirements
to gain and maintain competitive advantage. These
efforts help suppliers not only to improve their com-
petences but also develop a rationale of operational
performance between them [52].
Similarly, developed trust between buyers and
suppliers support them in supplier development pro-
grams to improve capabilities and in relationship spe-
cific investments. These efforts are classified as im-
portant actions in the literature of supply chain to
improve the relationship performance [14]. Trust al-
ways resist the opportunism and increase the impact
of buyer’s assets specificity in business relationships
[48]. In result, they concluded with three dimensions
of supplier development consequences; competitive
advantage, supplier performance, and buyer-supplier
relationship development.
Integration of buyers’ purchasing strategies with
corporate competitive approaches establishes an en-
vironment of supplier development as well as com-
petitive advantage. It includes; market acceptabili-
ty, quality, cost and improved product development
process. These factors are quite important in suppli-
er development programs that lead towards relation-
ship developments [53]. Likewise, [19] pointed out key
competitive priorities; cost, quality, time and flexibil-
ity that result in competitive advantage for buying
firms. They have stated that supplier commitment is
another important factor for continuous performance
improvement. In this way, [14] argued that suppliers
will resist in relationship specific investments if buy-
ing firms do not show a potential interest for a rela-
tionship or investments. Thus, employed supplier de-
velopment efforts for long term business relationships
will create an opportunity for both buyers and sup-
pliers to improve their capabilities and performances
[20, 22] and [54].
Supply chain literature on buyer-supplier rela-
tionship and supplier development is fragmented and
lacking because of missing link between the objec-
tives of supplier development and business relation-
ships. Reference [54] has also mentioned a research
gap close to this research where differences exist in
supplier development approaches and performance.
The process of supplier development approaches and
their objectives are missing towards developing re-
lationships. Therefore, [21] mentioned the different
short term but immediate and long term objectives of
supplier development approaches and their effects in
developing relationships. This study integrates and
fills the research gap by not only combining the sig-
nificant factors of supplier development efforts to re-
lationship development but also validate the follow-
ing extended research framework empirically.
The extended framework in Fig. 1 clarifies the
process of current research. By extending the re-
search framework provided by [3], this study provides
an empirical evidence of validating the proposed re-
search framework. In supplier development process,
buyers and suppliers need to develop relationship fo-
cused investments and information sharing activities
that will improve the performance in four key com-
petencies (cost, quality, time, and flexibility) as well
as supplier’s competency will be increased [55, 56]
and [25]. All important factors of supplier develop-
ment approaches are important in developing buyer-
supplier relationships in supply chain networks. Inte-
grated value creation requires actions from both buy-
ers and suppliers to synchronize the collective com-
petencies to develop the operations and relationship
performance [21].
Fig. 1. Extended research framework of supplier develop-
ment to buyer-supplier relationship.
Similarly, several studies have been published ex-
plaining the empirical outcomes of supplier devel-
opment approaches towards improved buyer-supplier
relationships through suppliers’ integration, collabo-
rative product development and planning, and in-
formation system etc. [57–62] and [63]. Further, the
results of supplier development approaches clearly
demonstrate not only a positive impact on firm’s fi-
nancial performance but also enhancing the opera-
tional competencies [61, 64] and [65]. Likewise, [1]
argued that product oriented firms are more eager
to implement supplier development approaches than
service oriented. Communication, top management,
supplier evaluation, and supplier strategic objectives
are the key factor in the process of supplier devel-
opment and buyer-supplier relationship development
[61, 63, 64] and [10].
Supplier development approaches have been dom-
inated in building deep supplier relationships. Ref-
erence [66] presented a detailed study of build-
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ing supplier relationships along with six distinct
steps. They argued that developing supplier’s com-
petencies, commitments, threats of switching, feed-
backs, innovative capabilities, information sharing,
and joint investments to improve operations pro-
vide significant opportunities to buyers in developing
strong relationships with their key suppliers. In the
same way, [67] proposed two approaches of devel-
oping buyer-supplier relationships through supplier
development and integration action plans. A generic
process model of [22] also demonstrates the supplier
development through ten systematic steps to imple-
ment and develop relationships with suppliers.
Our study offers an in-sight of supplier develop-
ment strategies, but particularly focuses upon how
supplier development strategies can be implemented
successfully and how they effect on buyer-supplier re-
lationship. We identify critical supplier development
factors within the strategic supply chain strategies,
and demonstrate their mutual support implementing
supplier development programs and buyer-supplier
relationship. Therefore, this study extends the frame-
work provided by [3] and implement and validate the
extended research framework in a case study. This
study provides the opportunities to firms to imple-
ment supplier development approaches strategically
and develop business relationship to improve opera-
tional and relationship performance.
Research design and methods
This study adopts exploratory case study as the
methodological approach for the research where the
purpose is to improve a detailed understanding of
supplier development approaches and their imple-
mentations for buyer-supplier relationship develop-
ment in the selected case [68, 69] and [70]. This study
is based on extending the research framework provid-
ed by [3] by implementing in this case to find out how
instigated supplier development approaches devel-
op buyer-supplier relationships. Case study method
is a suitable research method to employ when the
research phenomenon is complex and challenging.
Therefore, this method assists in this study to high-
light the significant supplier development approaches
in buyer-supplier development in a real world context
[71, 68] and [70]. Thus, a case study is advantageous
where the possibility of evolving accurate results ex-
tracted from data collection process to categorize
supplier development approaches and strategies in
development of business relationships [72] and [73].
The purpose of qualitative research is to compre-
hend the research field being studied [74]. Reference
[75] has explained that inductive reasoning is a re-
search method which is the most significant part of
the research and starts a cluster of observations to
develop theory or generalization. The deficiency of
qualitative studies on this topic directed us to high-
light the importance of question “how” and “what”
factors effecting in supplier development and to iden-
tify the process of supplier development based on real
practice [76]. This research design permits a compre-
hensive within case analysis to describe the general-
izability level of evolving results [77].
A manufacturing Finnish case company and its
key supplier were selected to acquire data related
to supplier development approaches through inter-
views. The reason of selecting this case company and
its supplier was a part of dynamic project of suppli-
er development implemented in this case. This sup-
plier produces capital products for the case compa-
ny and purchasing volume is very high. A total of
twenty interviews (11 from buyer, 9 from supplier)
were conducted in 2013 from the top management
of buyer and supplier to increase the richness of in-
formation. The respondents held top and mid-level
positions in the firms including strategic managers,
operation managers, and project managers who were
directly involved in decision making and implementa-
tion. Semi-structured interview questionnaire includ-
ing measurement substance of supplier development
approaches was utilized to attain the comprehension
from both buyers and suppliers [78]. Each interview
lasted an average of 1–2 hour and conducted face-to-
face with voice recording. It was transcribed later on
to ensure high degree of reliability and traceability
[72, 79] and [80]. This technique helped us to cover
different functional areas with a different perspective
of supplier development approaches and their impact
on buyer-supplier relationship. By following the rec-
ommended process of [79] and [81], one author was
truly engaged with data collection process through-
out.
Table 1
List of Respondents with their Position in Case Company.
Job title
No.
of
interviews
Approximate
time
of interview
Buyer’s Interviews
Strategic Managers
(Top management)
3 1:30 hours/interview
Operational Managers 5 About 1 hour/interview
Supplier Development
Mangers
3 2 hours/interview
Supplier’s Interview
Top Management
Team Members
2 1:30 hours/interview
Operational Managers 7 1–2 hour/interview
Total 20
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Propositions based on case analysis
The proposed supplier development framework is
tested empirically in dynamic business environment.
The case company is operating in engineering high
technology business, where the main customers are
global corporates. Business environment in case com-
pany is extremely dynamic where production load
is fluctuating +/−30%, which means that supplier
should be extremely flexible and agile. Case company
has a wider suppliers network (50 suppliers approx-
imately) in Europe and Asia. One of its key suppli-
ers was chosen for this study where the case compa-
ny implemented supplier development program. The
propositions suggested in this study were derived
from the in-depth case study and the most critical
supplier development approaches in buyer-supplier
relationship were identified.
Supplier assessment
Supplier assessment is a significant part of sup-
plier development program [4]. The most common
phase in supplier assessment is when the relation-
ship between buyer and supplier get formulated. In
this case, this key supplier was evaluated using sup-
plier evaluation process including the evaluation of
its technical capabilities, quality, and delivery per-
formance. Quality of the delivery was the most im-
portant criteria in supplier assessment process be-
cause of case company’s high market integrity. Ac-
ceptance certification was provided to communicate
their expectations to supplier after fulfilling all the
required standards. Continuous supplier evaluation
and feedback for supplier’s awareness of performance
and case company’s expectations are ensured. Top
management respondents from both (buyer and sup-
plier) were convinced about the importance of con-
structive feedback in supplier development program.
Discussion with respondents from buyer and supplier
reveals that
“. . . feedback and certification are extremely im-
portant for supplier assessment to develop the opera-
tional competency, performance and process develop-
ment. Moreover, it provides a baseline to set stan-
dards for supplier’s improvements and operational
knowledge transfer activities.”
Assessing current performance of suppliers pro-
vides enough knowledge about the development po-
tential of supplier which in result enhances suppli-
er development activities [4] and [26]. Similarly, in
this case supplier assessment has been a resourceful
action for continuous improvements in quality and
production process. These activities help not only in
developing suppliers and operations but also a signif-
icant source of relationship development. Trust likely
stimulates and continuously improves supplier devel-
opment process which has been seen in this case as
one of the significance factors. It has found a very
helpful tool for buyer in order to measure the suppli-
er’s performance and to develop buyer-supplier rela-
tionship. The role of top management is quite crucial
in this case. As one top manager of top management
from buyer mentioned that:
“. . . supplier assessment always contributes in re-
quired performance outcomes for both buyer and sup-
plier to build strong relationships with our supplier.
Because this firm is our key supplier, we always are
keen to launch such actions which ultimately enhance
the coordination with suppliers to develop strategic
long-term relationships.”
Moreover, evaluation and certification process
implementation in buying firm create the opportu-
nities to ensure the quality standards and a signifi-
cant part of supplier development program. Discus-
sion with respondents reveals the fact that this step
stands first in supplier development program which
ultimately support in continuing the following steps
but most importantly a baseline for relationship de-
velopment. Accordingly:
Proposition 1: The stronger the supplier assess-
ment including evaluation, certification, and feed-
back, the successful supplier development program
implementation comes to an existence with a mod-
erate impact on relationship development.
Competitive pressure
Competitive pressure is another significant tool
in strategic supplier development approaches where
firms utilize external forces to keep up the pressure
on suppliers [40, 41] and [4]. This motivational and
competitive factor helps in improving the supplier’s
process competency and in extracting price benefits.
In this case while implementing supplier develop-
ment program, we found interesting and sensitive no-
tions. Because the supplier is the key actor in buying
firm’s operations, competitive pressure strategy was
found in a negative association with buyer-supplier
relationship development but only in favor of buyer.
This approach keep supplier cost competitive and
efficient in its operations as Project Manager from
buyer mentioned that:
“. . . competitive pressure is one of the key ap-
proaches to keep suppliers cost competitiveness and
efficiency. Practically, this means that there should
be multiple suppliers which could deliver same com-
ponent or sub assembly which will cause to keep the
competition up and create the threat of switching sit-
uation for supplier.”
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The competitive pressure was seen in the case
company as well, which validates this approach well.
Competitive pressure motivates supplier to develop
its operational processes, production methods, sup-
ply chain management, operative efficiency, and cus-
tomer service. These are the key standard require-
ments of case company from their supplier. In this
case, there are two more suppliers who could deliver
the same products to the firm. Therefore, it creates a
threat of switching in buyer-supplier relationship en-
vironment and keep supplier motivated. Case compa-
ny always communicates the resources of other sup-
pliers to its key supplier in order to let its supplier
keep engaged with required quality.
From buyer-supplier relationship aspect in this
case, this strategy of supplier development negative-
ly effects on relationship development. This interest-
ing finding was revealed while talking to one of the
management team members from supplier as he men-
tioned that:
“. . . threat of switching can demotivate our op-
erations at the times and create reluctance between
us, but we still try to do our best in fulfilling the
requirements from buyer. Further, we have invested
our resources for our potential buyer and want to do
business for longer term.”
Even though, buying firm keeps developing its
suppliers equally and measuring and evaluating their
performances. Performance is monitored by utiliz-
ing the most significant measures; quality, cost, and
punctuality. In this case, buying firm try to develop
its key suppliers equally and introduce new technolo-
gies by knowledge transfer activities. The developed
production and delivery process method by supplier
is not shared with other supplier to keep them intact
in improving their production and technological ad-
vances as well as to be cost competitive for buying
firm. Moreover, during relationship with supplier, the
cost efficiency has been developed enough which is a
important evidence to show that competitive pres-
sure in supplier development is very useful practical
approach. Competitive pressure could develop buy-
ing firm and supplier relationship especially when
supplier is confident that they are able to continue
deep cooperation with buying firm. Therefore:
Proposition 2: Competitive pressure strategy in-
cluding multiple suppliers and threats of switching
in supplier development approaches positively effects
in favor of buyer firm, but negatively impact buyer-
supplier relationship development.
Supplier incentive
Supplier incentive is another significant suppli-
er development strategy to keep the suppliers moti-
vated which includes cost savings, recognition in in-
creased volumes, and favorable status for future busi-
ness [27, 67] and [4]. This case study is a successful
example of implementing supplier incentives in order
to gain competitive advantage and improved busi-
ness relationship performance. Case company assists
its key supplier by sharing knowledge to improve op-
erational outcomes. Incentives have been found very
successful strategy in knowledge transfer as well as
positive performance improvement in this case. In
discussion with buyer’s top management, it reveals
that:
“. . . supplier incentives ultimately provide us bet-
ter operational performance from our key suppli-
er and it keeps them motivated in improving their
process and technological developments. We rate
their performance accordingly and provide an oppor-
tunity and incentives in increased business volume.”
In the supplier development and buyer-supplier
relationship framework, supplier incentives are in-
crease volumes, favorable status for future business
and recognition for improved performance. In this
case study, the case company’s strategy is to grow
their business volume with supplier every year, which
means that the company is seeking to develop busi-
ness relationship. Case company’s business volume
has been increased already about 10–20% per year
since the relationship started. This has been a signif-
icant motivator for supplier to develop their opera-
tional processes and keep cost efficiency up. Similar-
ly, when the volume has been increased, the capacity
utilization was more efficient which in result created
cost efficiency.
Increased purchasing volume is very important
approach in developing buyer-supplier relationship.
Case company makes sure by giving a favorable sta-
tus to its supplier for future business growth. Conse-
quently, this strategy has been developed in this case
study so that possibilities of incentives were provid-
ed to its supplier in order to develop buyer-supplier
relationship performance. Recognitions from buying
firms to its supplier made high business performance
possible along with a longer term relationship. More-
over, this strategy has been seen a very useful tool in
developing trust between buyer and supplier which
in due course results in supplier development success
and buyer-supplier relationship development. For the
reason, supplier development project manager ar-
gued that:
“. . . recognition has been important for us to im-
prove our operations towards buyer. This strategy
is very useful and satisfied with our strategic goals
which always motivate us to enhance the production
and delivery quality continuously. Further, it allows
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us to open up our capabilities in front of buyer to
implement operational improvements accordingly.”
Thus, the analyzed supplier incentives strategy
provides the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Continuous supplier incentives
strategy enhances the business performance of both
buyer and supplier. The most frequent supplier in-
centives strategy implements, the strongest buyer-
supplier relationship will be developed.
Direct involvement
Direct involvement is the last and important step
of our framework in supplier development strate-
gies and transaction-specific supplier development
[27] and [14]. Direct involvement from buyer plays
a significant role not only in developing suppliers
but also improves buyer-supplier relationship per-
formance [20, 48] and [82]. This study includes site
visits, supplier training, and investments as supplier
development strategies to implement supplier devel-
opment program.While implementing direct involve-
ment strategy in this particular supplier development
program, it was found that buyer acted proactively
and directly in these activities to show up their in-
terests in developing supplier for better performance.
Investments in supplier operations by buyer made
supplier more committed towards the required op-
erational quality. It also supports supplier’s poten-
tial to enhance their operational competency which
made a win-win situation for both buyer and suppli-
er. Operational manager from buyer highlighted the
importance of direct involvement in following state-
ment:
“. . . our direct involvement provides an opportu-
nity to supplier to think in combined strategic way
which in result demonstrates the commitment from
both parties. This kind of activities always cause in
developing longer term business relationship. Suppli-
er’s site visits have significant value in our opera-
tions because of the nature of product our supplier
provide.”
Site visits are important especially when ready-
made product are produced in the supplier produc-
tion facility and the quality assurance of readymade
products are done in suppliers premises. During the
site visits, production process was evaluated visually
and developed according to the feedback. This case
demonstrate frequent supplier’s site visit (at least
once in a month) to follow agreed development ac-
tivities in order to develop the whole supply chain.
Supplier training is another important part of direct
involvement from buyer to integrate supplier and en-
hance the relationship trust. In many cases, suppliers
which produce ready products are small and medium
sized companies. They do not usually have enough
resources to organize specialized trainings for their
employees; buyer therefore plays an extremely im-
portant role here. Consequently, discussion with a
top management member from supplier reveals that:
“. . . training is extremely important in our oper-
ations which support us to fulfil the required qual-
ity and operational performance by buyer. Supplier
training is done in many ways for example; techno-
logical training and process quality training which is
resourceful in developing our performance. Buyer or-
ganizes the resources for training and all the related
employees participate to learn different operational
innovations and technologies.”
One very intensive training was “lean training”
organized by buyer in this case which was a tailor-
made project for supplier to develop production
processes and increase performance. Typical invest-
ments have also been made in production for example
machining centers tools and measurement systems
in this case company to enhance the production ef-
ficiency. These investments are a significant part in
developing collaboration with supplier which in re-
sult enhances the relationship performance. It could
be stated that buyer-supplier relationship is devel-
oped well during activities like site visits, supplier
training, and investments for the suppliers. Accord-
ingly:
Proposition 4: The higher the direct involvement
activities by buyer are, the higher chances of supplier
development success are along with a positive impact
on buyer-supplier relationship development.
Table 2 summarizes the results of this study and
highlights the most interesting findings. It clearly
demonstrates the impact of supplier development de-
terminants on supplier development program imple-
mentation and buyer-supplier relationship. The re-
sults in Table 2 indicate that implementing suppli-
er development programs, supplier assessment activ-
ities are the prerequisites in providing opportunities
to evaluate supplier continuously in order to kick
start a successful supplier development project along
with competitive advantage. This finding is consis-
tent with [4] where they found it the most important
factor for undertaking operational knowledge trans-
fer activities. On the other hand, it has a moder-
ate impact on developing buyer-supplier relationship
because of being a prerequisite in supplier develop-
ment program. Similarly, competitive pressure keeps
the supplier intact with the required quality and pro-
duction efficiency. The results posit that competitive
pressures are in favor of buying firm to keep their
supplier motivated toward quality and competency
and can be an important part of supplier develop-
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ment. However, because of threats of switching, it
negatively influences buyer-supplier relationship de-
velopment.
Table 2
Supplier development strategies and their impact on SD
and BSR.
Supplier
development
strategies
Impact
on supplier
development
project
Impact
on buyer-supplier
relationship
Supplier
Assessment
Successfully im-
plemented with
positive impact on
SD
Moderate impact
on BSR develop-
ment
Competitive
Pressure
Successfully im-
plemented with
positive impact on
SD
Negative im-
pact on BSR
development
Supplier
Incentives
Successfully im-
plemented with
positive impact on
SD
Highly Positive
impact on BSR
development
Direct
Involvement
Successfully im-
plemented with
positive impact
SD
Highly positive
impact on BSR
development
Moreover, supplier incentives in current suppli-
er development programs have been perceived in-
terestingly positive from both buyer and supplier.
Supplier appreciated the effort of incentives made
by buyer and highlighted as an important prerequi-
site for buyer-supplier relationship development. It
does not only keep supplier motivated towards qual-
ity and operational competency but also motivate
them to cooperate in any case. A high impact on
buyer-supplier relationship was seen, which demon-
strate the importance of this factor in supplier de-
velopment program. Lastly, direct involvement from
buyer in supplier development program has been seen
quite important in current case study. Top manage-
ment’s strategic involvement in supplier development
results in longer term relationships and commitments
and tacit knowledge transfer. This result is consis-
tent with [10] and [4] who found the top manage-
ment involvement/direct involvement strongly effect-
ing longer term commitment. In our case, it imple-
mented successfully in supplier development program
and provided a strong support in developing business
relationship.
Therefore, the analysis indicates that direct in-
volvement and supplier incentives are the strong
strategies of supplier development program which
have a strong positive impact on developing business
relationship. Although, supplier assessment moder-
ately effect relationship development, it strongly ef-
fect in supplier development implementation. Com-
petitive pressure has interestingly become a complex
determinant of supplier development in our frame-
work implementation where case company needs to
undertake it seriously to come up with the most suit-
able solution to gain competitive advantage.
Conclusions and findings
Supplier development and buyer supplier rela-
tionship development are dominant in today’s global
and dynamic business environment. Buying firms are
keen to develop long-term relationships with their
business partners to overcome the challenges pos-
tured by current market environment. In this sce-
nario, practitioners are more focused towards cost
minimization to improve the competitiveness by de-
veloping proper supplier integrations’ projects. For
the purpose, this study focused on implementing
a unique combined framework of supplier develop-
ment strategies to develop buyer-supplier relation-
ship. Four significant supplier development strategies
(i.e. supplier assessment, competitive pressure, sup-
plier incentives, and direct involvement) were empir-
ically tested and verified in order to develop business
relationship with an in-depth case study methodolo-
gy. The results of our case study supported the the-
ory based supplier development research framework.
Supplier development is a strategic process fol-
lowed by buying firms to develop their key sup-
pliers in order to enhance the punctuality, short-
en lead times, and operational quality and to de-
crease total cost of ownership. Therefore, this empir-
ical case study research results in a developed frame-
work of supplier development being tested and val-
idated based on extensive literature review. The re-
search tested a supplier development framework pro-
viding numerous strategic in-sights concerning how
implementing supplier development strategies result
in developing buyer-supplier relationship. The find-
ings reveal that supplier development strategies are
significant strategic tools to develop buyer-supplier
relationships and increase the supplier’s performance
and capabilities. Most interestingly, supplier incen-
tives and direct involvement were found as strategic
significant strategies for overwhelming business rela-
tionship. Suggested framework along with proposi-
tions is a unique combination of useful solutions for
tactical and strategic management’s decision making
and also valid for academic researchers to develop
supplier development theories.
Organizations always strive to construct effective
and competitive supply chain networks by enhancing
the competency and operational quality of their key
suppliers [4]. Similarly, implementing supplier devel-
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opment strategies develop operational performance
of suppliers which in return supports the buyer’s suc-
cessful and effective supply base. Top management
role of buyer and supplier in implementing supplier
development strategies acts as a significant facilita-
tor in trust building. This permits both buyer and
supplier to share important information to achieve
their business objectives and to develop the opera-
tional capabilities. Moreover, supplier evaluation is a
significant determinant of supplier development pro-
gram which allows firms to keep the supplier’s op-
erations consistent according to their required op-
erational competency. Consequently, by implanting
all the determinants of supplier development intact,
buyer-supplier relationship is developed along with
their operational performance. In addition, both par-
ties’ willingness and interest in supplier development
program is an important facilitator which ultimate-
ly create opportunities to improve operational and
relationship performance.
This study provides a unique research framework
along with empirical evidence. It contributes in pro-
vision of two-folded competitive advantage: success-
ful supplier development implementation and devel-
oped buyer-supplier relationship. Firms that suc-
cessfully progress implement supplier development
strategies in order to attain several benefits: cost effi-
ciency, continuous quality progress, better customer
services, improved delivery performance, and re-
duced product cycle time [10]. Therefore, this study
provides a combined framework of strategies to cope
with these crucial operational achievements. Further-
more, this study provides an in-sight of supplier de-
velopment strategies and their impact on suppliers
while implementing. Most interestingly, their impact
on developing buyer-supplier relationship is present-
ed.
Further research
Further research should focus on considering in-
depth investigation of trust and communication fac-
tors along with the proposed supplier development
approaches in a global business environment. The
propositions developed in our study need to be inves-
tigated further whether these are generally applica-
ble to other dynamic business environment. More-
over, this study represents a single manufacturing
case in Finland only. It will be interesting to apply
these propositions in several cases across the Fin-
land and in other industrial settings. It will provide
an opportunity to analyze how supplier development
strategies influence buyer-supplier relationship in dif-
ferent industry contexts. Further studies can inter-
estingly find out whether firms can build up strong
relationships with their suppliers using these supplier
development approaches, and if such improvements
need further stages and factors. All in all, our study
has presented that supplier development approach-
es include critical strategies exposing at the same
time new opportunities for additional qualitative and
quantitative research.
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Firms are collaborating more in supply chain network and identified
the importance of business relationships. This idea was embraced by
academic and empirical research in operations management since last
decade. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to develop a compre-
hensive integrated conceptual and empirical framework which elabo-
rates the role of transactional and relational factors to highlight buyer-
supplier relationship performance. While, limited studies explored
these factors separately neither provide the dynamic interactive role
of transactional and relational factors in an integrated framework.
Through multiple case studies, findings reveal that impact of relational
factors of trust and communication has constructive influence in reduc-
ing the transaction cost and improving relationship performance. This
study contributes to debate on managing complex business network
relationships by providing a combined theoretical setting (transaction
cost economics and social exchange theory) and empirically proven in-
tegrated model. Managers can enhance the operational performance by
selecting the most suitable constructs.
Key words: buyer-supplier relationship, transactional mechanism, rela-
tional mechanism, case study, operational performance, transaction cost
Introduction
Pressures to build and sustain global competitive advantage during
the last two decades have changed the way firms engage in business.
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Strategically management of buyer-supplier relationships have be-
come most important drivers of sustainable competitive advantage
and observed in both academic and practitioner literature. Partic-
ularly, the role of transactional mechanisms and relational mecha-
nisms in supply chain network is becoming more and more crucial
(Roden and Lawson 2014). As a result, there is a shift from ‘hier-
archical capitalism’ to ‘business networks’ (Li et al. 2010). Buyer-
supplier relationships have become a panacea for foreign firm’s
competitive and innovations anguishes; resource constraints; rising
costs and risks (Corsten, Gruen, and Peyinghaus 2011).
However, despite their popularity and importance, research and
anecdotal evidence show that managing buyer-supplier relation-
ships have become a challenge in supply chain network (Dyer 1997).
This has led researchers to investigate a wide range of factors that
ensure the success of these relationships. Recently, meta-analysis
studies have been conducted on purchasing and supply chain man-
agement (psm) and supply chain integration (sci) linking these
factors positively related to firm’s performance (Leuschner et al.
2013; Zimmermann and Foerstl 2014). While these limited studies
have richly probed the role of transactional and relational factors
on buyer-suppler performance, there is need to develop a compre-
hensive framework that explains transactional as well as relational
forces within an integrated theoretical and empirical model to ex-
plain the performance of buyer-supplier relationships.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the underlying
impact of transactional and relational factors in buyer-supplier re-
lationships through multiple case studies. Two theoretical perspec-
tives; transaction cost economics (tce), and social exchange theory
(set) are integrated in this study to see how effectively firms manage
their relationships with their suppliers. Such a theoretical pluralistic
approach will help to uncover rich explanations about the manage-
ment of buyer-supplier relationships. In order to get in-depth under-
standing about the impact of transactional and relational factors on
buyer-supplier relationship performance and transaction cost, this
study is based on qualitative investigation. For the purpose, three
Finnish companies were interviewed in 2014 that are involved in de-
veloping business relationships with their key suppliers (local and
international). Thus, this study contributes in a discussion of man-
aging and developing business relationships by providing empiri-
cal explanation of combined transactional and relational factors and
their impact on transaction cost and performance.
As a consequence, we investigate the following research question:
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How do the transactional factors of contract completeness and interde-
pendence, and relational factors of trust and communication affect the
buyer-supplier relationship outcomes?
The main research question can further be divided in the follow-
ing sub-questions. First, how and why do transactional factors effect
transaction cost between buyer and supplier? Second, how and why
do relational factors influence cost between buyer and supplier? Third,
how can transactional and relational mechanisms and reduced trans-
action cost enhance the overall firm’s performance?
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next
section, literature review is presented. This is followed by a descrip-
tion of empirical section which presents research methodology. Next
section provides results with discussion of these factors. After pre-
senting the discussion and implications of the results, the paper con-
cludes with some managerial implications, limitations and sugges-
tions for further research.
Literature Review
Over the past decades, several theories have been applied to explain
the rationality of buyer-supplier relationships. Among the utmost,
transaction cost economics, resource based view, institutional the-
ory and social exchange theory are the most important and vibrant
theories in this field commonly. In this study, theoretical framework
is drawn from the transaction cost economics and social exchange
theory. In general, both theories have a common aim of explaining
how buyer-supplier relationships are managed. However, the tools,
each theory proposes to manage the buyer-supplier relationships
are different. Transaction cost economics focuses on the structural
mechanisms (i.e., contract between buyers and sellers, specific asset
investments between buyer and supplier) to efficiently manage the
buyer-seller relationships (Williamson 1985; Brouthers and Hennart
2007). On the other hand, social exchange theory focuses on the so-
cial mechanism of trust and level of information sharing to manage
the buyer-supplier relationships (Madhok 1995; Johnson et al. 1997;
Muthusamy et al. 2007; Lin and Wang 2008).
As the purpose of this study is to find out how transactional and re-
lational factors regulate buyer-supplier relationship outcomes, these
factors can be justified rationally by integrating these two theories
together. Similarly, structural mechanisms are principally rooted in
tce (Williamson 1985), and social mechanisms mainly exist in set
(Blau 1964). Choice of theory depends upon the nature of problem
that is why; this paper integrates both perspectives (tce and set) to
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encounter the objectives. In the supply chain literature, transaction
cost economics (tce) and social exchange theory (set) provided a
rich explanation of transactional and relational factors. Several re-
searchers highlighted and used the theoretical perspectives of trans-
actional (structural) and relational (social) rationale separately but
in detail (Dyer 1997; Liu, Luo, and Liu 2009; Li et al. 2010; Nyaga,
Whipple, and Lynch 2010; Corsten, Gruen, and Peyinghaus 2011; Ro-
den and Lawson 2014). Consequently, resource-based view was not
integrated because the factors under research question cannot be
addressed according to the objectives of the study.
Sillanpää and Sillanpää (2014) developed a strategy framework
explaining supply chain which combines corporate strategy, supply
chain demand strategy, and business environment together. While
the framework by Sillanpää, Shahzad, and Sillanpää (2015), ex-
plains the analysis of supplier development and buyer-supplier rela-
tionship strategies (supplier assessment, competitive pressure, sup-
plier incentives, and direct involvement) influencing the business
performance. Therefore, several researchers have highlighted the
important role of supplier selection, and supplier’s involvement in
strategic decision making process (Choy, Lee, and Loo. 2002; Song
and Di Benedetto 2008; Ho, Xu, and Dey 2010; Hammami, Temponi,
and Frein 2014) to achieve effective supply chain.
Dyer (1997) study on United States and Japan supplier-automakers
international cooperative alliances depict that trust and mutual
hostages help to reduce automakers transaction costs and enhance
transaction value. In the same vein, Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone
(1998) study on United States buyer-supplier relationships depict
that presence of organizational trust reduces negotiation costs and
increases performance of buyer-supplier relationships. Similarly,
Artz and Brush (2000) study on 393 original equipment manufac-
turer (oem) supplier relationships in United States depict that pres-
ence of collaboration, continuity expectation, and communication
strategies lower negotiation costs in oem–supplier relationships. Fi-
nally, the Dyer and Chu (2003) study on 344 Supplier-automaker
relations in United States, Japan, and Korea show that presence of
trust reduces monitoring and enforcement costs and positively re-
lates with buyer’s profit performance.
Hence transaction costs are measured as negotiation costs (Za-
heer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998; Artz and Brush 2000), and con-
tractual costs, monitoring and enforcements costs (Dyer and Chu
2003). In some studies, (1) the presence of trust is considered to
reduce transaction costs (Dyer 1997; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone
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1998; Artz and Brush 2000; Dyer and Chu 2003), (2) and trust and
the presence of hostage are considered as both reducing transaction
costs (Dyer 1997) and enhancing performance. Apart from measur-
ing transaction cost in these few empirical studies, there are some
studies which have identified the structural mechanism (i.e. contract,
symmetric dependence, hostages) to manage the buyer-supplier
relationships and linking them with buyer-supplier performance
(Poppo and Zenger 2002; Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom
2005; Williamson 1985).
transactional and relational mechanisms
Transactional mechanisms explain the economic rationality and
governing these relationships through monitoring and incentive
based structures (Heide and John 1992; Jap and Ganesan 2000).
Moreover, the relevant literature of buyer-supplier relationship per-
formance and the factors involve including the literature of transac-
tional mechanisms inspired by the transaction cost economics (tce)
of Williamson (1985). On the other hand, relational mechanism fo-
cuses on governing and managing these relationships through moral
control and in cooperative environment (Liu, Luo, and Liu 2009).
Further, relational mechanisms manage and supervise the social
connection and cooperation based on relational norms in business
relationships. In this way, trust and relational norms from social
exchange theory (set) are to find out the impact on performance
and opportunism (Liu, Luo, and Liu 2009; Heide and John 1992).
This contributes in the literature by highlighting the relative ef-
fectiveness of these mechanisms in reducing the opportunism and
enhancing the relationship performance and explores these mecha-
nisms (Liu, Luo, and Liu 2009; Heide and John 1992; Jap and Ganesan
2000).
Li et al. (2010) highlighted the important antecedents that lead to
the adoption of social and formal control in long term buyer-supplier
relationships. Control mechanisms are the structural arrangements
between the organizations to manage the behaviour of both parties
in the relationship (Fryxell, Robert, and Maria 2002). Further, Li et
al. (2010) used formal control (relies on contracts) and social control
(relies on informal means) to find out their impact on the perform-
ance. In this paper, the authors filled the research gap by adding
the view of social network theory and institutional view in addition
to transaction cost economics (tce). Most of the existing literature
has been applying transaction cost economics and identified several
control factors in buyer-supplier relationship (Poppo and Zenger
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2002; Reuer and Ariño 2002; Williamson 1985; Wuyts and Geyskens
2005).
Moreover, existing literature has been generated the significant
insight into the control mechanisms but the findings are not con-
sistent over time. In this vein, Zhou et al. (2003) highlighted three
logics to manage the behaviour of firms in relationship 1) transac-
tions costs, 2) social relations, and 3) institutional constraints. Ex-
isting literature argue that formal control and social control mecha-
nisms are substitute (Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati 1995; Uzzi 1997).
On the other hand, some argue that these control mechanisms are
not substitute but complementary in explaining the firm’s perform-
ance (Luo 2002; Mesquita and Brush 2008; Poppo and Zenger 2002;
Wuyts and Geyskens 2005).
Similarly, Corsten, Gruen, and Peyinghaus (2011) presented the
understanding of buyer-supplier identification role in operations
management. They applied the construct of buyer-supplier identifi-
cation in the relationship by using social identity theory by mention-
ing different constructs of buyer-supplier identification like trust,
information sharing, knowledge sharing, and relation specific in-
vestment. This factor of supply chain which provides competitive
advantage, theoretically proposed (Ireland and Webb 2007) but not
empirically tested and analysed so widely. Recently, some scholars
have extended the conceptual framework of identification in supply
chain research (Dyer and Hatch 2006; Ireland and Webb 2007).
Moreover, Corsten, Gruen, and Peyinghaus (2011) argued that
supplier-to-buyer identification has an impact on the behaviours
between the organizations which lead towards the operational per-
formance. On the other hand, this identification of inter-organizati-
onal partners can be linked with information exchange which helps
to explain the operational performance of the firms. Furthermore,
if there is a trust in place between these notions, it would im-
pact directly in both relationship factors by enhancing the opera-
tional performance. Importance of management of trust has become
more vibrant in the organizations. Paliszkiewicz (2011) evaluated
the advancements and setbacks of trust management in organiza-
tions. There is a comprehensive consensus among trust scholars
that trust is clearly a sociological phenomenon which principally
emerges among individuals, however, it can also be established be-
tween organizations if ‘the positive expectations of the intentions
or behaviour of another [organization]’ are shared by a dominant
coalition of the individuals in both organizations engaged in the col-
laborative transaction (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998).
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Transactional and relational factors still can be seen in literature
as both complements and substitutes in buyer-supplier relationship.
However, prior empirical studies have been unsuccessful to reveal
how and why these transactional and relational factors are substi-
tutes or compliments in buyer-supplier relationship. Several stud-
ies have presented quantitative and cross sectional data about the
buyer-supplier relationship development but how and why these re-
lationships can be developed are not uncovered explicitly. This study
provides an insight of this phenomenon in a case study method
where three cases were analysed profoundly to identify the impact of
transactional and relational factors in buyer-supplier relationships.
research framework
Prior literature presents clear understanding of transactional and
relational mechanisms, widely used in several supply chain research
papers. A rhetoric discussion of successfully managing supply chain
management and business networks provides a concrete knowledge
of significant factors supported by different theories. Though, these
factors are scattered on the canvas of rich supply chain literature
with different behaviours but today’s need is to collate those factors
in order to streamline and develop strategic buyer-supplier relation-
ship. The framework combines all the mentioned significant features
that help companies to enhance the operational performances in
inter-organizational relationships and to reduce the transaction cost.
Figure 1 presents the research framework based on the research ob-
jectives and collate transactional and relational factors from prior
literature.
The important factors in research framework do not only have in-
teraction between them but also have a significant impact to hin-
der opportunism and transaction cost (Williamson 1985) in explain-
ing the performance of relationships. Moreover, this study not only
advances the understanding and importance of inter-organizational
networks but also provides an analytical framework as a synthesis of
significant transactional and relational mechanisms.
Research Design and Methods
This study employs a case study approach (Yin 1994; Eisenhardt
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) to get insight under ques-
tion phenomenon. This study is framed within the background of
tce and set to testify how the identified key variables behave in
different business environments. Similarly, the research question is
strictly scoped within the context of tce and set to get an insight of
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figure 1 Research Framework
transactional and relational mechanisms (Eisenhardt and Graebner
2007). Therefore, this research design helps us to get a better un-
derstanding and real-world context of buyer-supplier relationship
outcomes in natural setting (Bonoma 1985; Yin 1994: Eisenhardt and
Graebner 2007).
A multiple case study provides the external validity because of
comparative analysed results by within case and cross case analy-
sis thereby employing replication logic (Yin 2003; Eisenhardt 1989).
It provides the advantage in increasing the likelihood of develop-
ing accurate findings extracting from collected data and better infor-
mation to identify the transactional and relational factors and their
pattern in particular (Ghauri 2004; Yin 2003). The lack of qualitative
research in this topic led to identify the significant factors and se-
lect an exploratory method based on grounded theories (Glaser and
Strauss 2009).
the three case studies
Three manufacturing cases from Finland were selected based on the
equal level of operations, cultural closeness and suitability of rela-
tionship factors which prevails the logic among constructs (Eisen-
hardt and Graebner 2007). The cases are not selected to be repre-
sentative of the population of buyer-supplier relationships, but as
explanatory substance to validate the testability of transactional and
relational factors.
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Case A is a global leader based in Finland and compelled by an
urge to produce, manufacture, and sell electric drives and invert-
ers in the world. It has a huge suppliers’ network with hundreds of
key suppliers selected based on quality level, costs and capability to
handle ‘high mix low’ volume that provide capital component sup-
plies to run their daily operations. Case company B based in Finland
leads in power and automation technologies and success was driven
by a strong concentration on research and development along with
long track record of innovation. This case started relationship with
this key supplier three years ago and selected based on quality as-
surance, cost, and dynamic capability. Case company C is engaged in
products and services for customer’s value and effectiveness glob-
ally and one of the global leaders in their operations and serves a
huge number of customers. They have established a supplier de-
velopment system to enhance the operational performance between
buyer and supplier to strengthen their supply base. This relationship
was started in 2000 and case company considered many parameters
during the selection (e.g. outsource production facility, quality, cost,
delivery time etc.).
data collection
As purpose of this research is to find out insight impact of transac-
tional and relational mechanisms in developing buyer-supplier re-
lationship, data was collected from selected cases keeping the im-
portance of these mechanisms in mind. Semi-structured interviews
including measurement items (see appendix 1) were conducted to
collect data in order to achieve a certain level of comparability (Bry-
man 2004). Each interview was held face to face with voice recording
and then transcribed to ensure high degree of reliability and trace-
ability (McCutcheon and Meredith 1993).
This study contains a high level of dependability and reliability be-
cause of the process followed recommended by Miles and Huberman
(1984) and Hill, Thompson, and Williams (1997), where two authors
collected data from the cases in order to enhance the creative po-
tential. One informant (top management level) from each selected
case company was picked up for interview (three interviews in to-
tal). Interviews lasted an average of two hours where each inter-
view was recorded and transcribed. The primary focus was to ob-
tain the information regarding transactional and relational factors
in their buyer-supplier relationship that could not be retrieved from
secondary sources. The informants in selected case companies were
at top level managerial positions, all of whom were typically respon-
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sible in daily operations, and having direct strategic interaction with
suppliers. Anonymity of company sources was confirmed in report
findings to communicate openly with the respondents which pro-
vided a comfort level to respondent.
construct operationalization and data analysis
A case protocol was written as recommended by Yin (1994) to estab-
lish a comparison between selected cases and quality of case analy-
sis. The idea of case protocol was written to identify the transactional
and relational factors and their impact on relationship outcomes and
to measure these factors through in-depth interviews.
Contract completeness was measured by asking overall nature of
the contract in terms of its importance between two parties, oper-
ating procedures, types of conflict resolution clauses, termination,
unanticipated contingencies, and quality of distributed resources
between buyer and supplier. Further, interdependence was measured
using a systematic approach in buyer-supplier relationship where
the amount and ratio of resources invested by two parties were ana-
lyzed. Communication was measured by asking quality, frequency,
and openness of communication between the parties. Trust was
measured by inquiring the overall assessment of this phenomenon
between the parties in respondent’s perspective. Transaction cost
was measured by asking the frequent cost occurred in terms of ne-
gotiation, consumed time in handling conflicts, and monitoring the
supplier’s operations. On the other hand, relationship outcomes have
been measured by using the criteria of overall performance, prof-
itability, just in time delivery, manufacturing/quality, cost control,
cost compared with other suppliers, and satisfaction level of this
relationship.
The collected data was analyzed using qualitative data analysis
techniques: data-driven thematic analysis and putting all the infor-
mation in classified chronological order to uncover the detailed el-
ements of transactional and relational mechanisms in relationship
outcomes (Miles and Huber man 1994). We followed the recom-
mended steps to analyse the collected data where recorded inter-
views where broken down in the context of constructs accordingly.
Each case was analyzed separately, then a cross-case analysis done
to identify the similarity and differences of these mechanisms in dif-
ferent cases (Ragin 1994; Eisenhardt 1989). The consistency analysis
between empirical findings and theoretical arguments across cases
were utilized to draw conclusions. Figure 2 elaborates the complete
process of research methodology employed for this research.
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Research Findings
Supplier and respondent names were decided to keep anonymous,
so with analyzed results of transactional and relational factors in
buyer-supplier relationship outcomes are presented. This section
describes how these mechanisms are perceived and operationalized
case by case, and then comparative analysis findings are presented.
case a
Transactional Characteristics of Relationship in Case A
Interview with respondent from Case A has revealed that they trust
their key supplier significantly which makes their position very
strong in this relationship, they deal and negotiate openly in the
time of crises. A written contract is emplaced between buyer and
supplier but at the same time they prefer the organizational culture
and communicate openly if they need to resolve a conflict between
them. In this case, they have very strong bonding with their key sup-
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plier and contract has a low impact in managing this relationship
which effectively influences the relationship outcome positively.
In this cooperation, both parties have invested massively to man-
age and to keep the operations smooth. Both parties have invested
in knowledge transfer, know-how, quality testing systems, automated
order transactions, lean production, training, engineering drawings
etc. This huge investment by both parties makes the more indepen-
dent on each other. Interdependence is quite high in this case where
both parties have invested capital resources for the relationship. The
ratio of these resources is about 50–50% by investing financial, man-
agerial, technological, and physical resources for relationship devel-
opment.
Relational Characteristics of Relationship in Case A
The quality, frequency, and openness are considered to be impor-
tant while communicating with their suppliers. Similarly, in this case
communication emplaced is formal and informal to solve the con-
flicts timely which always help for better operational results. So, this
shows the high frequency level of communication between two par-
ties in this particular case. In this particular case, trust was not built
from very first day but developed gradually. Similarly, trust has de-
veloped and become a strong reason to eliminate several problems
and costs.
Relationship Outcomes in Case A
The impact of transactional and relational factors on reducing the
transaction cost show that situations may differ case by case. Trans-
actional and relational factors provide the opportunity to run the
business smoothly and build strong bonding with suppliers. Follow-
ing this approach, they are helpful in reducing the cost but some-
times negotiations on different issues can be a reason to bear extra
costs. Because this relationship started in 1999, they have therefore
built trust, communication, asset specific investments, and action
plans in their operations. The opportunism factor has been almost
vanished from this relationship. In the following table 1, respon-
dent’s view upon transactional and relational factors in Case A is
stated.
case b
Transactional Characteristics of Relationship in Case B
In this case, interdependence is asymmetric in nature even both par-
ties have invested little resources for this relationship and they are
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table 1 Respondent’s View upon Transactional and Relational Factors in Case A
Respondent’s view
upon Contract
‘Of course contract has a significant value in any of the re-
lationship and sometimes it becomes really important when
unanticipated events happen but in our case, the most im-
portant thing is relationship and way of thinking rather con-
tracts.’ The respondent further explained that: ‘Contracts do
not contain everything so, we only need to come on table to
discuss about any unpredicted situation.’
Respondent’s view
upon Interdepen-
dence
‘Both of us (buyer and supplier) have invested in a huge
amount of resources for this relationship where dependence
level is very high because they have our product drawings
(tailor made product) and we are their giant customer.’
Respondent’s view
upon Communica-
tion
‘We communicate with our key supplier very frequently about
any specific issues in our monthly meetings and I do not find
any problem while communicating with us from their side.’
Respondent’s view
upon Trust
‘Trust is everything in personal level relationship as well as
in company level relationship and we are happy that our sup-
plier fulfils the promises in time and we have a great confi-
dence on its integrity.’
Respondent’s view
upon Relationship
Outcomes
‘Sometimes, companies need to bear the costs of continuous
improvement in operations while dealing with their key sup-
pliers.’
Respondent’s view
upon Relationship
Outcomes
‘Communication atmosphere is quite open to improve the op-
erations and to solve the problem which means we are not
bearing the high level of negotiation, decision making, mon-
itoring, and information sharing cost but we have to be more
cost effective tomorrow than today. Costs, quality, time, and
technology are the elements that should be improved all the
time to build strong and long term relationship.’
one of the main customers for the supplier. The reason behind of
being asymmetric interdependence is that the age of relationship is
just three years and both parties want to share their resources more.
Further, if relationship dissolves, the tangible resources can be re-
covered and used again. Most important issues regarding operations,
management, conflicts, and contingencies plans are being followed
in this relationship as stated in the contract.
Relational Characteristics of Relationship in Case B
Both parties carry quite the same organizational culture, so they are
familiar with each other’s way of working where they can trust on.
This shows that there is a medium level of trust developed in this re-
lationship which is quite obvious due to lesser years of this relation-
ship. Moreover, communication in this relationship is also integral
part and they usually do not face problems because of same cultural
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values in communication and understandings. Both parties are quite
accustomed with organizational norms. In this buyer-supplier rela-
tionship, communication part is more open and frequent because of
turbulent business type where product and production line change
in short time and they need frequent and open communication to
keep it updated.
Relationship Outcomes in Case B
In this specific relationship, both parties carry some costs in terms
of negotiations, combine decision making, monitoring quality of sup-
plied components and information sharing cost. So, the transaction
cost overall is a bit higher because of newly made relationship. The
relationship performance is at the medium level even the supplier
in this relationship is a capital supplier. They have good relationship
but both parties still want to improve their operations between them
and trying to balance between the cost, just in time (jit), quality and
dynamic capability in a way that they achieve a reasonable level of
relationship performance. In the following table 2, respondent’s view
upon transactional and relational factors in Case B is stated.
case c
Transactional Characteristics of Relationship in Case C
It is already stated that Case company C owns 50% of the shares of its
key supplier, so quite obviously they have invested a huge amount of
resources in terms of financial, managerial, technological know-how,
and physical resources in this relationship. Similarly, in this relation-
ship, both parties are dependent on each other and an asymmetric
dependence exists because it is quite difficult for both parties to find
new supplier and buyer respectively. Huge investments do not allow
both parties to dissolve this relationship and recover the invested
resources which reduce the fear of opportunism at the same time.
Exploiting the invested resources seems difficult in this relationship
because of a high level of investment for the relationship. Contract
also describes the situations therefore, if any conflicts between par-
ties arise, both parties try to solve a conflict by negotiation or by court
in worse situation.
Relational Characteristics of Relationship in Case C
In case C where communication between parties is the key factor,
it always tries to be open and keep informed their supplier about
changes that may affect other parties to avoid any ambiguity and
vagueness. This fluent and frequent communication poses that both
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table 2 Respondent’s View upon Transactional and Relational Factors in Case B
Respondent’s view
upon Interdepen-
dence
‘We want to share our knowledge and resources with our sup-
pliers but it will be built gradually. Our supplier also has re-
formed their production to fulfil our quality requirements.’
Respondent’s view
upon Contract
‘Contract is very complicated and in detailed all about the op-
erations and management but still we do business according
to the written clauses of the contract for most important is-
sues but I still believe that in a problem situation, trust plays
an important role.’
Respondent’s view
upon Trust
‘Trust is not of course enough, operations must be transparent
to build up trust in a relationship. Suppliers need to be very
open in any situation and if they are transparent, then trust
comes in the relationship.’
Respondent’s view
upon Communica-
tion
‘According to my understanding, we try to fulfil our promises
and I think due to same norms and values, our supplier also
do the same. Our supplier communicates honestly and openly
if they are not able to fulfil promises and they do their best for
it.’
Respondent’s view
upon Relationship
Outcomes
‘It depends upon the conflict, but we put all the related issues
under considerations and try to solve it as soon as possible.
Our supplier is expert but if we are unhappy with the opera-
tions, we consider negotiating for related issues and decision
is made by the managements of both parties.’
Respondent’s view
upon Overall Per-
formance
‘I cannot see big issues in this relationship overall and we are
quite happy and satisfied but we expect that our supplier will
improve their operations in future to prolong the relationship
and to develop good terms.’
parties provide important and timely information each other to avoid
any unprecedented conflicts. Further, trustworthiness in a relation-
ship is significant and no relationship could be developed without
trust. Case company C has a high degree of trust on their supplier
and vice versa.
Relationship Outcomes in Case C
This case however faces challenges in strategic decision making for
being global company but supplier is very efficient and it compen-
sates the transaction cost. Quality standards are already agreed be-
tween them, which means no extra cost for monitoring the quality
level of components exists. Thus, this relationship has developed al-
ready a certain level of understanding between the parties for their
capital transactions and interfaces for supplier integration are devel-
oped for information sharing that allows both parties to reduce their
transaction cost. The respondent rated high for overall performance
and both parties are quite satisfied with their relationship. They are
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table 3 Respondent’s View upon Transactional and Relational Factors in Case C
Respondent’s view
upon Transac-
tional Character-
istics
‘All the clauses regarding termination and operating proce-
dures of contract are agreed between the parties but we coop-
erate and build relationship with our supplier based on trust
and fair communication which we consider is a key aspect for
relationship development.’
Respondent’s view
upon Transac-
tional Character-
istics
‘Both of parties need to solve a conflict if any by negotiating or
compromising otherwise we can follow the legal clause of the
contract by knocking the court’s door but it has been very sel-
dom in our case because we never face this kind of situation
in this relationship.’
Respondent’s view
upon Communica-
tion
‘Both of the parties try to be open in communicating any
changes in procedures or operations to avoid conflicts and we
do not feel any resistance or hesitation because relationship
is working perfectly for last 11 years and further we do not
spend a lot of time for meetings etc.’
Respondent’s view
upon Trust
‘First of all, our supply chain is integrated and of course there
are issues every now and then but they do not affect our rela-
tionship because we understand each other’s operations and
mostly our supplier fulfil all of its promises which enhance
the trust level in our business relationship.’
Respondent’s view
upon Relationship
Outcomes
‘We have developed supplier integration program where both
of the parties have easy access to the technical documents,
product drawings, information sharing etc., and overall trans-
action cost between the parties is very low.’
committed to continue the relationship for longer term and want to
enhance the transaction value.
comparative case findings
Table 4 summarizes the comparative impact of degree of transac-
tional and relational mechanisms in three analyzed case companies.
It describes the level of these mechanisms in their operations for
relationship outcomes. Based on the results, we have described the
degree of these mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationship as low,
medium, and high which identify the factors need to be improved.
This rating of low, medium, and high in table 4 was achieved and
determined by particular existence level of transactional and rela-
tional mechanisms in the cases. This is followed by Woolthuis, Hille-
brand, and Nooteboom (2005) who selected the extremes of low ver-
sus high to discover the research question. Hereby, we have divided
the degrees into three extremes low, medium, and high to achieve the
comprehension and rationale of research objectives. Further, the an-
swers were analyzed and transcribed into the ratings to make it more
clear and understandable. This clarifies not only the developed per-
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table 4 Degree of Transactional and Relational Mechanisms in Cases
Mechanism Category Case A Case B Case C
Transactional
mechanisms
Interdependence Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric
Contract Low High Low
Relationship
Mechanisms
Communication High Medium High
Trust High Low High
Buyer-Supplier
Relat. Outcome
Transaction cost Medium High Low
Overall performance High Medium High
ception of these mechanisms into respondents’ mind but also iden-
tify what the significant factors to be improved.
Based on the analyzed results summarized in table 4, this study
provides comparative findings of transactional and relational factors.
As we can see that in Case A, interdependence between parties is
symmetric which help to reduce the opportunism level in relation-
ship. Further, the impact of contract is quite low which illustrates
that both parties try to resolve their conflicts based on the trust. Sim-
ilarly, communication and trust in Case A have high impact in devel-
oping the relationship that posits the positive impact on relation-
ship performance. Finally, transaction cost has a medium impact in
this relationship, which recommends that they need to further think
about their transactions with supplier more in detail to evaluate how
they can reduce transaction cost.
Case B posits results unlike Case A, where transactional mecha-
nisms need to be improved. These results endorse the both parties to
invest more for the relationship, which will affect their interdepen-
dence level and reduce opportunism between the parties. Because
this relationship is newly made (3 years), they need to develop trust
between each other to enhance the transaction value of relationship.
If relational mechanisms have developed in an organization, compa-
nies mutually solve conflicts and unpredicted situations. Symmetric
interdependence provides the opportunity for both parties to pro-
long relationship with good terms and to enhance relationship per-
formance.
On the other side, Case C is quite unique between three cases be-
cause it does not only have good relationship with supplier but it
also has ownership in supplier’s assets. In this situation, interde-
pendence will always be symmetric and fear of opportunism will be
very low. Contract between both parties will exist but they will try to
solve all the problems and conflicts in a win-win situation. In this
case, trust and communication has a high impact on relationship
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performance because they do not need to negotiate frequently for
certain issues. Trust always reduce the possibility of negotiation and
transaction cost.
Conclusion
This paper empirically demonstrates the impact of transactional and
relational mechanisms on transaction cost and buyer-supplier rela-
tionship performance. To examine the role of these mechanisms in
relationship performance, this study produces an empirically tested
research framework based on two major theoretical perspectives:
transaction cost economics and social exchange theory. Previous re-
search lacks in identifying generally the role of transactional and re-
lational factors in developing buyer-supplier relationship and more
specifically measuring the transaction cost. It also lacks in evaluat-
ing these mechanisms together for a specific relationship in multiple
case study where the knowledge can be acquired in detail.
This study uncovers that relational mechanisms are more effec-
tive than transactional mechanisms on relationship performance.
Trustful atmosphere between parties facilitate to resolve the con-
flicts and safeguard the contingencies that in result enhances trans-
action value and reduces transaction cost. The collected data from
Finnish cases with same organizational culture indicate that trust
and communication are the most important factors in developing
long-term relationships with business partners. Findings also show
that transactional factors have significant effect in developing buyer-
supplier relationship. This means that symmetric interdependence
reduces the potential of uncertainty of outcomes, replicates a level of
competitive and synergetic relationship nature and develops higher
transaction value (Mahapatra, Narasimhan, and Barbieri 2010; Hen-
drikse and Windsperger 2011; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, 41).
Most importantly, this study presents empirically tested integrated
framework which combined significant factors of tce and set. This
kind of combination does not only highlight the importance of these
factors but also to answer the question of how and why these fac-
tors influence the buyer-supplier operations. Our findings show the
impact of transactional and relational factors on transaction cost
between buyer and supplier and how to hinder the opportunism.
Because this study examines these factors from buyer perspective,
it provides a new dimension to buyers to integrate and reconsider
these factors while making decisions to get competitive advantage.
The findings contribute to existing research on the management of
buyer-supplier relationship by developing an integrated framework
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of social exchange theory and transaction cost economics. Moreover,
a case study explores the significance of transactional and relational
mechanisms for buyer-supplier performance. This finding provides
an insight for the managers to understand the importance of these
mechanisms in their operations to build up strong relationships not
only to improve performance but also to reduce transaction cost.
Managers can enhance the operational performance by selecting the
most suitable construct in developing long-term relationship with
their suppliers.
further research
It is important to note that this study contains limitations which pro-
vide future research prospects. Our study focuses on Finnish manu-
facturing industry by selecting three case companies. Interesting fu-
ture research can be done by adding more cases to get a comprehen-
sive overview of the constructs used in the study. Future research can
be developed a full set of characteristics within the model along with
a strong aspect of culture to be tested in Nordic countries. This view-
point will provide more generalized and interesting findings due to
different cultural norms. For example, trust and communication play
a crucial role in developing buyer-supplier relationship in Finnish
organizational culture. It would be interesting to see the extent and
effectiveness of this framework in other countries too. Finally fu-
ture research should attempt to identify some other supplementary
factors contributing to reduce transaction cost and to develop buyer-
supplier relationships. Quantitative study with a sufficient number
of respondents is quite an interesting idea to test the proposed inte-
grated framework in further research.
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Appendix 1: Measurement Items
buyer’s background information
1. Name of your company?
2. Type of the industry?
3. Number of employees (in 2014)?
4. Ownership: (family-owned, state-owned, local Plc. mne)?
5. When was your company formed?
supplier’s background information
1. Name of the key supplier?
2. Supplier’s home country?
3. Number of employees in your supplier company approximately (in
2014)?
4. Supplier ownership type: (Family-owned, state-owned, local Plc.
mne)?
5. When did relationship start with supplier?
6. Why did your firm select this supplier?
transactional characteristics of relationship
1. What kind of resources have your firm and supplier invested in this
relationship (e.g., financial, managerial, technological, physical, or
others)? If yes, then what is the ownership ratio?
2. Suppose if your relationship with this supplier dissolves today,
to what extent you and your supplier can recover the invested
resources: (a) very low, (b) moderately low, (c) slightly low, (d)
medium, (e) slightly higher, (f) moderately higher, (g) very high?
3. If your relationship with this supplier dissolves today, can your firm
find another supplier for same components?
4. If your relationship with this supplier dissolves today, can your sup-
plier find another buyer for the same components?
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5. What is importance of contract in your relationship with supplier
and what sort of things you have included in contract (operate and
manage the relationship, resolve conflicts, terminate the relation,
unanticipated contingencies, quality of resources contributed, and
avoiding exploitation)? What is the impact of contract on actual
dealings between companies?
relational characteristics
1. Communication is very important ingredient for developing the re-
lationship between buyers and suppliers. How do you describe the
quality, frequency, and openness of communication between your
firm and supplier:
(a) keeping informed each other about events or changes that may
affect the other party,
(b) providing important and timely information that might help the
other party,
(c) exchange of information in this relationship takes place fre-
quently and informally.
2. How important is trust in your relationship with supplier? How do
you describe the overall trustworthiness of supplier in this relation-
ship? Does he fulfil his promises? Does he sometimes try to hide
some important information from you?
(a) Cannot be trusted at times
(b) Is perfectly honest and truthful
(c) Can be trusted completely
(d) Can be counted on to do what is right
(e) Is someone I have great confidence in
(f) Has high integrity
relationship outcomes
Transaction Cost
1. Developing relationship always carry some cost in terms of nego-
tiations, combine decision making, monitoring the quality of sup-
plied components, and sharing information. How efficiently your
relationship handles these kinds of costs?
(a) How effective your meetings are with your suppliers in terms of
time spent and making important decisions?
(b) Do you spend a lot of time in monitoring the quality of supplier’s
deliveries?
(c) Do you spend a lot of time together with supplier in order to
solve conflicts?
(d) How easy it is to understand the information provided by sup-
plier?
Buyer-Supplier Relationship Outcome
1. How do you evaluate the performance of your relationship? (Over-
all performance, profitability, just in time delivery, manufacturing
quality, cost control, achieving goals, performance compared to
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other suppliers, and relationship with supplier)? How satisfied is
your firm with this relationship:
(a) Has the relationship been satisfactory?
(b) Has the relationship been very successful?
(c) Has the relationship met your firm expectations?
(d) Has your firm achieved the set objectives?
This paper is published under the terms of the Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (cc by-nc-nd 4.0)
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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A B S T R A C T
Inter-firm relationship governance is becoming increasingly fragmented and complex in industrial marketing
and management. There is a need to develop an integrative framework, which describes the nature of the
relationship (complementary or substitutes) between economic and sociological governance mechanisms, and
their relative effectiveness in explaining ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. Building on
transaction cost economics (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET), we investigate the varying roles of economic
(i.e., contract completeness and symmetric dependence) and sociological (i.e., trust and communication) gov-
ernance mechanisms. The deductive-nomological framework is tested by employing a nonparametric technique
(i.e., partial least squares - PLS) to structural equation modeling (SEM) and semi-partial correlation. The analysis
of data from 170 buyer-supplier relationships established by Finnish SMEs indicates that sociological mechan-
isms function as substitutes with contractual governance and complementary with symmetric dependence in
relation to ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. Further, economic governance mechanisms
have a more effective role in minimizing ex-post transaction costs, whereas sociological governance mechanisms
are more powerful in enhancing relationship commitment.
1. Introduction
Minimizing transaction costs and maximizing relationship commit-
ment have become the central research phenomena in inter-firm re-
lationship management. Transaction cost is defined by Williamson
(1985) as all of the ex-ante and ex-post contracting, monitoring and
enforcement costs connected with conducting exchange activities be-
tween firms (Gulbrandsen, Lambe, & Sandvik, 2017). Relationship
commitment, on the other hand, is considered as a central ingredient of
the relationship marketing model affecting the behavior of partners
(Shi, Shi, Chan, Liu, & Fam, 2011), and involves a need to develop and
maintain a stable relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992). However, the
uncertainty of buyers and suppliers regarding the expectations whether
the counterpart abandons opportunistic behavior and acts co-
operatively in bargaining and negotiation is an inevitable dilemma in
relationship exchange (Gorton et al., 2015). Similarly, incomplete
contracts, distrust, asymmetric information sharing and inter-
dependence, differences in objectives as well as unanticipated changes
in the market are depicted as negative forces influencing transaction
costs and relationship commitment.
Governance, therefore, becomes pivotal in buyer-supplier relation-
ship development (Liu, Li, Shi, and Liu, 2017; Luo, Liu, Yang,
Maksimov, & Hou, 2015). Prior inter-firm governance literature sug-
gests that, in order to achieve joint objectives, firms need to erect ap-
propriate governance factors, namely; economic and sociological me-
chanisms (e.g., Bai, Sheng, & Li, 2016; Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Yang, Gao,
Li, Shen, & Zheng, 2017), rooted in transaction cost economics (TCE)
and social exchange theory (SET). Economic mechanisms, in line with
TCE, include certain governance factors, firms emplaced to avoid
transactional uncertainties through adequate structural implications.
Whereas sociological mechanisms as SET factors help to govern inter-
firm relationships by developing a cooperative environment between
firms (Liu et al., 2009; Liu, Li, Shi, and Liu, 2017).
Although prior empirical research has extensively documented the
effective roles of governance mechanisms, it remains in limited context
of opportunism mitigation (e.g., Liu et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2015), re-
lationship performance (e.g., Yang, Zhao, Yeung, & Liu, 2016; Liu, Li,
et al., 2017) and conflict management (e.g., Lee et al., 2017; Lumineau
& Henderson, 2012; Yang et al., 2017). A growing number of empirical
studies demonstrate that economic structure of relationship exchange is
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sociologically embedded (e.g., Dyer & Chu, 2011; Granovetter, 2005).
Some past empirical studies have investigated only a few governance
mechanisms i.e. trust and transaction-specific investments, their roles
remained in isolation in explaining governance cost (Bharadwaj &
Matsuno, 2006; Corsten & Felde, 2005; Dyer & Chu, 2003) and com-
mitment (Chang, Wang, Chih, & Tsai, 2012; Shi et al., 2011). Moreover,
several recent studies on inter-firm have called for a systematic research
on distinct roles of relationship governance mechanisms in relation to
transaction costs and relationship commitment in different types of
buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Burkert, Ivens, & Shan, 2012;
Gulbrandsen et al., 2017; Liu, Li, et al., 2017). Therefore, researchers
have different opinions as well as they found conflicting empirical re-
sults on whether these mechanisms function as complementary (Liu
et al., 2009; Van der Valk, Sumo, Dul, & Schroeder, 2016) or sub-
stitutive forces (Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 2010; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005).
On the other hand, the relative effectiveness of these mechanisms is
characterized by nuanced understanding of different transaction ob-
jectives driving governance structures, which is missing in the litera-
ture.
Different governance structures are required for different transac-
tion objectives in governing relationship exchange (Burkert et al.,
2012). Better understanding of relationship outcomes and collaboration
goals drive managers to analyze which governance mechanism is more
crucial for a particular task (Yang et al., 2016). Therefore, the varying
roles of economic and sociological governance mechanisms in mini-
mizing ex-post transaction costs and maximizing relationship commit-
ment has yet to be addressed. Such mixed evidence and conflicting
views on complementary-substitutive perspective and relative effec-
tiveness of governance mechanisms, therefore, necessitates further in-
vestigation of the phenomenon. Thus, an interesting question now is
concerned with whether sociological governance mechanisms function
as complementary or substitutes with contractual governance and
symmetric dependence respectively in minimizing ex-post transaction
costs and fostering relationship commitment.
To fill these gaps and provide further insights, this study aims to
address the concerns mentioned above. Therefore, this study con-
tributes to the industrial marketing and management literature by
portraying a comprehensive picture of relative effectiveness, as well as
the joint use of both economic (i.e., contract completeness and sym-
metric dependence) and sociological (i.e., trust and communication)
governance mechanisms influencing ex-post transaction costs and re-
lationship commitment. Further, it develops and empirically tests a
nomological framework by employing a nonparametric technique (i.e.,
PLS) to SEM and semi-partial correlation. The empirically comparative
investigation in concurrent examination of these two effects alongside
will support us in understanding the relative influence of varying
governance mechanisms in order to manage successful buyer-supplier
relationships. Such techniques provide firms the opportunities to eval-
uate the relative effectiveness of various governance mechanisms (Yang
et al., 2016). The study's findings generally support our argument that
economic mechanisms are relatively more effective at minimizing ex-
post transaction costs, while sociological governance mechanisms are
more effective at maximizing relationship commitment. Further, when
sociological mechanisms interact with contract completeness and
symmetric dependence, interesting findings emerge related to their
complementary and substitutive nature.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1. Governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships
Governing successful buyer-supplier relationships in a systematic
way is found to be pivotal in enhancing beneficial outcomes and sta-
bility (Liu et al., 2009; Liu, Li, et al., 2017, Liu, Luo, Huang, and Yang,
2017). The main question, therefore, is how to design an effective
governance structure where both parties are fully devoted to fulfilling
their common business objectives (Luo et al., 2015). For this reason,
several recent studies have highlighted the significance of multiple
governance mechanisms (e.g., Bai et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2009; Yang
et al., 2017). These mechanisms are mainly found embedded in both
economic and sociological mechanisms (Liu, Li, et al., 2017, Liu, Luo,
et al., 2017).
2.1.1. Economic governance mechanisms
Economic governance mechanisms are explained in terms of eco-
nomic rational organizational measures, which support managing,
monitoring and harmonizing partners' behaviors in relationship ex-
change (Liu et al., 2009; Williamson, 1985). Contract completeness and
symmetric dependence, as economic mechanisms, demonstrate mu-
tually specified contractual clauses and relationship specific invest-
ments (Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2000; Liu, Luo, et al., 2017). Contractual
governance is albeit ubiquitous and offers an institutional framework
regulating course of relationship exchange (Luo, 2009; Liu, Luo, et al.,
2017), it varies in the level of completeness, complexities (Crocker &
Reynolds, 1993), rigidity, and flexibility (Sande & Haugland, 2015).
Several researchers have maintained that contracts will always be in-
complete due to inevitable unpredictability (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993;
Luo, 2009). Therefore, a relatively complete contract minimizes the
boundary spanners' uncertainty and risks of opportunisms. A well-de-
fined contract is considered as a comprehensive instrument (i.e., ex-
plaining rules and regulations, rights and obligations of both parties)
for safeguarding specific assets against opportunism (Luo, 2009; Liu,
Luo, et al., 2017). Moreover, the level of completeness in a contract
stipulates the extent to which contractual terms and future con-
tingencies are specific and detailed. Term specificity highlights each
partner' rights, duties and responsibilities in order to organize and
manage the relationship whereas contingency adaptability concerns the
contractual response to future problems, conflicts and contingencies
(Luo, 2002; Reuer & Ariño, 2007). Hence, this level of contact com-
pleteness delineate exchange substance and structure resulting in
maximum pay-off.
Whereas symmetric dependence entails both relationship partners
to invest idiosyncratically in physical and human assets that are less
valuable to alternative uses (Ali & Larimo, 2016; Khalid & Ali, 2017;
Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995). These co-specialized investments
create interdependence between partners, prior research, therefore ar-
gued that symmetric interdependence is a product of both partners'
equal dependence on each other by investing jointly in a relationship
(e.g., Kumar et al., 1995; Wu & Wu, 2015). On the other hand, asym-
metric dependence effects on coercive power of less dependent partner
to exploit, and creates prospects for opportunism and conflict (Liu, Luo,
et al., 2017; Shen, Wang, & Teng, 2017). Therefore, high level of
symmetric dependence enhances the joint motivation of forbearance
and relational embeddedness between partners, and discourages in-
dividual private goal seeking by binding and locking firms to a parti-
cular course of action (Schmitz, Schweiger, & Daft, 2016; Young-Ybarra
& Wiersema, 1999).
2.1.2. Sociological governance mechanisms
Sociological governance mechanisms are defined as socially
embedded organizational measures in economic activities, which help
in managing, monitoring and organizing relationship exchange
(Granovetter, 2005; Liu, Luo, et al., 2017). Based on existing research,
we categorize two sociological governance mechanisms (i.e., trust and
communication), which underlie the impact of relational ties between
buyer and supplier. Trust is a non-contractual mechanism and defined
as the willingness to trust or confidence that a partner holds about the
other partner's reliability, benevolence, and integrity (Zaheer, McEvily,
& Perrone, 1998). Prior research on relationship trust has distinguished
different conceptualization and presented influential perspectives. Such
as, Dyer and Chu (2011) highlighted trust as the level of confidence of a
relationship partner for other partner's fair behavior of not exploiting its
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vulnerabilities. On the other hand, Williamson (1993) presented im-
portant economic perspective of trust and distinguished between cal-
culative, personal and institutional trust. Calculative trust includes
“relational” frame of trust nurtured by mutual hostages and considered
as “risk”. Personal trust implicates in personal relationships and por-
trays as non-calculative. Institutional trust refers to social and organi-
zational embeddedness and appears also as being calculative. Both the
relational calculation and the “leap of faith” comprise trust in business
relationships. While effective communication, is considered as a useful
tool in developing collaboration, integration and cooperation between
relationship partners (Kim & Chai, 2017). It refers to the bilateral ex-
pectation of formal and/or informal sharing of meaningful and timely
information exchange between relationship partners (Wang, Wang,
Jiang, Yang, & Cui, 2016). Building on SET, we conceptualize that
communication strengthens the confidence of both parties in a re-
lationship in terms of formal and informal availability of particular
information (Yang et al., 2017) that is timely and offered frequently
(Hung & Lin, 2013).
In this study, both economic and sociological mechanisms are an-
ticipated to mitigate ex-post transaction costs and to enhance re-
lationship commitment. Transaction costs include the costs involved in
order to attain jointly acceptable agreement (Luo et al., 2015; Zaheer
et al., 1998). Notably, ex-post transaction costs contain the negotiation
time and efforts required to define effective arrangements and to de-
termine divisions of costs and benefits (Gulbrandsen et al., 2017). On
the other hand, relationship commitment is defined as relationship
partners' confidence regarding the importance and efforts of main-
taining the long-term relationship by willingly making short-term sa-
crifices. We conceptualize relationship commitment as a sense of loy-
alty and the continuity of business for a longer time to strengthen the
relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Tellefsen, 2002). Fig. 1 sum-
marizes our theoretical model and hypotheses.
2.2. Economic governance mechanisms, transaction costs, and relationship
commitment
The level of contractual completeness makes the relationship con-
tractually explicit by mitigating partners' anxiety and exchange hazards
(Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005), and functions as a safeguard against higher
transaction costs. Previous research has argued that detailed con-
tractual terms and clauses, as comprehensive instruments, effectively
regulate behavioral boundaries, operational risks and opportunism,
thus, developing relationship commitment and cost performance (Liu
et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2017). Dyer and Chu (2003) maintained that
contracts minimize ex-post monitoring and enforcement costs because
all the expectations and obligations are explicitly indicated during the
contracting phase. On the other hand, some authors (e.g., Crocker &
Reynolds, 1993) suggested that contractual completeness is the optimal
balance between ex-ante (e.g., writing the contract) and ex-post
transaction costs (e.g., managing disputes). The former increases when
environmental uncertainty increases, the latter increases when the risk
of opportunism increases. Therefore, relatively more complete contract
provides a framework for guarding against ex-post transaction costs and
performance problems by controlling the private objectives of partners
at the cost of mutual benefits (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Liu, Luo,
et al., 2017). The more the extent to which a contract is complete, the
less the ex-post transaction cost will be. Further, previous empirical
studies (Liu et al., 2009; Reuer & Arino, 2002; Woolthuis, Hillebrand, &
Nooteboom, 2005; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005) have suggested that
complete contracts, by clearly specifying the promises and obligations
of each partner, enhance long-term commitment by mitigating oppor-
tunism. Based on the focus of our study, we thus argue that relationship
partners may mitigate ex-post transaction costs and enhance relation-
ship commitment by using more complete and detailed contractual
design.
Symmetric dependence corroborates the idiosyncratic relationship-
specific investments by both partners (Khalid & Ali, 2017; Shen et al.,
2017; Liu, Luo, et al., 2017) and enhance relationship commitment by
creating interdependence between them. A high level of symmetrical
interdependence is characterized by mutual investments indicating
loyalty and cooperative long-term relationship (Caniëls & Gelderman,
2007). Furthermore, it prohibits the market mechanism deployment
and private control in the relationship and becomes critical for im-
proving cost performance and learning (Chang & Gotcher, 2007; Liu, Li,
et al., 2017). Previous seminal research has presented both positive and
negative aspects of mutual investments in relation with transaction
costs. For example, several researchers (e.g., Dyer, 1997; Williamson,
1985) argued that increase in asset specificity escalates opportunism,
transaction costs and hold-up problems during the early stages of re-
lationship. However, once the relationship is developed and adequate
level of trust and symmetrical interdependence is attained, relationship
partners become more loyal to each other (Liu et al., 2009) and expect
continuous future transactions, thereby resulting in lower transaction
costs. On the other hand, asymmetric interdependence can be coun-
terproductive because less dependent partner dominates the relation-
ship and exploits its weaker counterpart (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007;
Shen et al., 2017) thereby resulting in lower commitment and higher
transaction costs (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). A fear of high switching
costs enhances the relationship partners' interest in maintaining a
quality relationship and commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Fol-
lowing transaction cost reasoning, researchers argued that higher level
of symmetric dependence displays strong and cooperative bond and
provides incentives for not abandoning the exchange and for devel-
oping the relationship as successfully as possible (e.g., Caniëls &
Gelderman, 2007). Based on this theoretical examination, we argue that
increase in the level of symmetric dependence creates mutual hostage
and stabilizes the relationship by realigning the self-interest (Liu, Luo,
et al., 2017), that influence ex-post transaction costs and serves as a
structural rationale for long-term committed relationship. Hence, we
hypothesize that.
H1. There is a negative relationship between the use of economic
governance mechanisms of (a) contract completeness and (b)
symmetric dependence, and ex-post transaction costs.
H2. There is a positive relationship between the use of economic
governance mechanisms of (a) contract completeness and (b)
symmetric dependence, and relationship commitment.
2.3. Sociological governance mechanisms, transaction costs, and
relationship commitment
As sociological governance mechanism, trust is a significant factor
for developing transaction cost performance, with the importance of a
cooperative atmosphere having been emphasized in some empirical
studies (e.g., Khalid & Ali, 2017; Liu, Luo, et al., 2017). The willingness
to trust or confidence in a partner, with regard to the other partner's
reliability, benevolence, and integrity, significantly influence ex-post
transaction costs and relationship commitment. The propensity of trust
between relationship partners may determine their reliance on trust to
minimize transaction costs (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Gulbrandsen
et al., 2017). Ex-post transaction costs are minimized more effectively if
a high level of inter-organizational trust is emplaced, as negotiations
can be quickly and easily successful because of relationship partners'
readiness (Zaheer et al., 1998). While low level of mutual trust en-
hances the complexities in a relationship, thereby resulting in higher
transaction costs and lower commitment. Further, trusted partners
spend less time in haggling over problems, adapting to unforeseen
circumstances and spending fewer resources monitoring each other's
behavior (Burkert et al., 2012; Dyer & Chu, 2011). Williamson (1993)
argued that if the degree to which associated investments between re-
lationship partners are not cost effective, calculative form of trust
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becomes the solution in order to economize transaction costs. Trust
being multidimensional concept functions as a substitute for hierarchal
control and minimizes both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs by
attenuating the efforts required to preempt the trustworthiness of
counterpart. On the other hand, trust should positively impacts on re-
lationship commitment. Trust is the main determinant of relationship
commitment and firms seek only trustworthy relationship partners,
therefore, the more the relationship partners trust each other, the more
they feel committed and secured (Burkert et al., 2012). This narrative
develops a perception of good faith, care and commitment for their
counterpart rather than opportunistic behavior (Dyer & Chu, 2003).
Communication as bilateral expectation of formal and informal in-
formation exchanges (Wang et al., 2016), can influence ex-post trans-
action costs and relationship commitment (Hung & Lin, 2013). These
bilateral expectations refer to the partners' beliefs regarding excellent
communication, function as useful safeguards to deter conflicts, per-
ceived risks and uncertainty (Heide & John, 1992; Yen, Shih-Tse Wang,
& Horng, 2011). Conversely, ineffective communication or asymmetric
information sharing create misunderstanding and place the partner in
jeopardy (Villena, Revilla, & Choi, 2011), which minimizes the like-
lihood of developing relationship quality and satisfaction (Hung & Lin,
2013), and maximizes the time and effort required to negotiate (i.e. ex-
post transaction costs). As communication promotes harmonization
between relationship partners in terms of the timely available in-
formation, it also helps in fostering confidence in partner's reliability
and integrity and thereby minimizes ex-post transaction costs (Hung &
Lin, 2013; Wang et al., 2016). Therefore, prior empirical research has
found a negative impact of communication on relationship partners'
bargaining costs (e.g., Yigitbasioglu, 2010). Furthermore, based on the
loyalty and good faith between relationship partners, effective com-
munication is crucial in knowledge sharing and cohesion, leading to
conflict resolution and relationship commitment development (Hung &
Lin, 2013; Yen et al., 2011). Similarly, studies delineated that com-
munication alleviates the uncertainty level and build a mutually
bounded relationship, thereby enhancing relationship commitment
(e.g., Cai, Yang, & Hu, 2009). Based on the above discussion, we derive
the following hypotheses:
H3. There is a negative relationship between the use of sociological
governance mechanisms of (a) trust and (b) communication, and ex-
post transaction costs.
H4. There is a positive relationship between the use of sociological
governance mechanisms of (a) trust and (b) communication, and
relationship commitment.
2.4. Interaction effects of economic and sociological governance
mechanisms
Prior research has presented two competing views toward the
nature of the relationship, i.e. complementarity and substitution be-
tween relationship governance mechanisms. The complementarity view
suggests that transactional and relational mechanisms function as
complements (Lee et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2009; Luo, 2002; Poppo &
Zenger, 2002). However, the other view holds that, due to the varying
nature of both transactional and relational mechanisms, joint adoption
is less effective at governing inter-firm relationships (Li et al., 2010;
Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). In this study, we examine how sociological
governance mechanisms interact with contract completeness and sym-
metric dependence in minimizing ex-post transaction costs and max-
imizing relationship commitment.
2.4.1. Interaction of sociological governance mechanisms and contract
completeness
Seminal studies have viewed sociological governance mechanisms
and contracts as substitutes believing that the presence of one prevents
the use of other (Li et al., 2010; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Wang, Yeung, &
Zhang, 2011). The theoretical reasons behind this substitution explain
the importance of sociological governance against contractual safe-
guards. Indeed, a contract may minimize the risk of opportunism, it
may also be seen as counterproductive to trust and bilateral commu-
nication (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Further, researchers argued that socio-
logical mechanisms mitigate relational risks by enhancing confidence in
a partner's willingness (Lui & Ngo, 2004), thereby minimizing the re-
dundant specification of monitoring contractual clauses (Gulati &
Sytch, 2008; Li et al., 2010). This notion results in closer cooperation
and fostered commitment between partners. On the other side, detailed
contracts may be interpreted as a sign of unfairness and hinder the
formation of sociological governance by enforcing contractual clauses
(Lumineau & Henderson, 2012), trust and communication, therefore
undermine the negative influence of structural factors (Wang et al.,
2011). Similarly, informal self-enforcing approaches relying on trust
and communication undermine the use of formal governance of con-
tracts (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Contractual safeguards and controlling
characteristics in the contract thus diminish the impact of sociological
mechanisms, thereby restraining cooperative interactions between
partners. Hawkins, Wittmann, and Beyerlein (2008) argued that, over
time, constant changes in strategies and extracted values may transform
a relationship from being economic to social and vice versa. The un-
derlying logic explains that drafting detailed and complex contracts
may undermine the sociological governance, meaning that their com-
bined use may not be effective. Therefore based on the above discussion
and theoretical examination, this study argues that sociological gov-
ernance mechanisms and contract completeness function as substitutes
in minimizing ex-post transaction costs and fostering relationship
commitment. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H5. Sociological governance mechanisms and contract completeness
will function as substitutes in (a) minimizing ex-post transaction costs,
and (b) maximizing relationship commitment.
2.4.2. Interaction of sociological governance mechanisms and symmetric
dependence
Despite the convincing opinions for viewing sociological govern-
ance and contract completeness as substitutes, the rationale for viewing
sociological governance and symmetric dependence as complements
seems equally compelling. The combination of sociological factors and
symmetric dependence might provide greater inter-firm cooperation
than employing them separately (Lee et al., 2017). Prior research has
argued that symmetric dependence of inter-organizational exchange is
socially embedded and complement in producing greater benefits (e.g.,
Dyer & Chu, 2011; Granovetter, 2005; Liu et al., 2009). However, so-
ciological mechanisms have limitations due to lack of explicit ap-
proaches and bounded rationality (Poppo & Zenger, 2002), symmetric
dependence, therefore provides an institutional framework and com-
plements sociological governance by offering structural constraints
through a mutual hostage. Liu et al. (2009) argued that firms realize
that damaging mutual specific investments can result in their reputa-
tion loss, thus avoid opportunistic behavior when trust and effective
communication are developed. Their significant empirical findings of
complementarity interplay between economic and social factors are
consistent with the prior seminal research (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002).
Thus, the underlying logic explains that symmetric dependence alone is
insufficient in minimizing ex-post transaction costs and maximizing
relationship commitment, because partners may not be able to resolve
the conflicts and external uncertainty cooperatively. Additionally, so-
ciological mechanisms alone can be insufficient because of the un-
certainty regarding the fair reciprocal behavior of the counterpart (Ali
& Larimo, 2016). Where symmetric dependence promotes sociological
governance, sociological factors facilitate structural framework to sta-
bilize the relationship exchange. Therefore, we suggest positive re-
ciprocal relationships between sociological governance mechanisms
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and symmetric dependence. Based on the above discussion, this study
advances the following hypotheses:
H6. Sociological governance mechanisms and symmetric dependence
will function as complements in (a) minimizing ex-post transaction
costs, and (b) maximizing relationship commitment.
2.5. The relative importance of economic and sociological governance
mechanisms
As we have hypothesized the interplay between governance me-
chanisms in order to minimize ex-post transaction costs, we further
predict that economic mechanisms are comparatively more effective
than sociological mechanisms in improving cost performance (Yang
et al., 2016). Relative effectiveness of governance mechanisms is
characterized by nuanced understanding of contextual factors and
boundary conditions. Different governance structures are required for
different transaction objectives in governing relationship exchange.
Better understanding of relationship outcomes and collaboration goals
drive managers to analyze which governance mechanism is more cru-
cial for a particular task (Liu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2016). Based on
TCE reasoning, employing more complete contract and symmetric de-
pendence in a buyer-supplier relationship prevent the ex-post costs of
enforcing and handling (Dyer & Chu, 2003). Similarly, Poppo and
Zenger (2002) manifested economic mechanisms as a formal frame-
work to be used to resolve conflicts, alleviate the risk of mis-
understandings, drive combined actions, and clarify the responsibilities
and duties of each partner. Furthermore, explicitly described con-
tractual clauses positively affect the use of a cooperative negotiation
strategy (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012) and facilitate the continuity of
operations in effective manner (Yang et al., 2016), thereby reducing ex-
post transaction costs. As, economic governance provide structural
frameworks in curbing opportunism and transaction costs in a re-
lationship exchange, sociological factors have limited power to dis-
cipline operations (Yang et al., 2016). Although trust clearly matters in
relationship exchange and can significantly reduce transaction costs,
relational governance settings alone do not completely provide formal
framework and clear instructions in case of emergencies. Therefore, the
risk of a partner's high level of trust, being exploited, becomes higher.
Based on the above-mentioned reasons and the structural logic behind
the relative effectiveness of economic factors, we hypothesize that:
H7. Economic governance mechanisms are more effective than
sociological governance mechanisms at minimizing ex-post
transaction costs.
While we predicted that economic governance is more effective in
minimizing ex-post transaction costs, sociological governance, on the
other hand, can be more effective than economic factors at maximizing
relationship commitment (Yang et al., 2016). Previous empirical studies
argued that sociological governance mechanisms overcome the adap-
tive boundaries of complex contracts and function as informal instru-
ments in developing relationship commitment (Kohtamäki, Vesalainen,
Henneberg, Naudé, & Ventresca, 2012; Krause, Handfield, & Tyler,
2007). Therefore, this informal governance not only share the social
platforms but also facilitate increased knowledge sharing, problem-
solving efforts and learning within a relationship (Liu et al., 2009; Yang
et al., 2016). Furthermore, relational instruments i.e. trust and com-
munication function as a counterforce to power imbalance and mini-
mizes the influence of power asymmetry, thereby enhancing commit-
ment and desire to continue long-term relationship (Yang et al., 2016).
Commitment flourishes and develops more when factors, such as trust,
norms of flexibility, solidarity, and communication, robustly exist in a
relationship (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). On the contrary, because eco-
nomic governance create an explicit structural system, in which both
parties must comply, the motivation to enhance relationship commit-
ment is thus constrained. Sociological governance, therefore, support
flexible environment and encourage relationship partners to engage in
such activities beyond the limits of interdependence and contract
clauses in order to enhance relationship commitment (Liu et al., 2009;
Yang et al., 2016). Based on the above-mentioned reasons and the social
logic behind the relative effectiveness of sociological governance fac-
tors, we hypothesize the following:
H8. Sociological governance mechanisms are more effective than
economic governance mechanisms at maximizing relationship
commitment.
3. Research methodology
3.1. Data collection
This study consists of Finnish SMEs involved in buyer-supplier re-
lationships operating with key suppliers (i.e. suppliers providing key
components and services) from a variety of countries in Asia and
Europe, as well as the USA. A sample of 892 potential SMEs was gen-
erated from a database operated by the Collector Finland (i.e., a fi-
nancial service provider, offering cost-effective and innovative solu-
tions to private and corporate customers in Nordic countries), which
includes basic information about Nordic buyer-supplier relationships.
The sample indicates that 170 SMEs had suppliers in three regions
(Europe: 143; USA: 17; Asia: 10), with an average size of 24 employees/
SME and an average turnover of €38 m/SME. The SMEs in the data set
were operating in several dispersed classified industries, with 66.47%
Fig. 1. Theoretical model and hypotheses.
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belonging to manufacturing and 33.53% belonging to the services in-
dustry. However, it was less useful when attempting to identify eco-
nomic and sociological governance factors pertaining to the manage-
ment of buyer-supplier relationships from the database. Therefore, we
decided to collect primary data from key executives from Finnish SMEs
in order to obtain the essential details on these buyer-supplier re-
lationship issues. This database was used to identify the names and
emails of potential respondents, while most of them were CEOs, CFOs,
and board directors. Pre-testing was executed among the research
group members in order to determine whether the respondents appre-
hend the questions as offered. Thus in spring 2015, a web-based
questionnaire was designed (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009) and
sent to 892 firms by following another email to non-respondents three
weeks later. In result, we collected 170 usable responses, yielding a
response rate of 19.06% (170 of 892).
Despite this response rate, we performed an independent sample t-
test as proposed by Armstrong and Overton (1977) in order to measure
whether, and to what extent, this survey was subject to non-response
bias, and to analyze the difference between early and late respondents
(N = 85; N = 85). No significant differences between the early and late
respondents were found in terms of firm's size (p = 0.510) and length
of the relationship (p = 0.319). Therefore, non-response bias was not a
problem for this study. Prior methodological literature, as well as many
empirical studies (e.g., Ali & Larimo, 2016; Silva, Bradley, & Sousa,
2012), have taken the stance that late respondents are also re-
presentative of non-respondents.
A likelihood of common method variance exists in the research
when all the constructs are measured using the same survey (Najafi-
Tavani, Zaefarian, Naudé, & Giroud, 2015; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee,
& Podsakoff, 2003). Therefore, in order to measure and control for
potential effect of common method bias, ex-ante and ex-post strategies
were followed (Chang, van Witteloostuijin, & Eden, 2010). During the
ex-ante research design stage, we followed different strategies. First,
respondents were guaranteed of anonymity and confidentiality re-
garding the study. Second, the sequence of questions was emplaced in a
way that a logical relationship between the variables seemed un-
apparent, as questions related to ex-post transaction costs and re-
lationship commitment were asked in different sections. After we col-
lected data, we performed Harman's one-factor test as an ex-post
approach in order to measure the degree to which collected data is
influenced negatively by common method bias. In result of non-rotated
factor solution in exploratory factor analysis, no single or general factor
was apparent explaining most of the variability in the data, with major
factor accounting for 26.88% of total variance. Thus, common method
variance was not a problem in the analysis.
3.2. Measures
This study employs reflective measurement models and the items
used to operationalize each construct were developed on a 7-point
Likert scale based on the existing literature. All the constructs demon-
strated satisfactory reliability and validity with their Cronbach's Alpha
(CA), Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite Reliability (CR)
values as well as item loadings in Table 1. We adapted four items for the
ex-post transaction costs construct from Zaheer et al. (1998), which
demonstrated satisfactory reliability and validity (AVE: 0.79; CA: 0.75;
CR: 0.83). Relationship commitment was measured using four items
(AVE: 0.80; CA: 0.79; CR: 0.92) based on Anderson and Weitz (1992)
and Tellefsen (2002). Trust was measured by adapting seven items
(AVE: 0.78; CA: 0.81; CR 0.93) from Morgan and Hunt (1994). Com-
munication was operationalized adapting four items (AVE: 0.83; CA:
0.93; CR.95) drawing from Heide and John (1992) and Young-Ybarra
and Wiersema (1999). Contract completeness including term specificity
and contingency adaptability was measured using six items (AVE: 0.77;
CA: 0.93; CR 0.95), based on Luo (2002, 2009).
The method that we employed to measure the level of symmetric
dependence between partners was adapted from previous empirical
studies (e.g., Ali & Larimo, 2016; Khalid & Ali, 2017). Symmetric de-
pendence characterizes the extent to which both buyer and supplier are
interdependent and have invested equal idiosyncratic specific assets
ranged from “1 = very low to 7 = very high”. Therefore, it was divided
into buyer's dependence and supplier's dependence. Buyer dependence
comprises of two items, adapted from previous research: A- we need the
size of investment in a focal relationship, and B- we need the level of
replicability, that is, we need to measure difficulty in redeploying the
resources outside the relationship (e.g. Reuer & Arino, 2002; Young-
Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999; Zeng, 1998). In order to determine the de-
pendence of buyer firm, these two items were collapsed into one. Si-
milarly, respondents were also asked the same questions to specify the
size of supplier's investments in the relationship and the difficulty level
of supplier's investment redeployment, that were collapsed into one in
order to calculate supplier dependence. To determine the level of
symmetric dependence between buyer and supplier, a calculation was
made by taking the absolute difference between both partner's inter-
dependence. In this instance, a zero specified a perfectly symmetric
dependence of both parties. This measure explains the perfect sym-
metric dependence between partners in case of both high mutual de-
pendence and low mutual dependence.
To exemplify, suppose we have a case wherein (A) the size of in-
vestment is 4 out of 7; and (B) the difficulty to replace is 5 out of 7. In
this case, we calculate the level of dependence by multiplying A by B;
that is the buyer's dependence is 4 ∗ 5 = 20. Similarly, if the calculation
of supplier's dependence is also 20, we have a pair of buyer and supplier
in which both have similar level of dependence, i.e. 20. As such, the
difference between these values is 20–20 = 0, representing a perfect
symmetric dependence. These calculations helped us to determine the
level of symmetrical interdependence between buyer and supplier in
order to analyze the data. Three additional variables of less interest
were included to control the dependent variables. These include age of
the firm, relationship length (Liu et al., 2009), and size of the buyer
firm (Luo et al., 2015) as control variables because of their potential
effect on dependent variables. Age of the firm was measured as the
number of years in operation and size of the firm as a number of em-
ployees. Finally, relationship length indicates the time period of the
relationship between buyer and supplier.
3.3. Measure validation
To analyze our deductive-nomological model, we utilized a non-
parametric technique (i.e., partial least squares - PLS) to variance-based
structural equation modeling (SEM) by using SmartPLS 2.0 software
(Chin, 1998; Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005) for the following reasons.
Firstly, we adopted variance based PLS-SEM approach because this
study tests an explorative model with alternative hypotheses, i.e.
whether economic and sociological governance mechanisms (direct
effect and interaction effect) explain ex-post transaction costs and re-
lationship commitment. Secondly, PLS-SEM is capable of modeling la-
tent constructs beyond measurement error, therefore is appropriate to
test interaction effects in particular (Chin, 1998; Mitchell, Mitchell, &
Smith, 2008). Thirdly, PLS-SEM modeling is not only considered as the
most suitable approach when dealing with a small sample size but it
also allows researchers to evaluate both formative and reflective mea-
surement models simultaneously as well as hierarchical models (Becker,
Klein, & Wetzels, 2012; Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, and Ringle, 2012). Thus,
it exhibits higher statistical power than covariance-based SEM when
used on complex models with limited sample size (Hair, Sarstedt,
Pieper, et al., 2012; Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, and Mena, 2012; Chin,
1998). This is particularly applicable to this study, as the final sample
size was 170 buyer-supplier relationships. Furthermore, multivariate
normal data is not required in PLS-SEM modeling (Chin, 1998).
Therefore, growing number of recent industrial marketing and man-
agement studies employed PLS-SEM because of its dynamic attributes
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(e.g., Khalid & Ali, 2017; Kohtamäki et al., 2012; Mitrega, Forkmann,
Zaefarian, & Henneberg, 2017; Najafi-Tavani et al., 2015; Zaefarian,
Forkmann, Mitręga, & Henneberg, 2017).
Although PLS modeling evaluates both structural and measurement
model at the same time, this study followed Hulland's (1999) technique
in testing models. We analyzed and interpreted the estimated model in
two phases: first, the estimation and reliability of the measurement
model, and, second, the evaluating the structural model. We also vali-
dated measurement model by evaluating the individual item reli-
abilities: convergent and discriminant validity (Chin, 1998; Hair,
Sarstedt, Ringle, et al., 2012). All the loaded indicators on latent vari-
ables are above Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers, and Krafft's (2010) recommended
a level of 0.7, which specifies a high degree of item reliability, whereas
the mean of composite reliability (CR) represents the construct relia-
bility for each latent variable. The composite reliability is noted higher
than the threshold of 0.6. Further, the average variance extracted (AVE)
with a greater value than the threshold of 0.5 is considered for all the
latent variables in order to evaluate the convergent validity of the re-
flective block of the model (Gotz et al., 2010), demonstrating sa-
tisfactorily valid.
Table 2 exhibits the inter-construct correlations and average var-
iance extracted. Previous studies also recommended that if square roots
of the AVEs are statistically higher than correlations among the latent
constructs, discriminant validity could be assured (Chin, 1998; Gotz
et al., 2010). We also assessed the level of multi-collinearity between
the constructs and variance inflation factor (VIF) was found well below
five (the highest VIF values is 1.78), thus indicating no significant
multi-collinearity (Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, et al., 2012, Hair, Sarstedt,
Ringle, et al., 2012). Additionally, we computed a confirmatory factor
analysis, and the results specify a good model fit (χ2 = 277.90,
Table 1
Constructs, item loadings, Cronbach's alpha (CA), AVE and composite reliability values (CR).
Constructs and items Loadings Item source(s)
Ex-post transaction cost (AVE: 0.79; CA: 0.75; CR: 0.83) Zaheer et al. (1998)
How easy are negotiations between your firm and key supplier firm over sharing the burden of costs (not
explicitly covered by the contract) when (very difficult 1–7 very easy):
Your business unit requests engineering changes? 0.85
Supplier X's raw material costs increase? 0.87
How quick are negotiations between your firm and key supplier firm over sharing the burden of costs (not
explicitly covered by the contract) when (very slow 1–7 very quick):
Your business unit requests engineering changes? 0.81
Supplier X's raw material costs increase? 0.83
Relationship commitment (AVE: 0.80; CA: 0.79; CR: 0.92) Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Tellefsen (2002)
Please indicate how strongly you agree with the following statements concerning supplier commitment
(strongly disagree 1–7 strongly agree)?
We have a strong sense of loyalty to our key supplier 0.87
We are continually on the lookout for new sources to replace our supplier (R) 0.89
We are very committed to our key supplier 0.91
We expect to be doing business with our key supplier for a long time 0.90
Trust (AVE: 0.78; CA: 0.81; CR 0.93) Morgan and Hunt (1994)
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements (strongly disagree 1–7 strongly agree):
Our key supplier firm:
Cannot be trusted at times (R) 0.91
Is perfectly honest and truthful 0.93
Can be trusted completely 0.96
Can be counted on to do what is right 0.89
Is always faithful 0.93
Is someone I have great confidence in 0.92
Has high integrity 0.91
Communication (AVE: 0.83; CA: 0.93; CR 0.95) Heide and John (1992) and Young-Ybarra and
Wiersema (1999)
Regarding communication between you and your key supplier, please indicate your level of agreement with the
following statements (strongly disagree 1–7 strongly agree):
We always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party 0.88
It is expected that any information, which might help the other party, will be provided to them 0.91
It is expected that proprietary information will be shared if it can help the other party 0.91
Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally, not only according to a
pre-specified agreement
0.94
Contract completeness (AVE: 0.77; CA: 0.93; CR 0.95) Luo (2002) and Luo (2009)
To what extent are the following arrangements with your key supplier firm formalized in the written contract
(not at all 1–7 entirely)?
How to operate and manage the relationship 0.86
How to cooperate, coordinate, and resolve conflicts between your firm and key supplier 0.91
How to terminate the relationship 0.85
How to handle the unanticipated contingencies during relationship formation and operation 0.88
Cost and quality of resources invested in relationship 0.88
How to secure invested resources from exploitation 0.90
Symmetric dependence Zeng (1998), Reuer and Arino (2002) and Young-
Ybarra and Wiersema (1999)
Items measuring the dependence of buyer firm (very low 1–7 very high):
Our investment in the relationship is
If this relationship was to dissolve, our non-recoverable investments would be
Items measuring the dependence of key supplier firm (very low 1–7 very high):
Supplier firm's investment in the relationship is
If this relationship was to dissolve, the key supplier firm's non-recoverable investments would be
Symmetric dependence
Level of symmetric dependence between buyer and key supplier (i.e., difference between dependence of buyer
and supplier firm) [0 = 7, 1–8 = 6, 9–16 = 5, 17–24 = 4, 25–32 = 3, 33–40 = 2, 41–48 = 1]
1
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d.f. = 165, RMSEA = 0.064, GFI = 0.873, CFI = 0.961, NFI = 0.911,
IFI = 0.962). Hence, we safely conclude that all the constructs and
items were found to be satisfactorily sound, assuring discriminant va-
lidity and reliability.
4. Analysis and results
4.1. Structural estimates
We employed PLS-analysis (a path weighting technique with a
maximum of 300 iterations) in order to test our direct effect and in-
teraction effect hypotheses (i.e. H1–H6), and a bootstrapping method of
sampling was utilized to generate t-values (Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, et al.,
2012; Chin, 1998). These structural estimations are presented in
Table 3 where R2 (i.e., the coefficient of determination) for the de-
pendent variable, path loadings (i.e., standardized β) and significance
levels demonstrate the main effects (Gotz et al., 2010). The nomological
validity of our model was evaluated by examining the explained var-
iance R2 for each dependent construct in our framework (Sarstedt,
Ringle, Henseler, & Hair, 2014). The R2 for dependent variables in
Models 3 and 7 are 0.29 and 0.32, respectively, which posits that the
independent constructs describe 29% of the variance in ex-post trans-
action costs and 32% of the variance in relationship commitment.
From the results of Model 3, significant negative relationships were
found between contract completeness and ex-post transaction costs
(β=−0.40, p≤ 0.01) and between symmetric dependence and ex-
post transaction costs (β=−0.13, p≤ 0.05). These results support
H1. Further, Model 7 shows that contract completeness (β= 0.19,
p≤ 0.01) exerts a significant and positive effect on relationship com-
mitment. However, symmetric dependence does not significantly relate
to relationship commitment. These results partially support H2
(H2a = supported, H2b = not supported).1 Furthermore, from Model 3,
significant negative relationships were found between communication
and ex-post transaction costs (β=−0.30, p≤ 0.05) and between trust
and ex-post transaction costs (β=−0.18, p≤ 0.05). These results
support H3. Further results from Model 7 indicate that communication
(β= 0.33, p≤ 0.01) and trust (β= 0.17, p≤ 0.05) exert a significant
and positive effect on relationship commitment. These results support
H4.
Models 4 and 8 respectively in Table 3 are used to examine the
interaction effects between sociological mechanisms and contract
completeness and between sociological mechanisms and symmetric
dependence in relation to ex-post transaction costs and relationship
commitment. We mean-centered and multiplied the indicators of
sociological mechanisms and economic factors to obtain the interaction
effects. Several researchers have confirmed that negative coefficients of
interacting variables would support a substitute relationship whereas
positive coefficients suggest a complementary relationship (e.g., Li
et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Wang et al., 2011).
In relation to ex-post transaction costs, results in Model 4 suggest that
interaction between trust and contract completeness (β= 0.19,
p≤ 0.05) is positive and significant while the interaction between
communication and contract completeness is positive, albeit non-sig-
nificant. Whereas, the results from Model 8 show that interaction be-
tween trust and contract completeness (β=−0.16, p≤ 0.05), is
negative and significant. Similarly, the interaction between commu-
nication and contract completeness (β=−0.20, p≤ 0.05) is negative
and significant, in relation to relationship commitment. These results
partially support H5a and completely support H5b, representing sub-
stitute relationships between sociological governance mechanisms and
contract completeness. Further, in relation to ex-post transaction costs,
the interaction between trust and symmetric dependence (β=−0.17,
p≤ 0.05) is negative and significant. Meanwhile, the interaction be-
tween communication and symmetric dependence is negative and sig-
nificant (β=−0.15, p≤ 0.05). On the other hand, the interaction
between trust and symmetric dependence (β= 0.14, p≤ 0.05), in re-
lation to relationship commitment, is significant and positive, while the
interaction between communication and symmetric dependence
(β= 0.13, p≤ 0.05) is significant and positive. These results lend full
support to H6a and H6b, representing complementary relationships
between sociological governance mechanisms and symmetric depen-
dence.
4.2. Relative power of governance mechanisms
To test hypotheses H7 and H8, two methods were employed to
compare the relative powers of economic and sociological governance
mechanisms, as offered and used by Liu et al. (2009). Firstly, if we take
“ex-post transaction costs”, for example, we can get ΔR2 as per the
regression results of Models 1, 2 and 3:
= − = −
=
−
ΔR R R 0. 29 0. 25
0. 04
2
Model 3 Model 1
2
Model 3
2
Model 1
= − = −
=
−
ΔR R R 0. 29 0. 21
0. 08
2
Model 3 Model 2
2
Model 3
2
Model 2
Here, ΔR2Model 3 − Model 1 describes the proportion of the variance of
ex-post transaction costs that sociological mechanisms can explain,
while ΔR2Model 3 − Model 2 represents the proportion of the variance of ex-
post transaction costs, that economic mechanisms can explain. As
ΔR2Model 3 − Model 2 > ΔR2Model 3 − Model 1, this suggests that economic
mechanisms are statistically stronger in effecting ex-post transaction
costs than sociological mechanisms. Further, taking “relationship
commitment” as the dependent variable, we acquire ΔR2 as per the
regression results of Models 5, 6 and 7:
Table 2
Inter-construct correlations, AVE and square roots of AVE along the diagonal.
Constructs AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Communication 0.83 0.91
2. Trust 0.78 0.47 0.88
3. Contract completeness 0.77 0.20 0.12 0.88
4. Symmetric dependence 1 0.04 0.02 0.04 1
5. Age of the company 1 0.19 −0.01 0.06 0.06 1
6. Relationship length 1 0.23 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.52 1
7. Size of buyer firm 1 0.02 −0.06 0.08 −0.07 0.32 0.28 1
8. Transaction costs 0.79 −0.31 −0.17 −0.29 −0.12 −0.04 −0.12 0.04 0.89
9. Relationship commitment 0.80 0.47 0.36 0.28 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.00 −0.35 0.89
1 We further split the contract completeness construct into two sub-dimensions of term
specificity and contingency adaptability and examined the effect of each of these sub-
dimensions on both ex-post transaction costs as well as on relationship commitment. The
results suggests that term specificity has negative impact on ex-post transaction costs
(β=−0.28, p≤ 0.05) and positive impact on relationship commitment (β= 0.27,
p≤ 0.05), however the path from contingency adaptability to these dependent variables
while in a right direction, is not significant. These finding suggest that term specificity is
more important in explaining transaction cost and can increase relationship commitment.
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= − = −
=
−
ΔR R R 0. 32 0. 19
0. 13
2
Model 7 Model 5
2
Model 7
2
Model 5
= − = −
=
−
ΔR R R 0. 32 0. 25
0. 07
2
Model 7 Model 6
2
Model 7
2
Model 6
Here, ΔR2Model 7 − Model 5 represents the proportion of the variance of
relationship commitment, that sociological mechanisms can explain,
while ΔR2Model 7 − Model 6 represents the proportion of the variance of
relationship commitment, that economic mechanisms can explain. As
ΔR2Model 7 − Model 6 < ΔR2Model 7 − Model 5, this suggests that sociological
mechanisms are statistically stronger in influencing relationship com-
mitment than economic mechanisms. Notably, none of the control
variables was significantly related to ex-post transaction costs and re-
lationship commitment.
Secondly, the semi-partial correlation was performed to further
examine the above relative predicting power (see Table 4), which re-
presents the independent influence of a predicting variable to the de-
pendent variable controlling for the effect of other variables (Liu et al.,
2009). The impact of economic mechanisms on attenuating ex-post
transaction costs equals the sum of the impact of contract completeness
and symmetric dependence, which is 0.081 (0.060 + 0.021). Similarly,
the impact of sociological mechanisms on shrinking ex-post
transaction costs equals to the sum of the impact of trust and commu-
nication, which is 0.055 (0.030 + 0.025). The impact of economic
mechanisms on ex-post transaction costs is found to be stronger than
the impact of sociological mechanisms. This test also confirms that the
impact of economic mechanisms on relationship commitment
(0.029 + 0.001 = 0.030) is smaller than that of sociological mechan-
isms (0.076 + 0.022 = 0.098). Therefore, these findings support H7
and H8, which recommend that economic governance mechanisms are
more powerful in shaping ex-post transaction costs, while sociological
governance mechanisms are more effective in maximizing relationship
commitment.
5. Discussion and implications
5.1. Results summary
We developed and empirically tested a combined model of eco-
nomic (i.e., contract completeness and symmetric dependence) and
sociological (i.e., trust and communication) governance mechanisms,
which minimize ex-post transaction costs and maximize relationship
commitment. Based on the analysis of 170 buyer-supplier relationships
involving Finnish SMEs, this study had resulted in several noteworthy
findings. First, economic and sociological mechanisms are equally im-
portant in terms of transaction costs containment to relationship com-
mitment development. Second, this study notably incorporates com-
plementarity view of sociological governance mechanisms and
symmetric dependence, consistent with prior research. On the other
hand, sociological governance mechanisms and contractual governance
found as substitutes in explaining ex-post transaction costs and re-
lationship commitment. Third, economic mechanisms perform a more
powerful role in minimizing ex-post transaction costs, whereas socio-
logical mechanisms enhance relationship commitment more effectively.
Overall, these results suggest the significance of varying roles of re-
lationship governance mechanisms in order to govern relationship ex-
change effectively.
5.2. Theoretical implications
Recent studies have emphasized on governance structure that de-
velops relationship performance (Liu, Li, et al., 2017; Luo et al., 2015),
credibility and quantity of knowledge transfer (Liu, Luo, et al., 2017),
Table 3
PLS analysis results (standardized beta coefficients & t-values).
Constructs Transaction costs Relationship commitment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Contract completeness −0.28 (2.93)⁎⁎⁎ −0.40 (2.51)⁎⁎ −0.24 (2.36)⁎⁎ 0.28 (2.68)⁎⁎ 0.19 (2.27)⁎⁎ 0.27 (2.40)⁎⁎
Symmetric dependence −0.16 (1.82)⁎ −0.13 (1.73)⁎ −0.12 (1.69)⁎ 0.11 (1.42) 0.09 (1.31) 0.07 (1.12)
Communication −0.31 (2.02)⁎ −0.30 (1.67)⁎ −0.22 (1.78)⁎ 0.37 (3.08)⁎⁎⁎ 0.33 (2.83)⁎⁎ 0.30 (2.69)⁎⁎
Trust −0.19 (1.85)⁎ −0.18 (1.73)⁎ −0.16 (1.66)⁎ 0.18 (1.69)⁎ 0.17 (1.70)⁎ 0.16 (1.67)⁎
Interaction effects
Trust⁎ contract completeness 0.19 (1.91)⁎ −0.16 (1.83)⁎
Communication⁎ contract completeness 0.06 (0.34) −0.20 (1.84)⁎
Trust⁎ symmetric dependence −0.17 (1.81)⁎ 0.14 (1.76)⁎
Communication⁎ symmetric dependence −0.15 (1. 69)⁎ 0.13 (1.66)⁎
Control variables
Size of buyer firm (i.e., # of employees) 0.09 (0.82) 0.05 (0.46) 0.02 (0.65) 0.03 (0.28) −0.06 (0.64) −0.01 (0.19) −0.02 (0.30) 0.01 (0.08)
Length of relationship −0.15 (1.13) −0.10 (0.75) −0.02 (0.79) −0.10 (0.80) 0.16 (1.33) 0.09 (0.74) 0.08 (0.68) 0.06 (0.60)
Age of company 0.04 (0.26) 0.05 (0.34) 0.01 (0.47) 0.10 (0.82) −0.01 (0.02) −0.02 (0.21) −0.02 (0.21) −0.01 (0.13)
R2 0.25 0.21 0.29 0.35 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.43
⁎⁎⁎ p≤ 0.001.
⁎⁎ p≤ 0.01.
⁎ p≤ 0.05.
Table 4
Semi-partial correlation for the predicting power of governance mechanisms.
Ex-post transaction costs Relationship commitment
Part
correlation
Square of
part
correlation
Part
correlation
Square of
part
correlation
Economic
governance
mechanisms
Contract
completeness
−0.246 0.060 0.170 0.029
Symmetric
dependence
−0.147 0.021 0.039 0.001
Sociological
governance
mechanisms
Communication −0.176 0.030 0.275 0.076
Trust −0.159 0.025 0.150 0.022
Control variables
# of employees 0.052 0.002 −0.108 0.012
Age of company 0.068 0.005 0.011 0.000
Age of relationship −0.090 0.008 0.071 0.005
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relational satisfaction (Gorton et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2016) while
minimizing conflicts (Lee et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017) and oppor-
tunism (Liu et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2015). Conflicting empirical results
on the nature of governance mechanisms (i.e., commentary and/or
substitutes) and their isolated existence have overlooked the significant
question of varying roles of governance mechanisms. Therefore, this
study contributes to the industrial marketing and management litera-
ture by providing a comprehensive picture of relative effectiveness, as
well as the joint use of both economic and sociological governance
structure.
In particular, we advance the research in following ways. First, this
study develops an integrated framework of inter-organizational co-
operation by synthesizing two relevant theories, namely, TCE and SET.
The findings support and add to TCE reasoning and empirically de-
monstrate that the higher extent of contract completeness prevents the
possibilities of exchange hazards, conflicts and contingencies, and op-
portunistic behavior (Luo, 2009; Liu et al., 2009; Liu, Luo, et al., 2017).
Our findings offer an additional insight by providing empirical evidence
in an SME setting and explain that contractual governance provides an
institutional framework to relationship partners in safeguarding ex-post
transaction costs, opportunistic behavior and performance problems by
controlling the private objectives of partners at the cost of mutual
benefits (Lee et al., 2017). Furthermore, the significant effect of sym-
metric dependence in terms of minimizing ex-post transaction costs
reveals that increase in the level of symmetric dependence creates
mutual hostage and loyalty, and stabilizes the relationship by rea-
ligning the self-interest and the expectations of continuous future
transactions (Liu et al., 2009; Liu, Luo, et al., 2017). Similarly, a rela-
tively complete contract keeps the relationship partners committed by
providing a convincing signal, restraining uncertainty about behaviors
and functioning as deterrence against exploitation and opportunism.
Thus, contractual completeness is considered as important manifesta-
tion of tangible expressions of confidence and commitment between
relationship partners by explicitly clarifying prior equivocal results
(Burkert et al., 2012; Woolthuis et al., 2005).
However, contrary to the expectation, we found no significant po-
sitive relationship between symmetric dependence and relationship
commitment. This finding is against the arguments advanced by scho-
lars (e.g., Burkert et al., 2012; Xie, Suh, & Kwon, 2010) who posit that
idiosyncratic relationship-specific investment are considered as a
commitment device as well as the indications of adopting longstanding
coordination by contributing a strong bond and providing incentives for
not abandoning the exchange relationship. One possible explanation for
this may be that symmetric dependence includes not only the issue of
symmetry but also the level of mutual dependence (i.e., high and low
mutual dependence) since low and high mutual dependence should not
have the same impact on relationship commitment. It is not likely that
firms are more committed at a lower level of symmetric dependence
because of their lower stakes in the relationship. Furthermore, the level
of interdependence between firms may vary because same amount of
relationship-specific investments do not mean the same to the firms
highly different in size (i.e., an investment of 1 million US$ does not
mean the same to each partner).
Among the sociological governance mechanisms, our findings also
confirm some major reasoning found in the literature and demonstrate
the effectiveness of trust and communication. SET suggests that re-
lationship exchange should be rooted in strong relational ties
between buyer and supplier in order to control operational hazards
(Granovetter, 2005; Liu, Luo, et al., 2017). Therefore, trust, timely in-
formation sharing, and open communication within relationship ex-
change lower the level of ex-post transaction costs (Gulbrandsen et al.,
2017; Yigitbasioglu, 2010). Likewise, the notion of a positive re-
lationship between sociological governance mechanisms and relation-
ship commitment extends the view depicted in prior research (Burkert
et al., 2012; Hung & Lin, 2013). This study suggests that, based on the
relational goodwill, effective communication is crucial in knowledge
sharing and consistency, resulting in the resolution of conflicts and
relationship commitment development (Yen et al., 2011). These find-
ings are congruent with recent research, which suggests that trust and
communication are the significant sociological factors in managing
successful business relationships (e.g., Liu, Luo, et al., 2017;
Gulbrandsen et al., 2017).
Second, it empirically tests the interaction effects of sociological
mechanisms with contract completeness and symmetric dependence
respectively in relation to ex-post transaction costs and relationship
commitment. The prior research presents competing views on the
nature of the relationship i.e. complementary or substitutive between
governance mechanisms (e.g., Lee et al., 2017; Li et al., 2010; Van der
Valk et al., 2016). This study offers additional insight and incorporates
complementarity view of sociological mechanisms and symmetric de-
pendence, and substitution view of sociological mechanisms and con-
tract completeness. Notably, the interaction effects of trust and com-
munication with symmetric dependence found to be complementary,
explaining that firms can adopt these factors simultaneously in order to
get cost advantages. These findings are congruent with the under-
standing of several authors (e.g., Ali & Larimo, 2016; Dyer & Chu, 2011;
Liu et al., 2009) who consider symmetric dependence as a form of re-
lational governance, in which partners willingly binding them in a re-
lationship for the purpose of social goodwill. Furthermore, the inter-
action effect of trust and contract completeness appeared as substitutes,
explaining that firms adopt them alternatively because the presence of
one obviates the use of other (Li et al., 2010; Lui & Ngo, 2004;
Lumineau & Henderson, 2012; Wang et al., 2011). This substitution
view suggests that drafting a detailed contract may be seen as coun-
terproductive to trust and hinder the formation of sociological gov-
ernance by enforcing contractual clauses, thereby increasing opportu-
nism and transaction costs (Li et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011). In a same
fashion, Gulati and Sytch (2008) maintain that trust hinders the need of
hierarchical control factors and functions as an effective alternative
sociological mechanism countering opportunistic behavior. This notion
posits that employing them simultaneously may complicate the un-
derstanding of inter-firm relationships, which in turn restricts the en-
hancement of relationship commitment. Therefore, this study suggests
that contractual governance functions as substitutes with sociological
governance, and can be adopted alternatively depending upon the ob-
jectives of the collaboration (Li et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011). Instead,
symmetric dependence more easily complements sociological govern-
ance because of its nature of relational embeddedness (Lee et al., 2017).
Finally, it shows the relative power of economic and sociological
mechanisms on ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment.
Although both governance mechanisms drive cost advantage and
commitment, their effects are different (Liu, Luo, et al., 2017; Yang
et al., 2016). Our findings suggest that economic mechanisms are more
powerful than sociological mechanisms in minimizing ex-post transac-
tion costs. This notion elucidates that economic governance structure
provides a formal framework to firms in clarifying the responsibilities
and duties of relationship partners (Liu, Luo, et al., 2017) and facilitate
the continuity of operations in effective manner while alleviating con-
flicts and additional bargaining costs more effectively than sociological
structure (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Yang et al., 2016). However, socio-
logical factors are more effective than economic mechanisms in max-
imizing relationship commitment, explaining that social factors support
flexible environment and overcomes the adaptive boundaries of com-
plex contracts, and function as informal counterforce to power im-
balance inhibiting opportunistic behavior (Krause et al., 2007; Liu
et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2016). This finding does not only extend our
understanding of varying governance mechanisms in order to in-
corporate their distinguishing power but also specifies their central role
in managing successful inter-firm relationships. Therefore, we argue
that different governance structures are required for different transac-
tion objectives in governing successful relationship exchange. Better
understanding of relationship outcomes and collaboration goals drive
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managers to analyze which governance mechanism is more crucial for a
particular task (Liu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2016).
5.3. Managerial implications
Governing successful inter-organizational relationships requires re-
lationship managers to show their willingness and commitment in
planning and exercising the optimal governance structure, therefore,
this study has several vital implications for SME managers. For this
reason, firms should consider making different choices about govern-
ance mechanisms under different transaction objectives. The colla-
boration objectives drive managers to analyze which governance me-
chanism is more crucial for a particular task. Contractual governance
may function as the foundation of a relationship, but relational based
governance support firms to continue long-term relationships through
cost advantage and fostered commitment. On the other hand, in the
case of lack of trust between partner firms, drafting an explicitly com-
plete contract prevents ex-post negotiations and reflects a sign of
commitment, thus minimizing any possible opportunistic behavior.
Further, firms are required to ensure the quality of an emplaced com-
munication system, which reduces the possible information asymme-
tries and allows firms to share substantial knowledge for internal op-
erations and external market conditions. This information sharing will
protect relationship exchange from behavioral uncertainty and mitigate
ex-post transaction costs, thereby keeping the firms committed.
Additionally, our results suggest that symmetric dependence between
firms inhibits any possible exploitation and opportunistic behavior, due
to idiosyncratic investments. Managers should ensure a trustworthy
relationship, which provides both partners with a certain level of con-
fidence and align their business objectives accordingly. Another man-
agerial implication of our study is the relative effectiveness of economic
and sociological mechanisms. Our results suggest that firms seeking
transaction costs advantage should pay more attention to economic
governance mechanisms, whereas managers with the intention of re-
solving a large number of conflicts in an informal manner and develop
personal ties should refer more to sociological governance mechanisms.
5.4. Limitations and further research
This study has some limitations that need to be addressed in further
research. Firstly, drawing from the theories of TCE and SET, this study
only investigates four governance mechanisms to derive the impact on
ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. Further study
may incorporate some other governance mechanisms, such as conflict
resolution strategies, relational norms, uncertainty, complexity, and the
reputations of partners. Noteworthy results can be found by employing
individual and interaction effects of these additional governance me-
chanisms on opportunism, satisfaction, and overall relationship per-
formance. Moreover, boundary conditions under which each of these
mechanisms become more effective also ought to be investigated in
future research. Secondly, this study consists of only Finnish small and
medium buyer-supplier relationships, future efforts, may extend the
existing Nordic SME sample in order to generalize the findings for the
whole region. Thirdly, because this study represents a cross-sectional
approach where only the buyer's perspective was probed in relation to
governance mechanisms, it would be interesting to know how suppliers,
either within a longitudinal setting or from a dyadic perspective, per-
ceive the impact of governance mechanisms and their outcomes.
Fourthly, this study is limited to a single key informant. Future
studies can obtain data from numerous but different respondents for
assessing the independent and dependent constructs in order to reduce
common method bias. Finally, we recommend future research in order
to consider some additional issues. We encourage further research to
investigate the impact of several governance mechanisms on a broad
range of transaction costs (i.e., ex-ante and ex-post) as well as in-
vestigating the relationship between transaction costs and relationship
commitment. Future research may also investigate the role of con-
tingency factors on the complementary-substitution nature of economic
and sociological governance mechanisms. Caniëls and Gelderman
(2007) argued that a consensus regarding the optimal operationaliza-
tion of interdependence lacks in the literature and resulted in contra-
dictory findings (Kumar et al., 1995). Therefore, we also encourage
researchers to advance refined measures of symmetric dependence by
encompassing various aspects of dependence. Symmetric dependence
may be more than the issue of symmetry and include the level of mutual
dependence (i.e., high and low mutual dependence) because of the
firms highly different in size (Ali & Larimo, 2016).
Acknowledgments
The earlier version of this paper was presented at the Management
International Conference (MIC) 2017 in Monastier di Treviso, Italy. This
paper is an outcome of the “Suuri Yrittäjätutkimus” research project.
The financial support provided by Collector Finland through a research
grant (271001101 - Collector-toteutus), is also acknowledged and
greatly appreciated.
References
Ali, T., & Larimo, J. (2016). Managing opportunism in international joint ventures: The
role of structural and social mechanisms. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 32(2),
86–96.
Anderson, E., & Weitz, B. (1992). The use of pledges to build and sustain. Journal of
Marketing Research, 29, 18–34.
Armstrong, J. S., & Overton, T. S. (1977). Estimating nonresponse bias in mail surveys.
Journal of Marketing Research, 396–402.
Bai, X., Sheng, S., & Li, J. J. (2016). Contract governance and buyer–supplier conflict: The
moderating role of institutions. Journal of Operations Management, 41, 12–24.
Becker, J. M., Klein, K., & Wetzels, M. (2012). Hierarchical latent variable models in PLS-
SEM: Guidelines for using reflective-formative type models. Long Range Planning,
45(5), 359–394.
Bharadwaj, N., & Matsuno, K. (2006). Investigating the antecedents and outcomes of
customer firm transaction cost savings in a supply chain relationship. Journal of
Business Research, 59(1), 62–72.
Brouthers, K. D., & Brouthers, L. E. (2003). Why service and manufacturing entry mode
choices differ: The influence of transaction cost factors, risk and trust. Journal of
Management Studies, 40(5), 1179–1204.
Brown, J. R., Dev, C. S., & Lee, D. J. (2000). Managing marketing channel opportunism:
The efficacy of alternative governance mechanisms. Journal of Marketing, 64(2),
51–65.
Burkert, M., Ivens, B. S., & Shan, J. (2012). Governance mechanisms in domestic and
international buyer–supplier relationships: An empirical study. Industrial Marketing
Management, 41(3), 544–556.
Cai, S., Yang, Z., & Hu, Z. (2009). Exploring the governance mechanisms of quasi-in-
tegration in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Business Research, 62(6),
660–666.
Caniëls, M. C., & Gelderman, C. J. (2007). Power and interdependence in buyer supplier
relationships: A purchasing portfolio approach. Industrial Marketing Management,
36(2), 219–229.
Casciaro, T., & Piskorski, M. J. (2005). Power imbalance, mutual dependence, and con-
straint absorption: A closer look at resource dependence theory. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 50(2), 167–199.
Chang, K. H., & Gotcher, D. F. (2007). Safeguarding investments and creation of trans-
action value in asymmetric international subcontracting relationships: The role of
relationship learning and relational capital. Journal of World Business, 42(4),
477–488.
Chang, S.-J., van Witteloostuijin, A., & Eden, L. (2010). From the editors: Common
method variance in international business research. Journal of International Business
Studies, 41, 178–184.
Chang, S. H., Wang, K. Y., Chih, W. H., & Tsai, W. H. (2012). Building customer com-
mitment in business-to-business markets. Industrial Marketing Management, 41(6),
940–950.
Chin, W. W. (1998). The partial least squares approach to structural equation modelling.
In G. A. Marcoulides (Ed.). Modern methods for business research (pp. 295–336). New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Corsten, D., & Felde, J. (2005). Exploring the performance effects of key-supplier colla-
boration: An empirical investigation into Swiss buyer-supplier relationships.
International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 35(6), 445–461.
Crocker, K. J., & Reynolds, K. J. (1993). The efficiency of incomplete contracts: An em-
pirical analysis of air force engine procurement. The Rand Journal of Economics,
126–146.
Dillman, D. A., Smyth, J. D., & Christian, L. M. (2009). Internet, mail and mixed-mode
surveys: The tailored design method (Third Edition). New York: Wiley & Sons.
Dyer, J. (1997). Effective interfirm collaboration: How firms minimize transaction costs
and maximize transaction value. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 535–556.
Dyer, J. H., & Chu, W. (2003). The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs
and improving performance: Empirical evidence from the United States, Japan, and
Korea. Organization Science, 14(1), 57–68.
K. Shahzad et al. ,QGXVWULDO0DUNHWLQJ0DQDJHPHQW[[[[[[[[[[²[[[

142 Acta Wasaensia
Dyer, J. H., & Chu, W. (2011). The determinants of trust in supplier-automaker re-
lationships in the US, Japan, and Korea. Journal of International Business Studies,
42(1), 10–27.
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4),
660–679.
Gorton, M., Angell, R., Dries, L., Urutyan, V., Jackson, E., & White, J. (2015). Power,
buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: Evidence from the Armenian dairy
sector. Industrial Marketing Management, 50, 69–77.
Gotz, O., Liehr-Gobbers, K., & Krafft, M. (2010). Evaluation of structural equation models
using the partial least squares (PLS) approach. In V. E. Vinzi, W. W. Chin, J. Henseler,
& H. Wang (Eds.). Handbook of partial least squares: Concepts, methods, and applications
(pp. 691–711). New York: Springer.
Granovetter, M. (2005). The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(1), 33–50.
Gulati, R., & Sytch, M. (2008). Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of
trust. Managerial and Decision Economics, 29(2–3), 165–190.
Gulbrandsen, B., Lambe, C. J., & Sandvik, K. (2017). Firm boundaries and transaction
costs: The complementary role of capabilities. Journal of Business Research (in press).
Hair, J. F., Sarstedt, M., Pieper, T. M., & Ringle, C. M. (2012). The use of partial least
squares structural equation modeling in strategic management research: A review of
past practices and recommendations for future applications. Long Range Planning,
45(5), 320–340.
Hair, J. F., Sarstedt, M., Ringle, C. M., & Mena, J. A. (2012). An assessment of the use of
partial least squares structural equation modeling in marketing research. Journal of
the Academy of Marketing Science, 40(3), 414–433.
Hawkins, T. G., Wittmann, C. M., & Beyerlein, M. M. (2008). Antecedents and con-
sequences of opportunism in buyer-supplier relations: Research synthesis and new
frontiers. Industrial Marketing Management, 37(8), 895–909.
Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1992). Do norms matter in marketing relationships? Journal of
Marketing, 56(2), 32–44.
Hulland, J. (1999). Use of partial least squares (PLS) in strategic management research: A
review of four recent studies. Strategic Management Journal, 20(2), 195–204.
Hung, K. P., & Lin, C. K. (2013). More communication is not always better? The interplay
between effective communication and interpersonal conflict in influencing satisfac-
tion. Industrial Marketing Management, 42(8), 1223–1232.
Khalid, S., & Ali, T. (2017). An integrated perspective of social exchange theory and
transaction cost approach on the antecedents of trust in international joint ventures.
International Business Review, 26(3), 491–501.
Kim, M., & Chai, S. (2017). The impact of supplier innovativeness, information sharing
and strategic sourcing on improving supply chain agility: Global supply chain per-
spective. International Journal of Production Economics, 187, 42–52.
Kohtamäki, M., Vesalainen, J., Henneberg, S., Naudé, P., & Ventresca, M. J. (2012).
Enabling relationship structures and relationship performance improvement: The
moderating role of relational capital. Industrial Marketing Management, 41(8),
1298–1309.
Krause, D. R., Handfield, R. B., & Tyler, B. B. (2007). The relationships between supplier
development, commitment, social capital accumulation and performance improve-
ment. Journal of Operations Management, 25(2), 528–545.
Kumar, N., Scheer, L. K., & Steenkamp, J. B. E. (1995). The effects of perceived inter-
dependence on dealer attitudes. Journal of Marketing Research, 348–356.
Lee, G., Shin, G. C., Haney, M. H., Kang, M., Li, S., & Ko, C. (2017). The impact of formal
control and guanxi on task conflict in outsourcing relationships in China. Industrial
Marketing Management, 62, 128–136.
Li, Y., Xie, E., Teo, H., & Peng, M. W. (2010). Formal control and social control in do-
mestic and international buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Operations
Management, 28(4), 333–344.
Liu, Y., Li, Y., Shi, L. H., & Liu, T. (2017). Knowledge transfer in buyer-supplier relationships:
The role of transactional and relational governance mechanisms. Journal of Business
Research. (In press).
Liu, Y., Luo, Y., Huang, Y., & Yang, Q. (2017). A diagnostic model of private control and
collective control in buyer-supplier relationships. Industrial Marketing Management,
63, 116–128.
Liu, Y., Luo, Y., & Liu, T. (2009). Governing buyer-supplier relationships through trans-
actional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China. Journal of Operations
Management, 27(4), 294–309.
Lui, S. S., & Ngo, H. Y. (2004). The role of trust and contractual safeguards on cooperation
in non-equity alliances. Journal of Management, 30(4), 471–485.
Lumineau, F., & Henderson, J. E. (2012). The influence of relational experience and
contractual governance on the negotiation strategy in buyer-supplier disputes.
Journal of Operations Management, 30(5), 382–395.
Luo, Y. (2002). Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures.
Strategic Management Journal, 23(10), 903–919.
Luo, Y. (2009). Are we on the same page? Justice agreement in international joint ven-
tures. Journal of World Business, 44, 383–396.
Luo, Y., Liu, Y., Yang, Q., Maksimov, V., & Hou, J. (2015). Improving performance and
reducing cost in buyer-supplier relationships: The role of justice in curtailing op-
portunism. Journal of Business Research, 68(3), 607–615.
Mitchell, R. K., Mitchell, J. R., & Smith, J. B. (2008). Inside opportunity formation:
Enterprise failure, cognition, and the creation of opportunities. Strategic
Entrepreneurship Journal, 2(3), 225–242.
Mitrega, M., Forkmann, S., Zaefarian, G., & Henneberg, S. C. (2017). Networking cap-
ability in supplier relationships and its impact on product innovation and firm per-
formance. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 37(5),
577–606.
Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, S. D. (1994). The commitment-trust theory of relationship mar-
keting. Journal of Marketing: A Quarterly Publication of the American Marketing
Association, 58(3), 20–38.
Najafi-Tavani, Z., Zaefarian, G., Naudé, P., & Giroud, A. (2015). Reverse knowledge
transfer and subsidiary power. Industrial Marketing Management, 48, 103–110.
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended
remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879–903.
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as
substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8), 707–725.
Reuer, J. J., & Arino, A. (2002). Contractual renegotiations in strategic alliances. Journal
of Management, 28(1), 47–68.
Reuer, J. J., & Ariño, A. (2007). Strategic alliance contracts: Dimensions and determinants
of contractual complexity. Strategic Management Journal, 28(3), 313–330.
Ringle, C. M., Wende, S., & Will, A. (2005). SmartPLS 2.0 (Beta). Hamburg: SmartPLS.
Sande, J. B., & Haugland, S. A. (2015). Strategic performance effects of misaligned formal
contracting: The mediating role of relational contracting. International Journal of
Research in Marketing, 32(2), 187–194.
Sarstedt, M., Ringle, C. M., Henseler, J., & Hair, J. F. (2014). On the emancipation of PLS-
SEM: A commentary on Rigdon (2012). Long Range Planning, 47(3), 154–160.
Schmitz, T., Schweiger, B., & Daft, J. (2016). The emergence of dependence and lock-in
effects in buyer–supplier relationships—A buyer perspective. Industrial Marketing
Management, 55, 22–34.
Shen, L., Wang, Y., & Teng, W. (2017). The moderating effect of interdependence on
contracts in achieving equity versus efficiency in interfirm relationships. Journal of
Business Research, 78, 277–284.
Shi, G., Shi, Y., Chan, A. K., Liu, M. T., & Fam, K. S. (2011). The role of renqing in
mediating customer relationship investment and relationship commitment in China.
Industrial Marketing Management, 40(4), 496–502.
Silva, S. C., Bradley, F., & Sousa, C. M. P. (2012). Empirical test of the trust-performance
link in an international alliances context. International Business Review, 21(2),
293–306.
Tellefsen, T. (2002). Commitment in business-to-business relationships: The role of or-
ganizational and personal needs. Industrial Marketing Management, 31(8), 645–652.
Van der Valk, W., Sumo, R., Dul, J., & Schroeder, R. G. (2016). When are contracts and
trust necessary for innovation in buyer-supplier relationships? A necessary condition
analysis. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 22(4), 266–277.
Villena, V. H., Revilla, E., & Choi, T. Y. (2011). The dark side of buyer–supplier re-
lationships: A social capital perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 29(6),
561–576.
Wang, Y., Wang, N., Jiang, L., Yang, Z., & Cui, V. (2016). Managing relationships with
power advantage buyers: The role of supplier initiated bonding tactics in long-term
buyer–supplier collaborations. Journal of Business Research, 69(12), 5587–5596.
Wang, L., Yeung, J. H. Y., & Zhang, M. (2011). The impact of trust and contract on
innovation performance: The moderating role of environmental uncertainty.
International Journal of Production Economics, 134(1), 114–122.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational
contracting. New York: The Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. The Journal
of Law and Economics, 36(Pt 2), 453–486.
Woolthuis, R. K., Hillebrand, B., & Nooteboom, B. (2005). Trust, contract and relationship
development. Organization Studies, 26(6), 813–840.
Wu, J., & Wu, Z. (2015). Key supplier relationships and product introduction success: The
moderating roles of self-enforcement and interdependence between buyer and sup-
plier. Industrial Marketing Management, 46, 183–192.
Wuyts, S., & Geyskens, I. (2005). The formation of buyer-supplier relationships: Detailed
contract drafting and close partner selection. Journal of Marketing, 69(4), 103–117.
Xie, Y. H., Suh, T., & Kwon, I.-W. G. (2010). Do the magnitude and asymmetry of specific
asset investments matter in the supplier–buyer relationship? Journal of Marketing
Management, 26(9–10), 858–877.
Yang, W., Gao, Y., Li, Y., Shen, H., & Zheng, S. (2017). Different roles of control me-
chanisms in buyer-supplier conflict: An empirical study from China. Industrial
Marketing Management, 65, 144–156.
Yang, Q., Zhao, X., Yeung, H. Y. J., & Liu, Y. (2016). Improving logistics outsourcing
performance through transactional and relational mechanisms under transaction
uncertainties: Evidence from China. International Journal of Production Economics,
175, 12–23.
Yen, Y. X., Shih-Tse Wang, E., & Horng, D. J. (2011). Suppliers' willingness of customi-
zation, effective communication, and trust: A study of switching cost antecedents.
Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 26(4), 250–259.
Yigitbasioglu, O. M. (2010). Information sharing with key suppliers: A transaction cost
theory perspective. International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics
Management, 40(7), 550–578.
Young-Ybarra, C., & Wiersema, M. (1999). Strategic flexibility in information technology
alliances: The influence of transaction cost economics and social exchange theory.
Organization Science, 10(4), 439–459.
Zaefarian, G., Forkmann, S., Mitręga, M., & Henneberg, S. C. (2017). A capability per-
spective on relationship ending and its impact on product innovation success and firm
performance. Long Range Planning, 50(2), 184–199.
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of
interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science,
9(2), 141–159.
Zeng, M. (1998). The impact of structure on cooperation and performance in joint ventures: an
empirical investigation of international joint ventures. Urbana-Champaign: University of
Illinois (Doctoral dissertation).
K. Shahzad et al. ,QGXVWULDO0DUNHWLQJ0DQDJHPHQW[[[[[[[[[[²[[[

 Acta Wasaensia 143 
Conflict resolution strategies and buyer-supplier relationship performance: The 
role of governance mechanisms 
Khuram Shahzad  
Doctoral Researcher  
Department of Production, University of Vaasa 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at 26th IPSERA Conference 2017, Budapest, Hungary. The 
constructive comments and feedback from the anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. I am 
also immensely grateful to Professor Marko Kohtamäki from the School of Management, University of 
Vaasa who provided the valuable comments and insights that greatly improved this manuscript.   
 
Abstract 
Conflicts in buyer-supplier relationship (BSR) have become inevitable, and pertinent literature 
lacks in providing enough evidence for the use of effective strategies to enhance relationship 
performance. Therefore, this study presents an integrated framework and investigates the 
relationship between governance mechanisms (i.e., contract, interdependence, trust, 
communication) and choices of conflict resolution strategies (CRS) and the effects on relationship 
performance. The results based on empirical evidence of 170 Finnish BSR, show that firms’ choice 
of CRS depends on the governance mechanisms. Problem solving approach is the most preferable 
choice while legalistic approach remains the least resort influenced by different governance 
mechanisms. Interdependence and trust between firms drive them to compromise on middle 
grounds in resolving inter-organizational conflicts. Further, the selected strategies by firms may 
also bolster or deteriorate relationship performance. These findings have important implications 
for theoretical perspectives and managerial practices. 
Keywords: conflict resolution strategy, buyer-supplier relationship, governance mechanisms, 
transaction cost economics, social exchange theory 
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1. Introduction 
Academics and practitioners have given constant attention to conflict resolution strategies (CRS) 
and relationship performance in buyer-supplier relationship (BSR) (Spekman et al., 1996). 
However, the uncertainty of buyers and suppliers regarding the expectations whether the 
counterpart behaves cooperatively in conflict is an inevitable dilemma in relationship exchange 
(Liu et al., 2009). The potential negative impact of these relationship disputes and failures 
overshadow the aggregate effects of relationship behaviors (Palmatier et al., 2006). Several studies 
have demonstrated high rates of relational disputes and failures (e.g., Bamford et al., 2004; Dant 
& Schul, 1992; Jap & Anderson, 2003). Key reasons for high failure are different organizational 
goals, distrust, asymmetric information sharing, and asymmetric interdependence, as well as 
unanticipated changes in the market, driving towards conflicts and deterioration of the relationship 
(Pajunen & Fang, 2013). Conflict realization and resolution derived by governance mechanisms, 
therefore, becomes central in buyer-supplier relationship development (Liu, Luo et al., 2017; Liu 
et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2015; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012; Krone & Steimel, 2013). Since firms 
need to erect appropriate governance mechanisms against inter-organizational conflict (Bai et al., 
2016; Yang et al., 2017), the choice of CRS becomes the most important in order to govern 
relationship successfully.  
According to prior seminal research on industrial marketing, relationship governance plays a 
pivotal role regarding conflict resolution in supply chain management (e.g., Yang et al., 2017; Lee 
et al., 2017; Bai et al., 2016; Liu, Luo et al., 2017). Seminal papers address multiple governance 
mechanisms, such as structures and trust (e.g., Poppo & Zenger 2002; Wuyts & Geyskens 2005; 
Kamann et al., 2006; Liu et al. 2009). Studies demonstrate that focal companies differ in their 
choices of conflict resolution approaches (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002) – e.g. how to deal with 
emerging disagreements (Lin & Germain, 1998) with suppliers. However prior empirical research 
have focused on the varying roles of governance mechanisms in context of opportunism and 
relationship performance (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Liu et al., 2009; 
Luo et al., 2015), relatively few recent studies recognized the significance of disputes and conflict 
management in buyer-supplier relationships (Lee et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017; Bai et al., 2016; 
Lumineau & Henderson, 2012; Finch et al., 2013). These limited studies mainly focused on the 
role of contractual or negotiated incentives in process of managing conflicts, functional or 
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dysfunctional conflicts (Chang & Gotcher, 2010; Cheng & Sheu, 2012; Ndubisi, 2011), and 
constructive or destructive conflicts (Li et al., 2011). In particular, despite this considerable 
research base and insights, the literature seem to be missing a comprehensive picture of conflict 
resolution process (White et al., 2007; Lin and Wang, 2002).  
First, though there is a considerable research on conflict resolution, but it remains in the context 
of international joint venture (Le Nguyen et al.; 2016; Lu, 2006; Wang et al., 2005; Lin & Wang, 
2002; Lin & Germain, 1998) and the applicability of choice of conflict resolution strategies in 
buyer-supplier perspective is unidentified. Second, trust and contractual governance specify the 
conflict’s origin and can elucidate the aspect of conflict management (Vaaland & Hakansson, 
2003; Yang et al., 2017). The potential impact of both trust (Yang et al., 2017; Ndubisi, 2011) and 
contract (Yang et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Bai et al., 2016; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012) on 
relationship conflict management exist in literature, but the choice of conflict resolution strategies 
influenced by some additional transactional (i.e. contract completeness and interdependence) and 
relational mechanisms (i.e. trust and communication) remain under-examined (Yang et al., 2017). 
Third, business relationship relies not only on the ways it is established initially and its longevity, 
but also on the ways to manage it successfully by resolving internal conflicts and developing 
effective strategies. Current literature is not significantly evident of such a variant relationship 
performance by effective strategies used in emerging disagreements (Le Nguyen et al., 2016). 
Therefore, additional empirical assessments regarding the relationship between governance 
mechanisms, conflict resolution strategies, and relationship performance is needed in industrial 
marketing research.  
Thus, this study aims to address these gaps in literature. This approach is different from earlier 
conflict management studies and provides a more integrative perspective of buyer-supplier conflict 
resolution process. Unlike prior research that mainly focuses on the functions of contractual 
governance and trust in managing conflicts (i.e., conflict mitigation, constructive/destructive 
conflicts), we argue that transactional (i.e. contract completeness and interdependence) and 
relational (i.e. trust and communication) governance mechanisms can be connected to the choice 
of effective conflict resolution strategies when conflict arise. It is important that relationship 
partners recognize the contextual situation in which choices of effective strategies are made (Lin 
& Germain, 1998) that does not only support in anticipating conflict resolution behaviors between 
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partners but also influences on the their strategy choice (Lin &Wang, 2002). Furthermore, by 
assessing the relationship between conflict resolution strategies and relationship performance, this 
study offers valuable insights to understand that effective strategies enable relationship partners to 
mutually adapt constructive approaches and facilitate cooperative behavior, concern both parties’ 
interests and feelings and satisfy their needs (Le Nguyen et al., 2015). Therefore, this study aims 
to answer the following research questions: ‘‘How do the transactional and relational governance 
mechanisms influence the choice of conflict resolution strategy and how conflict resolution 
strategies impact on the performance of BSR?” This study contributes to industrial marketing 
literature by extending earlier conceptualization and links both transactional and relational 
governance mechanisms with conflict resolution process. It also demonstrates the effect of soft 
and hard conflict resolution strategies on buyer-supplier relationship performance.  
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1 Conflicts and types of conflict resolution  
Buyer-supplier conflict represents the disagreement between both parties which arises from 
inconsistency of actual or desired behavior (Yang et al., 2017), because each party in a relationship 
strives to accomplish its own business objectives (Samaha et al., 2011). It emerges as a negative 
force which drives confusions and interruptions in business operations (Robbins, 2005). Fey and 
Beamish (1999) noted that researchers have mostly emphasized their studies on the avoidance of 
conflict. As conflict is inevitable part of relationships, firms should realize different conflict 
resolution strategies in order to deal with it successfully. Earlier relationship conflict studies, have 
presented different categories of conflicts, such as destructive/constructive conflicts (Yang et al., 
2017; Li et al., 2011), task conflict (Lee et al., 2017), and functional or dysfunctional conflicts 
(Chang & Gotcher, 2010; Cheng & Sheu, 2012; Ndubisi, 2011), but conflict resolution strategies 
of problem solving, compromising, forcing and legalistic strategies found missing and mainly 
discussed in international joint venture literature (Le Nguyen et al. 2016; Lin & Germain, 1998). 
In this study, we consider these strategies “a best fit” for the analysis as researchers (e.g., Le 
Nguyen et al., 2016; Lin & Germain, 1998) supported the explicit nature of these strategies.  
Problem solving is a soft strategy that does not only encourage mutual discussion on a conflict but 
also look out for better solutions in order to enhance mutual benefits as well as to avoid any 
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operational blockade (Lin & Wang, 2002). Both partners cooperatively exchange information 
about their objectives and priorities, and constantly suggest different alternatives (Pruitt 2013). 
Compromising strategy refers to accommodate both partners on a “middle-ground”. In comparison 
with problem solving, compromising strategy may not require considerable involvement from each 
partner. It may limits the possibilities of exploring the best available alternatives but a common 
agreed solution may help partners to continue their relationship smoothly (Lin & Wang, 2002). 
Legalistic strategy refers to deal with a conflict by practicing written contracts and informal 
binding agreements (Lin & Germain, 1998; Le Nguyen et al., 2016). In a buyer-supplier’s 
contractual formality, explicit legal clauses offer an institutional framework within which partners 
reconsider their rights and responsibilities and execute ongoing conflict resolution (Lumineau & 
Henderson, 2012). However, this approach may demonstrate high costs and a lengthy process 
which may destroy a trusted environment between partners in the long run (Lin & Wang, 2002).             
2.2 Transactional governance mechanisms and CRS 
Transactional governance mechanisms are explained as economic rational organizational 
measures that support managing, monitoring, and harmonizing partners’ behaviors in inter-
organizational relationships (Dyer, 1996; Liu et al., 2009). Transactional determinants (i.e., 
contract completeness and interdependence) are demonstrated as mutually specified contractual 
clauses and idiosyncratic relationship specific investments (Brown et al., 2000; Heide & John, 
1992; Yeung et al., 2013; Liu, Li et al., 2017), and offer structural ways to avoid opportunism and 
conflict between relationship partners. Therefore, this study examines two aspects of transactional 
governance mechanisms (i.e., contract completeness and interdependence) as determinants of 
appropriate strategy selection.   
Contractual governance is albeit ubiquitous in industrial relationships, but it varies in their level 
of completeness, complexities (Williamson 1991; Crocker & Reynolds, 1993), rigidity, and 
flexibility (Sande & Haugland, 2015). Several researchers have maintained that contracts will 
always be incomplete due to inevitable unpredictability (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Luo, 2009), 
Williamson (1979) therefore argued that a relatively complete contract minimizes the boundary 
spanners’ uncertainty, conflicts and risks of opportunism. The level of completeness in a contract 
stipulates the extent to which contractual terms and future contingencies are specific and detailed. 
Contractual completeness corroborates term specificity, contingency adaptability and contractual 
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obligatoriness (Luo, 2005). Term specificity highlights the specificity and details of contractual 
terms, whereas contingency adaptability concerns the handling of future problems contractually. 
Contractual obligatoriness includes the legal clauses to which partners are bound, and provides 
the possibility to penalize the counterpart (Cannon et al., 2000; Luo, 2002, 2005; Reuer & Arino, 
2007) as well as functions as a safeguard against exploitation albeit at possibly higher cost 
(Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011). This level of contract completeness delineates exchange substance 
and structure resulting in maximum pay-off (Williamson, 1979). Moreover, such provisions in 
contracts encourage partners to describe and coordinate a mutual agreement, and strategize a 
cooperative and integrative approach or alternative solution in a conflict situation (Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Yang et al., 2017). Dissimilarities in organizational 
objectives can be the critical factor to create potential risks and misunderstandings (Luo & Park, 
2004), detailed contractual terms clarify the roles and responsibilities and overcome the fuss and 
deterioration of relationship (Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011).    
The extent to which partners rely on contractual governance effects their behavioral approach 
directly and indirectly by describing and determining beliefs and expectations in conflict resolution 
(Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011). Detailed contractual coordination clauses (i.e. term specificity and 
contingency adaptability) promote inter-organizational harmonization and problem solving 
attitude by mutually acceptable alternatives, and help to strengthen cooperative relational 
experience. For this reason, Lumineau and Malhotra (2011) argued that contract completeness 
creates coordination driven perception among relationship partners, and facilitate valuable 
communication and information sharing. Furthermore, legal support of contract is self-explanatory 
notion for a partner to sanction the counterpart in case of specified contract terms violation 
(Cannon et al., 2000) and where both partners cannot mutually solve the conflict. It functions as a 
wide-ranging tool in order to control predicted and unpredicted future circumstances (Ferguson et 
al., 2005; Liu et al., 2009; Liu, Li & Zhang, 2010), thus minimizing behavioral uncertainty through 
enforcing formal rules, terms and procedures. In contrast, firms prefer not to seek compromises if 
problem solving approach becomes ineffective because legal clauses offer them leverage with 
which they can make their preferences in choice of penalizing the counterpart. Whereas previous 
studies emphases on the overall impact of contractual governance on buyer-supplier conflict (Yang 
et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Bai et al., 2016; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012), this study deviates 
from traditional conceptualization and examine the influence of contract completeness on firms’ 
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preference of CRS when conflicts arise. Thus, based on the above theoretical examination, this 
study hypothesizes that:  
H1. Contract completeness between buyer and supplier is positively related to (a) problem solving 
and (b) legalistic strategy, and inversely related to (c) compromising strategy.   
The other transactional governance mechanism, interdependence explicates that partners have a 
joint motivation of forbearance (Heide, 1994) and servers as an economic rationale in monitoring 
long-term relationship exchange (Wathne & Heide, 2004; Dyer, 1997). It entails both partners to 
invest idiosyncratically in physical and human assets that are less valuable to alternative usage 
(Williamson, 1985; Kumar et al., 1995; Ali & Larimo, 2016; Khalid & Ali, 2017; Liu, Li et al., 
2017). These co-specialized investments create interdependence (Dyer, 1997) between partners, 
Kumar et al. (1995), therefore argued that symmetric interdependence is a product of both partners’ 
equal dependence on each other by investing jointly in a relationship. On the other hand, 
asymmetric dependence effect on coercive power of less dependent partners to exploit and creates 
potential for opportunism and conflict (Liu, Li et al., 2017; Shen et al., 2017; Kumar et al., 1995). 
Therefore, high level of symmetric dependence enhances the relational embeddedness between 
partners and discourages individual private goal seeking by binding and locking firms to a 
particular course of action (Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999).   
Interdependence influence firms in choice of most appropriate alternative strategy while dealing 
with conflicts. Because both partners bind themselves by contributing idiosyncratic specific assets 
(i.e., which serves as non-legal sanctions) (Wright & Lockett, 2003), opportunistic behaviors 
become less likely in conflict situations. Previous research on international marketing argued that 
balanced power, balanced ownership and balanced control will lead towards integration and 
coordination among partners (Le Nguyen et al., 2016: Lin & Wang, 2002). Similarly, 
interdependence produces a socially embedded and structurally harmonized template and serves 
as a mutual hostage that motivates relationship partners to make relationship work (Anderson & 
Weitz, 1992; Dyer, 1997; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999; Liu et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2009). 
Relationship partners willingly follow relational approaches in order to escalate individual and 
collective gains. In cases where relationship partners cannot reach to the conflict resolution either 
by problem solving or compromising approach, it is more likely for them to seek legal support. 
Previous literature on industrial marketing and management does not provide enough theoretical 
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explanation regarding the influence of interdependence in the choice of CRS. Therefore based on 
the above discussion, this study argues that interdependence is a source of commitment which may 
correlate positively with problem solving, compromising and legalistic strategy. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:  
H2. Interdependence between buyer and supplier is positively related to (a) problem solving, (b) 
compromising and (c) legalistic strategy.    
2.2.1 Relational governance mechanisms and CRS 
Relational governance mechanisms are defined as socially embedded organizational measures in 
economic activities that help in managing, monitoring, and organizing successful BSR 
(Granovetter, 2005; Heide & John, 1992; Liu et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Liu, Li et al., 2017). 
Social exchange theory suggests that relationship exchange should be rooted in strong relational 
ties between buyer and supplier to control operational hazards (Granovetter, 2005). Therefore, 
based on existing research, this study categorizes two relational governance mechanisms (i.e., trust 
and communication) underlying the impact of these relational ties between buyer and supplier that 
influence CRS. 
Trust as relational governance factor emphasizes cooperative environment (Liu et al., 2009) for 
developing and sustaining long-term relationship, and critically calculate the perceived risk (Lui 
& Ngo, 2004). Prior seminal research defined trust as non-contractual mechanism based on three 
elements; (1) confidence in one’s expectations about another’s behavior, (2) confidence in 
another’s goodwill, and (3) confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity (Dyer & 
Chu, 2011; Zaheer et al., 1998; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Williamson (1993a) distinguished between 
calculative, personal and institutional trust. Calculative trust includes “relational” frame of trust 
nurtured by mutual hostages whereas personal trust implicates in personal relationships and 
portrays as non-calculative. While institutional trust, refers to social and organizational 
embeddedness and appears also as being calculative. In this manner, Zaheer and Venkatraman 
(1995) argued that both the relational calculation and the “leap of faith” comprise trust in business 
relationships. Higher level of mutual trust exhibits more successful relationship exchange (Liu, Li 
et al., 2017) as negotiations can quickly and easily be successful because of relationship partners’ 
readiness (Zaheer et al., 1998; Mohr & Spekman, 1994). While lower level of mutual trust between 
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partners enhances the complexities, thereby resulting in inter-organizational conflicts (Dyer, 1997; 
Zaheer et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2010; Dyer & Chu, 2011). Furthermore, trusted partners spend less 
time in haggling over problems, adapting to unforeseen circumstances (Yang et al., 2017) and 
spending fewer resources in monitoring and predicting each other’s behavior (Dyer, 1997; Dyer 
& Chu, 2011). The more the relationship partners trust each other, the more a belief of benevolence 
and reliability among relational partners. Hence, in the absence of control structure, trust develops 
the expectations of partner’s action in cooperative manner in order to address hazards (Das & 
Teng, 1998).  
Trust is a source of managing greater stress or conflict, and displays greater adaptability in 
relationship exchange (Williamson, 1985). Building on conceptualization of trust, we suggest that 
existing trust between partners enhances firms’ confidence and behavior consistency (Yang et al., 
2017), thereby influencing in their choice of more collaborative strategies in a disagreement. 
Ndubisi (2011) suggests that trust is linked with integrating, accommodating and compromising 
style of conflict handling as it demonstrates the commitment between relationship partners and 
facilitates effective conflict resolution. Trust promotes problem solving approach between partners 
and encourages each other to express their feelings and opinions fully, learning about issues 
jointly, and openly sharing concerns and issues about their counterpart (Yang et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, compromised solutions are prevailed because it encourages trusting partners to 
maintain friendly environment, discover a fair and optimal solution (Yang et al., 2017), look for 
“middle-ground” and arrive at acceptable compromises in order to resolve conflicts (Ndubisi, 
2011). On the other hand, lack of trust is not only harmful for the firms but also reduces the 
relationship commitment and effectiveness of joint problem solving. Schurr and Ozanne (1985) 
found trust to be integral and central part to the process of attaining cooperative problem solving 
and productive dialogue. Further, when trust is present, relationship partners can openly discuss 
the issues because they are not afraid of vicious actions by each other (Morgan and hunt 1994).  
In contrast, trust and legalistic conflict resolution strategy should correlate inversely. More 
recently, Kozan et al. (2014) found that relationship partners behave cooperatively when high level 
trust is emplaced and avoid forceful strategy (i.e., legalistic strategy). Similarly, Le Nguyen et al. 
(2016) also found that high trust between partners drives them to avoid legalistic approach while 
dealing with conflict. Firms prefer not to seek lengthy and costly legal support but problem solving 
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or compromising approach if trust is emplaced. Therefore based on the above discussion and 
theoretical examination, this study argues that trust exhibits mutual commitment which may 
correlate positively with problem solving, compromising and negatively with legalistic strategy. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H3. Trust between buyer and supplier is positively related to (a) problem solving, (b) 
compromising and inversely related to (c) legalistic strategy.    
The other relational governance factor, communication, is considered as a useful tool in developing 
collaboration, integration and cooperation between relationship partners (Kim & Chai, 2017). It 
refers to the bilateral expectation of information exchange between relationship partners (Wang et 
al., 2016) and can be explained as, formal and informal sharing of meaningful and timely 
information between relationship parties (Anderson & Narus, 1990, p. 44). Mutually effective 
communication and timely information sharing function as useful safeguards to deter perceived 
risks, conflicts and uncertainty (Heide & John, 1992; Yen et al., 2011; Liu, Li et al., 2017) and 
foster partners’ confidence by aligning perceptions and expectations (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). 
Moreover, communication quality; suitable, truthful, beneficial and reliable communication, is a 
crucial source in joint planning and goal setting, thereby effectively influences the decision making 
process (Krishnan et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2017; Phan et al., 2005). Conversely, ineffective 
communication and asymmetric information sharing create misunderstanding and place the partner 
in jeopardy (Villena et al., 2011). It minimizes the likelihood of developing relationship quality 
and satisfaction (Hung & Lin, 2013), and maximizes the time and effort required to negotiate over 
conflicts (Liu, Luo et al., 2017). Hence, we conceptualize that communication strengthens the 
confidence of both parties in a relationship because both relationship partners are willing to share 
information frequently that enable them to handle conflicts effectively (Das & Teng, 1998; Kim 
& Chai, 2017).  
Communication promotes mutual understandings between partners and drives firms towards 
collaborative conflict resolution and effective interaction (Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2010; Sinickas, 
2001; Das & Teng, 1998). Information sharing and joint decision making in effective 
communication process facilitate an integrative behavior characterized by intentions to safeguard 
the interest of both partners in order to attain “win-win” goals (Putnam, 1990; Koza & Dant, 2007). 
Further, it signals trust and commitment between partners thus enhances the collaboration, and 
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facilitates joint problem solving approach. Phen et al. (2005) argued that managers need to evaluate 
conflicts from both (i.e., relationship partners) perspectives and openly express their views across. 
On the other hand, bilateral communication and information sharing should inversely correlate to 
compromising strategy. Because the nature of compromising strategy refers to accommodate both 
relationship partners on “middle-ground”, it may not require considerable information sharing and 
open communication between relationship parties (Lin & Wang, 2002). Song et al. (2006) argued 
that compromising is a midrange strategy which is often related to quick decisions and 
unwillingness to explore best available alternatives. Therefore, it is less likely that the level of 
communication and information exchange is higher in a compromising approach. Similarly, 
communication should also inversely correlate to legalistic conflict resolution strategy. Firms 
prefer not to seek lengthy and expensive legal process if relationship partners openly and timely 
share significant information. In such conflict situations, problem solving approach becomes 
central where both relationship parties are more interested in sharing critical information and 
bilateral communication in order to end the deadlock. Therefore, problem solving approach 
remains as an important conflict resolution technique influenced by effective communication. 
Thus, based on the above discussion and theoretical examination, this study argues that bilateral 
and open communication exhibits mutual confidence of relationship partners which leads towards 
more problem solving approach rather compromising or legalistic strategy. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H4. Communication between buyer and supplier is positively related to (a) problem solving and 
inversely related to (b) compromising and (c) legalistic strategy.    
2.3 CRS and buyer-supplier relationship performance  
CRS are the significant approaches effecting performance outcomes. Several researchers (e.g., Le 
Nguyen et al., 2016; Lin & Germain, 1998; Mohr & Spekman, 1994) have highlighted the 
importance of CRS and their impact on relationship performance. Mohr and Spekman (1994) argue 
that the way in which relationship partners resolve conflict can have productive or destructive 
implications for relationship outcome. Firms are more interested to involve in cooperative 
strategies such as problem solving and compromising in order to implicate productively. These 
integrative efforts are applied to seek synergy and collaboration between partners, concern both 
parties’ interests and feelings in a relationship, satisfy their needs and positively effect on 
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relationship performance (Le Nguyen et al., 2015; Lu, 2006; Monczka et al., 1999; Koza & Dant, 
2007). Joint problem solving and compromising techniques enable partners to adopt constructive 
approaches in a “deadlock” situation and foster a “win-win” solution. Further, both partners quite 
often adopt a “give-and-take” attitude to achieve compromise in order to resolve conflict. These 
efforts of balancing the needs and concerns of both parties positively nurture the relationship 
performance (Lin & Germain, 1998).          
On the other hand, legalistic conflict resolution strategy is more assertive and indicative in nature 
than other collaborative strategies of problem solving and compromising. Legalistic approach may 
not only increase the likelihood of future conflicts, but it can also hurt the partner’s feelings and 
create frustration and rigidity between them. Similarly, Le Nguyen et al. (2015) and Lin and 
Germain (1998) found negative impact of legalistic conflict resolution strategy on performance 
and satisfaction explaining that it can minimize the likelihood of eliminating the causes of conflicts 
and may drive towards relationship destruction. Moreover, Pfeffer (1994) argued that legalistic 
conflict resolution approach aggravate problems between relationship partners. Therefore, legal 
approaches may decrease the partners’ motivation of contribution and involvement in the 
relationship (Le Nguyen et al., 2015). Based on the above theoretical examination and discussion, 
this study argues that problem solving and compromising strategies of conflict resolution should 
have a positive impact and legalistic strategy on contrary, negative impact on buyer-supplier 
performance outcomes. Thus the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H5. (a) Problem solving and (b) compromising positively relate to buyer-supplier relationship 
performance, while (c) legalistic strategy negatively associates with buyer-supplier relationship 
performance. 
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
Fig. 1 Research model 
3. Research method 
3.1 Data collection and research design 
This study consists of Finnish SMEs involved in BSR operating with key suppliers from a variety 
of countries in Asia and Europe, as well as the USA. A sample of 892 potential SMEs was 
generated from a database operated by the Collector Finland (i.e., a financial service provider, 
offering cost-effective and innovative solutions to private and corporate customers in Nordic 
countries), which includes basic information about Nordic buyer-supplier relationships. The 
sample indicates that 170 SMEs had suppliers in three regions (Europe: 143; USA: 17; Asia: 10), 
with an average size of 24 employees/SME and an average turnover of €38m/SME. The SMEs in 
the data set were operating in several dispersed classified industries, with 66.47% belonging to 
manufacturing and 33.53% belonging to the services industry. However, an attempt to identify 
transactional and relational governance mechanisms relating to the CRS and BSR performance 
was ineffective from database. Therefore, to attain the requisite level of details on these BSR 
management issues, it was decided to collect primary data from key executives from Finnish 
SMEs. The potential respondents’ names and emails were identified from this database and most 
of them were CEOs, CFOs and board directors. Pre-testing was carried out among research group 
members in order to find out whether the respondents of the questionnaire would understand the 
questions as presented. The wording and sequence of some questions were modified based on the 
feedback. 
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The questionnaire was designed and developed in accordance with the suggestions by Collis and 
Hussey (2009). Prior research suggests that, compared to mail-based surveys, a web survey enables 
access to an enormous number of dispersed respondents in an easier, faster and cheaper way, as 
well as exhibits the data in numerical form in real time (Dillman et al., 2009). Therefore, in spring 
2015, a web-based questionnaire was administered and sent to 892 firms. A follow up email was 
sent to non-respondents three weeks later. In total, 170 responses were received, yielding a 
response rate of 19.06% (170 of 892). Despite this response rate, an independent sample t-test was 
performed to assess whether, and to what extent, our survey was subject to non-response bias, and 
to check the difference between early respondents (N = 85) and late respondents (N = 85), as 
suggested by several authors (e.g., Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Werner, Praxedes & Hyun-Gyu, 
2007; Silva, Bradley & Sousa, 2012). No significant differences were found between early and 
late respondents in terms of a firm’s size (p = 0.510) and the length of the buyer-supplier 
relationship (p = 0.319). Thus, non-response bias was not a problem for this study. Further, prior 
methodological literature, as well as many empirical studies (e.g., Ali & Larimo, 2016; Aulakh et 
al., 1996; Sarkar et al., 2001), has taken the stance that late respondents are also representative of 
non-respondents.  
A likelihood of common method variance exists in the research when all the constructs are 
measured using the same survey (Najafi-Tavani et al., 2015). Therefore, an ex-ante and ex-post 
steps were taken to limit and evaluate the common method bias, as suggested by Chang et al. 
(2010). Two further approaches were followed in ex-ante phase. First, respondents were assured 
of anonymity and privacy of the study. Second, a logical relationship between the constructs was 
kept unapparent by using the order of questions in the instrument, as questions related to conflict 
resolution strategy and relationship performance were asked in different sections. Harman’s one-
factor test was conducted as an ex-post approach in order to measure the extent to which data were 
negatively influenced by common method bias. In result of non-rotated factor solution in 
exploratory factor analysis, no single or general factor was apparent explaining most of the 
variability in the data, with major factor accounting for 26.88% of total variance. Thus, common 
method variance was not a problem in the analysis of the study.    
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3.2 Measures 
This study employs reflective measurement models and the items used to operationalize each 
construct were developed on a 7-point Likert scale based on the existing literature. All the 
constructs demonstrated satisfactory reliability and validity with their Cronbach’s Alpha (CA), 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite Reliability (CR) values as well as item 
loadings in Table 1. Relationship performance was operationalized using four items (composite 
reliability 0.93) obtained from prior empirical research (Kumar et al., 1992; Artz, 1999). These 
measures included the firm’s performance outcome such as satisfaction, success, relationship 
expectations, and achieving the set objectives. The three CRS (e.g., problem solving, 
compromising, and legalistic) were operationalized from Lin and Germain’s (1998) study. The 
respondents were asked the extent to which a relationship partner resorts to specific actions in 
resolving conflicts. Trust was measured by adapting seven items (composite reliability 0.93) from 
Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) research. Communication was operationalized adapting four items 
(composite reliability 0.95) drawing from Heide and John (1992) and Young-Ybarra and 
Wiersema (1999). Contract completeness was measured using six items (composite reliability 
0.95), based on Luo (2002, 2009).   
We followed the method used in recent studies (e.g., Ali & Larimo, 2016; Khalid & Ali, 2017) in 
order to measure the level of interdependence. It characterizes the extent to which both buyer and 
supplier are interdependent and have invested idiosyncratic specific assets in the relationship 
ranged from “1 = very low to 7 = very high”. Interdependence was divided into buyer dependence 
and supplier dependence in order to measure the construct. Buyer dependence comprises of two 
statements: a) how large is the firm’s investment in the relationship and b) what is the degree to 
which the firm’s investment is ‘sunk’ in the relationship (e.g. Zeng, 1998; Reuer & Arino, 2002; 
Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999). In order to determine the dependence of buyer firm, these two 
statements were collapsed into one. Similarly, respondents were also asked to specify the size of 
supplier’s investments and the difficulty level of supplier’s investment redeployment in order to 
calculate supplier dependence. To determine the level of interdependence between buyer and 
supplier, a calculation was made by taking the absolute difference between both partner’s 
dependence. In this instance, a zero specified a perfectly symmetric dependence of both parties. 
To exemplify, buyer and supplier’s interdependence can be determined in the following ways. In 
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order to determine buyer’s dependence, it is supposed that: 1) the size of the investment in the 
relationship is represented by 4 out of 7, while 2) the difficulty level in redeploying the resources 
outside the relationship is 5 out of 7. In this case, buyer’s dependence is: 4*5 = 20. Similarly if the 
calculation of supplier’s dependence is also 20, the difference between these values is: 20 – 20 = 
0, representing a symmetric dependence between buyer and supplier because of their idiosyncratic 
investments in the relationship. These calculations helped us to determine the level of symmetrical 
interdependence between buyer and supplier in order to analyze the data.   
Three additional variables of less interest were included to control the dependent variables. These 
include, age of the firm, relationship length (Liu et al., 2009) and size of the buyer firm (Zhou & 
Xu, 2012) as control variables because of their potential effect on dependent variables. Age of the 
firm was measured as the number of years in operation and size of the firm as number of 
employees. Finally relationship length refers to the time period of the exchange relationship 
between buyer and supplier.  
Table 1 Constructs, item loadings, Cronbach's alpha (CA), AVE and composite reliability values (CR) 
Constructs and items Loadings Item source(s)
Relationship performance (AVE: 0.77; CA: 0.90; CR: 0.93)  Artz (1999) and Kumar et al. (1992)
The performance of this relationship has? (very difficult 1-7 very easy):  
…been very satisfactory 0.82 
…been very successful 0.89 
…fully met our expectations 0.89 
…achieved the set objectives Ϭ͘ϴϵ 
Conflict resolution strategies   Lin and Germain (1998)
When there are disagreements/conflicts between buyer and supplier regarding operations and/or 
strategic decisions, your actions are? (never used 1-7 always used): 
 
…use spirit of mutual consensus to fully satisfy both own and supplier’s concern (i.e. problem solving) 1 
…use “give and take” to achieve compromise (i.e. compromising)    1 
…use legal provisions in the contract to obtain compliance (i.e. legalistic)  1 
Trust (AVE: 0.93; CA: 0.81; CR 0.93)  Morgan and Hunt (1994) 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements (strongly disagree 1-7 strongly 
agree):
 
Our key supplier firm:   
…cannot be trusted at times (R) 0.94 
…is perfectly honest and truthful 0.93 
…can be trusted completely 0.96 
…can be counted on to do what is right 0.89 
…is always faithful 0.93 
…is someone I have great confidence in 0.92 
…has high integrity 0.91 
Communication (AVE: 0.83; CA: 0.93; CR 0.95)  Heide and John (1992) and Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 
(1999) 
Regarding communication between you and your key supplier, please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements (strongly disagree 1-7 strongly agree): 
 
…we always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party 0.88 
…it is expected that any information, which might help the other party, will be provided to them 0.92 
…it is expected that proprietary information will be shared if it can help the other party 0.90 
…exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally, not only 
according to a pre-specified agreement 
0.93 
Contract completeness (AVE: 0.77; CA: 0.93; CR 0.95)  Luo (2002) and Luo (2009)
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To what extent are the following arrangements with your key supplier firm formalized in the written 
contract (not at all 1-7 entirely)? 
 
…how to operate and manage the relationship 0.88 
…how to cooperate, coordinate, and resolve conflicts between your firm and key supplier 0.92 
…how to terminate the relationship 0.86 
…how to handle the unanticipated contingencies during relationship formation and operation 0.88 
…cost and quality of resources invested in relationship 0.87 
…how to secure invested resources from exploitation 0.87 
Symmetric dependence  Zeng (1998), Reuer and Arino (2002) and Young-Ybarra and 
Wiersema (1999)
Items measuring the dependence of buyer firm (very low 1-7 very high):  
…our investment in the relationship is  
…if this relationship was to dissolve, our non-recoverable investments would be  
Items measuring the dependence of key supplier firm (very low 1-7 very high):  
…supplier firm’s investment in the relationship is  
…if this relationship was to dissolve, the key supplier firm’s non-recoverable investments would be  
Symmetric dependence:  
Level of symmetric dependence between buyer and key supplier (i.e., difference between dependence 
of buyer and supplier firm) [0 = 7, 1-8 = 6, 9-16 = 5, 17-24 = 4, 25-32 = 3, 33-40 = 2, 41-48 = 1] 
1 
3.3 Measure validation 
To analyze our model, we employed partial least squares (PLS) variance-based structural equation 
modelling (SEM) by using SmartPLS 2.0 software (Chin, 1998; Ringle, Wende & Will, 2005) for 
the following reason. First, we adopted variance based PLS-SEM approach because it enables the 
estimation of a series of relationships, in which one dependent variable turns into the explanatory 
variable in subsequent relationships. Second, this method is appropriate when it tests an 
explorative model (i.e. transactional and relational governance mechanisms influence CRS, and 
CRS explain relationship performance). Third, PLS-SEM modelling is not only considered as the 
most suitable approach when dealing with a small sample size but it also allows researchers to 
evaluate both formative and reflective measurement models simultaneously as well as hierarchical 
models (Becker et al., 2012; Hair et al., 2012a). Thus, it exhibits higher statistical power than 
covariance-based SEM when used on complex models with limited sample size (Hair et al., 2012a; 
Hair et al., 2012b; Chin, 1998). This is particularly applicable to this study, as the final sample size 
was 170 buyer-supplier relationships. Furthermore, multivariate normal data is not required in 
PLS-SEM modeling (Chin, 1998). Therefore, growing number of recent industrial marketing and 
management studies employed PLS-SEM because of its dynamic attributes (e.g., Kohtamäki et al., 
2012; Khalid & Ali, 2017; Zaefarian et al., 2017; Najafi-Tavani et al., 2015; Mitrega et al., 2017). 
Although PLS estimates both measurement and structural model concurrently, this study followed 
the techniques offered by Hulland (1999) and Hair et al. (2014) in order to estimate PLS models. 
In two steps, we analyzed and interpreted the estimated model: first, the estimation and reliability 
of measurement model, and second, the testing of structural model. We also validated 
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measurement model by evaluating the individual item reliabilities: convergent and discriminant 
validity (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2012b). The loaded indicators were above the benchmark criteria 
of 0.7 (Gotz et al., 2010) on their particular latent variables showing a high degree of internal 
consistency. Composite reliability scores were also calculated in order to assess construct 
reliability. As reported in Table 1, composite reliability for all constructs is above than the 
benchmark criteria of 0.6 (Gotz et al., 2010) therefore, indicated that construct reliability is 
statically significant. Further, the average variance extracted (AVE) with a greater value than the 
threshold of 0.5 is considered for all the latent variables in order to evaluate the convergent validity 
of the reflective block of the model (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gotz et al., 2010), demonstrating 
satisfactorily valid. The AVE also helps in evaluating discriminant validity if the square roots of 
AVEs of constructs are higher than the correlations between the latent variables (Chin, 1998; 
Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gotz et al., 2010). Therefore, all the latent constructs were found to be 
satisfactorily sound and discriminant validity is assured. We also assessed the level of multi-
collinearity between the constructs and variance inflation factor (VIF) was found well below 5 (the 
highest VIF values is 1.75), thus indicating no significant multi-collinearity (Hair et al., 2012a, 
2012b). Additionally, we computed a confirmatory factor analysis, and the results specify a good 
PRGHOILWȤ 489.91, d.f. = 282, RMSEA = 0.066, GFI = 0.83, CFI = 0.947, NFI = 0.885, IFI = 
0.948). Hence, we safely conclude that all the constructs and items were found to be satisfactorily 
sound, assuring discriminant validity and reliability. 
Table 2 Inter-construct correlations, AVE and square roots of AVE along the diagonal 
4. Analysis and results 
4.1 Structural estimates 
Constructs AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Contract completeness 0.77 0.88           
2. Interdependence 1 0.04 1          
3. Trust 0.93 0.12 0.02 0.96         
4. Communication 0.83 0.20 0.04 0.47 0.91        
5. Problem solving 1 0.32 0.14 0.25 0.20 1       
6. Compromising 1 -0.16 0.22 0.23 -0.15 0.13 1      
7. Legalistic 1 0.42 -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.21 0.36 1     
8. Relationship performance 0.77 0.14 -0.06 0.37 0.51 0.23 0.19 -0.14 0.88    
9. No. of employees 1 0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.06 0.20 0.11 -0.05 1   
10. Age of the relationship 1 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.28 1  
11. Age of buyer firm 1 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.04 -0.00 0.08 0.05 0.32 0.52 1 
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We employed PLS-analysis (a path weighting technique with a maximum of 300 iterations) in 
order to test our direct effect and interaction effect hypotheses, and a bootstrapping method of 
sampling was utilized to generate t-values (Hair et al., 2012a; Chin, 1998). The significance levels, 
path coefficients (i.e., standardized ȕ), and R2 (i.e., the coefficient of determination) of dependent 
variables show the main effects of structural model. The nomological validity of our model was 
evaluated by examining the explained variance R2 for each dependent construct in our framework 
(Sarstedt et al., 2014). The R2 for problem solving, compromising and legalistic strategies are 0.42, 
0.39, and 0.28 respectively. It demonstrates that context variables explain 42% of the variance in 
problem solving, 39% in compromising and 28% in legalistic strategies. Similarly, the R2 for 
relationship performance is 0.36, explaining 36% of the variance in the dependent variable of 
relationship performance. Table 3 presents the partial least square (PLS) results of structural model 
with CRS and relationship performance as dependent variables.  
Table 3 PLS path analysis results (standardized beta coefficients and t-values) 
Constructs Problem solving Compromising Legalistic Relationship performance 
   
Contract completeness 0.29 (3.28)*** 
 
-0.15 (1.82)**  0.44 (6.50)*** 
 
 
Interdependence 
 
0.13 (1.75)**  0.19 (2.20)*** -0.07 (0.86)  
Communication 0.18 (1.93)** -0.12 (1.70)** 
 
-0.08 (0.88)  
Trust 0.22 (2.40)***  0.19 (2.10)** 
 
-0.12 (1.74)**  
Problem solving 
 
    0.21(2.25)*** 
Compromising 
 
    0.17(1.84)** 
Legalistic 
 
   -0.13 (1.69)** 
Control variables 
 
    
No. of employees     -0.02 (0.28) 
Age of relationship     0.02 (0.19) 
Age of buyer firm     0.03 (0.36) 
 
R2 0.42 0.39 0.28 0.36 
*** 333  
The results indicate that contract completeness is positively related to problem solving (ȕ = 0.29, 
p  0.001) and legalistic strategy (ȕ = 0.44, p  0.001), and inversely related to compromising (ȕ = 
-0.15, p  0.01). These results completely support H1. Further, interdependence exerts a significant 
positive effect on problem solving (ȕ = 0.13, p  0.01) and compromising strategy (ȕ = 0.19, p  
0.001), but negatively related legalistic strategy. These results partially support H2 (H2a and H2b 
= supported, H2c = not supported). The results for H3a (ȕ = 0.22, p  0.001), H3b (ȕ = 0.19, p  
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0.01) and H3c (ȕ = -0.12, p  0.01) supported the notion that trust between buyer and supplier has 
a positive effect on problem solving and compromising conflict resolution strategy and a negative 
effect on legalistic strategy. Moreover, the results of H4 show a significant positive relationship 
between communication and problem solving strategy (ȕ = 0.18, p  0.01) and a negative 
significant relationship between communication and compromising strategy (ȕ = -0.12, p  0.01) 
supporting H4a and H4b. However, the predicted inverse relationship between communication and 
legalistic strategy was found non-significant, partially supporting H4. Table 2 also presents the 
results for the impact of CRS on buyer-supplier relationship performance. It indicates the 
significant positive relationship between problem solving (ȕ = 0.21, p  0.001), compromising (ȕ 
= 0.17, p  0.01) strategies and relationship performance and significant negative relationship 
between legalistic strategy (ȕ = -0.13, p  0.01) and relationship performance. These results thus 
support H5a, H5b and H5c. Table 4 summarizes proposed hypotheses and results.      
Table 4 Summary of hypotheses and results. 
Hypotheses Description Results 
H1 Contract completeness between buyer and supplier is positively 
related to (a) problem solving and (b) legalistic strategy, and inversely 
related to (c) compromising strategy 
 
Supported 
H2 Interdependence between buyer and supplier is positively related to 
(a) problem solving, (b) compromising and (c) legalistic strategy 
Partially supported (except the 
relationship between Interdependence 
and legalistic strategy, all else 
supported) 
 
H3 Trust between buyer and supplier is positively related to (a) problem 
solving, (b) compromising and inversely related to (c) legalistic 
strategy 
 
Supported 
H4 Communication between buyer and supplier is positively related to 
(a) problem solving and inversely related to (b) compromising and (c) 
legalistic strategy 
 
Partially supported (except the 
relationship between communication and 
legalistic strategy, all else supported) 
H5 (a) Problem solving and (b) compromising positively relate to buyer-
supplier relationship performance, while (c) legalistic strategy 
negatively associates with buyer-supplier relationship performance 
Supported 
 
5. Discussion and implications 
5.1 Results summary  
We developed and empirically tested a combined model of transactional (i.e., contract 
completeness and interdependence) and relational (i.e., trust and communication) governance 
mechanisms which influence in choice of the most appropriate CRS and their impact on 
relationship performance. Based on the analysis of 170 buyer-supplier relationships of Finnish 
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SMEs, this study demonstrates several interesting findings. Firstly, as hypothesized relationship 
governance mechanisms are found keystone components supporting firms in selecting the most 
suitable of CRS that determine relationship performance. Secondly, results indicate that problem 
solving strategy is the most crucial conflict resolution approach firms always prefer to use in a 
conflict situation. Legalistic strategy can be the least resort (i.e., when relationship partners cannot 
mutually come out of a deadlock situation), and preferable in case of specified contract terms 
violation. The use of compromising strategy is influenced by interdependence and trust between 
relationship partners which demonstrates that the interdependency between firms drive them to 
compromise in order to resolve the conflicts. Similarly, when trust is emplaced, relationship 
partners may compromise in order to continue longer term relationship. Thirdly, CRS influence 
relationship performance. Problem solving and compromising are the most significant CRS that 
enhance relationship performance, whereas legalistic strategy can hurt the partner’s feelings and 
diminish relationship performance.       
5.2 Theoretical implications       
This study contributes to purchasing and supply management literature and provides new insights 
in different ways. Because current literature does not provide enough explanation on the influence 
of governance mechanisms on buyer-supplier’s choices of CRS, this study extends the earlier 
conceptualization and empirically investigates the influence of governance mechanisms in the 
choice of CRS. This is accomplished by developing and empirically testing a combined model of 
transactional and relational governance mechanisms. In addition, this study highlights the most 
preferable CRS in order to resolve buyer-supplier disagreements. Furthermore, by testing the 
impact of CRS on relationship performance, this study advances the research and provides 
empirical identification of most relevant strategies that can suppress or bolster relationship 
performance.            
Concerning the first context variable, the findings affirmed and add to the TCE reasoning by 
empirical demonstration, that contract completeness including term specificity and contingency 
adaptability encourage relationship partners to describe and coordinate a mutual agreement which 
facilitates more cooperative and integrative problem solving approach in conflict situation in order 
to satisfy their needs (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). Therefore, contract completeness stimulates 
a problem solving approach in order to resolve conflicts. Further, the positive relationship between 
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contract completeness and legalistic strategy demonstrates that if problem solving approach 
becomes ineffective, the presence of explicit safeguard clauses of a complete contract encourages 
relationship partners to legally sanction their counterpart in case of specified contract terms 
violation (Cannon et al., 2000; Lusch & Brown, 1996). Compromising as a conflict resolution 
strategy becomes less prevalent in this situation as relationship partners have the possibility to 
follow contractual obligations. Moreover, this study reveals that interdependence between 
relationship partners significantly influence their choices of CRS. The use of problem solving and 
compromising approach influenced by interdependence between relationship partners 
demonstrates that due to the level of investments contributed in a relationship, it is very difficult 
for relationship partners to redeploy these investments, therefore prevent partners’ opportunistic 
behavior when conflict arises (Dyer, 1997; Wright & Lockett, 2003) and facilitate integration and 
coordination (Le Nguyen et al., 2016; Lin & Wang, 2002). These findings also complement the 
theoretical notion that interdependence produces a socially embedded template where relationship 
partners willingly follow relational norms (Luo et al., 2009) and induce problem solving and 
compromising approach. As predicted, our study found no significant negative relationship 
between interdependence and legalistic strategy. A potential explanation for this can be the fact 
that equal relationship-specific investment bounds both partners with a huge redeployment cost, 
thereby squeezing the possibilities to seek more expensive and lengthy legal support.  
Among the relational governance mechanisms, the findings also confirm some major reasoning in 
the literature and demonstrate the influence of trust and communication in selecting CRS. Social 
exchange theory suggests that relationship exchange should be rooted in strong relational ties 
between buyer and supplier to control operational conflicts. Based on the findings, this study 
implies that trust is an important governance mechanism which influences firms significantly in 
choice of most appropriate CRS in a disagreement situation (Han & Harms, 2010) using more 
integrative and cooperative approach; problem solving and compromising. Similarly, relationship 
partner feel comfortable in openly discussing their problems, expressing their opinions, learning 
about issues jointly, and sharing concerns that facilitate a problem solving attitude (Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994). The significant positive relationship between trust and compromising strategy 
demonstrates that relationship partners are encouraged to find out fair and agreeable solutions, 
look for “middle-ground” to compromise in resolving conflicts. These findings are congruent with 
prior research (Dyer, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2010; Ndubisi, 2011) which suggests 
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that mutual trust determines an effective conflict handling environment by inducing problem 
solving and compromising approach when conflict arises. Further as proposed, this study finds a 
negative significant relationship between trust and legalistic strategy. This notion is in line with 
findings of recent empirical studies (e.g.,  Kozan et al., 2014; Le Nguyen et al., 2016) suggesting 
that relationship partners behave cooperatively and avoid using legalistic approach when there is 
high level of trust emplaced.       
Moreover, effective and open communication between relationship partners is found a significant 
relational governance factor in choice of conflict resolution strategy. The positive significant 
relationship between communication and problem solving demonstrates that effective 
communication is a crucial strategic cooperative relational instrument which drives firms towards 
interaction and knowledge sharing, facilitating a collaborative and integrative conflict resolution, 
consistent with Koza and Dant (2007) and Sinickas (2001). Open communication signals trust and 
commitment between partners thus enhances the collaboration and sense of sharing relevant 
information in order to resolve a conflict. Further a negative significant relationship between 
communication and compromising strategy affirms the proposed hypothesis and demonstrates that 
when firms have to compromise to resolve a conflict, it may not require considerable information 
sharing and open communication because quick decisions are required and relationship partners 
may not eager to explore best available alternatives. These findings are consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Ling & Wang, 2002; Song et al., 2006). 
In the relationship between CRS and BSR performance, this study demonstrates that problem 
solving and compromising strategies positively relate to relationship performance. The problem 
solving approach to resolving conflicts posits to be a significant mechanism in fostering 
relationship performance, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Lin and Germain, 1998; Le 
Nguyen et al., 2015; Mohr & Spekman, 1994). This means that firms are more interested to involve 
in cooperative strategies such as problem solving and compromising enabling relationship partners 
to mutually adopt particular constructive approaches for a “deadlock” and foster a “win-win” 
solution. These integrative efforts facilitate cooperative behavior, concern both parties’ interests 
and feelings and satisfy their needs prevailing positive impact on relationship performance (Le 
Nguyen et al., 2015). The findings also demonstrate a significant negative relationship (as 
hypothesized) between legalistic strategy and relationship performance. This notion posits that 
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legalistic approach may not only aggravate future problems but also decrease the firms’ motivation 
of contribution and involvement in the relationship, consistent with the findings of previous studies 
(e.g., Le Nguyen et al., 2015; Lin & Germain, 1998; Lu, 2006).  
5.3 Managerial Implications  
This study has several vital implications for managers dealing with conflicts in business 
relationships. A multidimensional framework of this study (specifying a linkage between 
governance mechanisms, CRS approaches and relationship performance) not only provides an 
understanding for the relationship managers in their choices of most suitable CRS but also predicts 
their partner’s choices when conflict arise. Awareness of possible actions and behaviors of partners 
thus prevails in the relationship in case of conflict, and help them in resolution effectively. Most 
importantly, the results suggest that problem solving approach of conflict resolution is positively 
influenced by all governance mechanisms. Mangers should thus understand that cooperative and 
integrative problem solving approach is the most crucial conflict resolution strategy which 
facilitates open discussion and mutual agreement in order to get a “win-win” solution for both 
parties. Further, managers should ensure a trustworthy relationship, which provides both partners 
with a certain level of confidence to compromise on a “middle-ground” in order to continue long-
term relationship. Similarly, interdependency between firms drives firms to compromise because 
of relationship-specific investments which enhances relationship performance. Unlike problem 
solving and compromising strategy, legalistic strategy can be the least resort for managers in cases 
when partners cannot mutually come out of a deadlock situation. Because it is a lengthy and 
expensive approach and can hurt partner’s feeling, managers should ensure that conflicts are 
resolved through alternative approaches in order to assure relationship performance.       
5.4 Limitations and further research  
This study has some limitations that need to be addressed in further research. Firstly, drawing from 
the theories of TCE and SET, this study only investigates four governance mechanisms to derive 
the impact on CRS. Further studies may incorporate some other governance mechanisms with their 
mediating effects, such as opportunism, relational norms, uncertainty, reputations of buyers and 
suppliers etc. Noteworthy results can be found by employing interaction impact (complementary 
or substitutive) of these mechanisms influencing the choice of CRS and their impact on 
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relationship performance. Secondly, this study consists of only Finnish SMEs relationships 
operating with key suppliers in Europe, Asia and the USA. Future efforts may extend the existing 
Nordic SMEs sample in order to generalize the findings for the whole Nordic region. Thirdly, 
because this study represents a cross-sectional approach where only the buyer’s perspective was 
probed, it would be interesting to know how suppliers, either within a longitudinal setting or from 
a case study dyadic perspective, perceive the impact of governance mechanisms on CRS and 
relationship performance. Fourthly, this study is limited to a single key informant. Future studies 
can obtain data from numerous but different respondents for the purpose of assessing the 
independent and dependent constructs in order to reduce common method bias. Besides, in this 
study, types of conflicts (e.g., constructive and destructive conflicts) are not specified. Therefore, 
future research can include this notion and examine whether choice of CRS depends on conflict 
types. Finally, we recommend future research in order to take some additional issues into account. 
We encourage investigating the direct and indirect impact of governance mechanisms on 
transaction cost and opportunism through CRS. Caniëls and Gelderman (2007) argued that a 
general consensus regarding the optimal operationalization of interdependence lacks in the 
literature and resulted in contradictory findings (Kumar et al., 1995). Therefore, we also encourage 
researchers to advance more refined measures of symmetric dependence by encompassing various 
aspects of dependence. Symmetric dependence may be more than the issue of symmetry and 
include the level of mutual dependence (i.e., high and low mutual dependence) because of the 
firms highly different in size (Ali & Larimo, 2016).  
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